Something is stirring within the Hamas body politic, a moderating trend that, if nourished and
engaged, could transform Palestinian politics and the Arab-Israeli peace process. There are
unmistakable signs that the religiously based radical movement has subtly changed its
uncompromising posture on Israel. Although low-key and restrained, those shifts indicate that
the movement is searching for a formula that addresses the concerns of Western powers yet
avoids alienating its social base.
Far from impulsive and unexpected, Hamas's shift reflects a gradual evolution occurring over
the past five years. The big strategic turn occurred in 2005, when Hamas decided to
participate in the January 2006 legislative elections and thus tacitly accepted the governing
rules of the Palestinian Authority (PA), one of which includes recognition of Israel. Ever since,
top Hamas leaders have repeatedly declared they will accept a resolution of the conflict along
the 1967 borders. The Damascus-based Khaled Meshal, head of Hamas's political bureau
and considered a hardliner, acknowledged as much in 2008. "We are realists," he said, who
recognize that there is "an entity called Israel." Pressed by an Australian journalist on policy
changes Hamas might make, Meshal asserted that the organization has shifted on several
key points: "Hamas has already changed--we accepted the national accords for a Palestinian
state based on the 1967 borders, and we took part in the 2006 Palestinian elections."
Another senior Hamas leader, Ghazi Hamad, was more specific than Meshal, telling
journalists in January 2009 that Hamas would be satisfied with ending Israeli control over the
Palestinian areas occupied in the 1967 war--the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem. In
other words, Hamas would not hold out for liberation of the land that currently includes Israel.
Previously Hamas moderates had called at times for a tahdia (a minor truce, or "calm") or
hudna (a longer-term truce, lasting as long as fifty years), which implies some measure of
recognition, if only tacit. The moderates justified their policy shift by using Islamic terms (in
Islamic history hudnas sometimes develop into permanent truces). Now leaders appear to be
going further; they have made a concerted effort to re-educate the rank and file about the
necessity of living side by side with their Jewish neighbors, and in so doing mentally prepare
them for a permanent settlement. In Gaza's mosques pro-Hamas clerics have begun to cite
the example of the famed twelfth-century Muslim military commander and statesman
Saladin, who after liberating Jerusalem from the Crusaders allowed them to retain a coastal
state in the Levant. The point is that if Saladin could tolerate the warring, bloodthirsty
Crusaders, then today's Palestinians should be willing to live peacefully with a Jewish state in
their midst.
The Saladin story is important because it provides Hamas with religious legitimacy and allows
it to justify the change of direction to followers. Hamas's raison d'être rests on religious
legitimation; its leaders understand that they neglect this at their peril. Western leaders and
students of international politics should acknowledge that Hamas can no more abandon its
commitment to Islamism than the United States can abandon its commitment to liberal
democracy. That does not mean Hamas is incapable of change or compromise but simply
that its political identity is strongly constituted by its religious legitimation.
It should be emphasized as well that Hamas is not monolithic on the issue of peace. There
are multiple, clashing viewpoints and constituencies within the movement. Over the years I
have interviewed more than a dozen leaders inside and outside the occupied territories.
Although on the whole Hamas's public rhetoric calls for the liberation of all of historic
Palestine, not only the territories occupied in 1967, a healthy debate has grown both within
and without.
Several factors have played a role in the transformation. They include the burden of
governing a war-torn Gaza and the devastation from Israel's 2008-09 attack, which has
caused incalculable human suffering and increasing public dissatisfaction in Gaza with
Hamas rule.
Before the 2006 parliamentary elections, Hamas was known for its suicide bombers, not its
bureaucrats, even though between 2002 and 2006 the organization moved from rejectionism
toward participation in a political framework that is a direct product of the Oslo peace process
of the 1990s. After the elections, the shift continued. "It is much more difficult to run a
government than to oppose and resist Israeli occupation," a senior Hamas leader told me
while on official business in Egypt in 2007. "If we do not provide the goods to our people,
they'll disown us." Hamas is not just a political party. It's a social movement, and as such it
has a long record of concern about and close attention to public opinion. Given the gravity of
deteriorating conditions in Gaza and Hamas's weak performance during last year's fighting, it
should be no surprise that the organization has undergone a period of fairly intense soul-
searching and reassessment of strategic options.
Ironically, despite the West's refusal to regard the Hamas government as legitimate and
despite the continuing brutal siege of Gaza, demands for democratic governance within Gaza
are driving change. Yet Hamas leaders are fully aware of the danger of alienating more-
hardline factions if they show weakness or water down their position and move toward de
facto recognition of Israel without getting something substantive in return. Hamas's strategic
predicament lies in striking a balance between, on the one hand, a new moderating and
maturing sensibility and, on the other, insistence on the right and imperative of armed
resistance. This difficult balance often explains the tensions and contradictions in Hamas's
public and private pronouncements.
What is striking about Hamas's shift toward the peace process is that it has come at a time of
critical challenges from Al Qaeda-like jihadist groups; a low-intensity civil war with rival Fatah,
the ruling party of the PA; and a deteriorating humanitarian situation in Gaza.
Last summer a militant group called Jund Ansar Allah, or the Warriors of God, one of a
handful of Al Qaeda-inspired factions, declared the establishment of an Islamic emirate in
Gaza--a flagrant rejection of Hamas's authority. Hamas security forces struck instantly and
mercilessly at the Warriors, killing more than twenty members, including the group's leader,
Abdel-Latif Moussa. In one stroke, the Hamas leadership sent a message to foes and friends
alike that it will not tolerate global jihadist groups like Al Qaeda, which want to turn Gaza into
a theater of transnational jihad.
Despite the crushing of Moussa's outfit, the extremist challenge persists. The Israeli siege, in
place since 2006, along with the suffering and despair it has caused among Gaza's 1.4
million inhabitants, has driven hundreds of young Palestinians into the arms of small Salafist
extremist factions that accuse Hamas of forfeiting the armed struggle and failing to
implement Shariah law. Hamas leaders appear to be worried about the proliferation of these
factions and have instructed clerics to warn worshipers against joining such bands.
Compared with these puritanical and nihilistic groups, Hamas is well within the mainstream of
Islamist politics. Operationally and ideologically, there are huge differences between Hamas
and jihadi extremists such as Al Qaeda--and there's a lot of bad blood. Hamas is a broad-
based religious/nationalist resistance whose focus and violence is limited to Palestine/Israel,
while Al Qaeda is a small, transnational terrorist network that has carried out attacks
worldwide. Al Qaeda leaders Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri have vehemently
criticized Hamas for its willingness to play politics and negotiate with Israel. Hamas leaders
have responded that they know what is good for their people, and they have made it crystal
clear they have no interest in transnational militancy. Their overriding goal is political and
nationalist rather than ideological and global: to empower Palestinians and liberate the
occupied Palestinian territories.
Unlike Al Qaeda and other fringe factions, Hamas is a viable social movement with an
extensive social network and a large popular base that has been estimated at several
hundred thousand. Given its tradition of sensitivity and responsiveness to Palestinian public
opinion, a convincing argument could be made that the recent changes in the organization's
conduct can be attributed to the high levels of poverty, unemployment and isolation of
Palestinians in Gaza, who fear an even greater deterioration of conditions there.
A further example of Hamas's political and social priorities is its decision to agree in principle
to an Egyptian-brokered deal that sketches out a path to peace with Fatah. After two years of
bitter and violent division, the warring parties came very close to agreement in October. The
deal collapsed at the last moment, but talks continue. There are two points to make about the
Egyptian role: first, Hamas leaders say they feel somewhat betrayed by the Egyptians
because after pressure from the Americans, Cairo unilaterally revised the final agreed-upon
text without consulting the Hamas negotiating team. Second, many Palestinian and Arab
observers think Egypt is in no hurry to conclude the Fatah-Hamas talks. They contend that
faced with regional challenges and rivals (Iran, Turkey, Syria and Saudi Arabia), the Mubarak
regime views its brokering process in the Palestinian-Israeli theater as an important regional
asset and a way to solidify its relationship with Washington.
Despite its frequently reactionary rhetoric, Hamas is a rational actor, a conclusion reached by
former Mossad chief Ephraim Halevy, who also served as Ariel Sharon's national security
adviser and who is certainly not a peacenik. The Hamas leadership has undergone a
transformation "right under our very noses" by recognizing that "its ideological goal is not
attainable and will not be in the foreseeable future," Halevy wrote in the Israeli daily Yediot
Ahronot just before the 2008 attack on Gaza. He believes Hamas is ready and willing to
accept the establishment of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders. The US Army
Strategic Studies Institute published a similar analysis just before the Israeli offensive,
concluding that Hamas was considering a shift of its position and that "Israel's stance toward
[Hamas]...has been a major obstacle to substantive peacemaking."
Indeed, it could be argued that Hamas has moved closer to a vision of peace consistent with
international law and consensus (two separate states in historic Palestine, divided more or
less along the '67 borders with East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine, and recognition of
all states in the region) than the current Israeli governing coalition. Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu vehemently opposes the establishment of a genuinely viable Palestinian state in
the West Bank and Gaza, and is opposed to giving up any part of Jerusalem--and
Netanyahu's governing coalition is more right wing and pro-settlement than he is.
Hamas's political evolution and deepening moderation stand in stark contrast to the
rejectionism of the Netanyahu government and call into question which parties are "hardline"
and which are "extremist." And at the regional level, a sea change has occurred in the official
Arab position toward the Jewish state (the Arab League's 2002 Beirut Declaration,
subsequently reiterated, offers full recognition and diplomatic relations if Israel accepts the
international consensus regarding a two-state solution), while the attitudes of the Israeli ruling
elite have hardened. This marks a transformation of regional politics and a reversal of roles.
Observers might ask, If Hamas is so eager to accept a two-state solution, why doesn't it
simply accept the three conditions for engagement required by the so-called diplomatic
Quartet (the United States, Russia, the European Union and the United Nations): recognition
of Israel, renunciation of violence and acceptance of all previous agreements (primarily, the
Oslo Accords)? In my interviews with Hamas officials, they stress that while they have made
significant concessions to the Quartet, it has not lifted the punishing sanctions against
Hamas, nor has it pressed Israel to end its siege, which has caused a dire humanitarian
crisis. In addition, Hamas leaders believe that recognition of Israel is the last card in their
hand and are reluctant to play it before talks even begin. Their diplomatic starting point will be
to demand that Israel recognize the national rights of the Palestinians and withdraw from the
occupied territories--but it will not be their final position.
There can be no viable, lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians if Hamas is not
consulted and if the Palestinians remain divided, with two warring authorities in the West
Bank and Gaza. Hamas has the means and public support to undermine any agreement that
does not address the legitimate rights and claims of the Palestinian people. Its Fatah/PA rival
lacks a popular mandate and the legitimacy needed to implement a resolution of the conflict.
PA President Mahmoud Abbas has been weakened by a series of blunders of his own
making, and with his moral authority compromised in the eyes of a sizable Palestinian
constituency, Abbas is yesterday's man--no matter how long he remains in power as a lame
duck, and whether or not he competes in the upcoming presidential elections.
If the United States and Europe engaged Hamas, encouraging it to continue moderating its
views instead of ignoring it or, worse yet, seeking its overthrow, the West could test the
extent of Hamas's evolution. So far the strategy of isolation and military confrontation--
pursued in tandem by Israel and the United States--has not appeared to weaken Hamas
significantly. If anything, it has radicalized hundreds of young Palestinians, who have joined
extremist factions and reinforced the culture of martyrdom and nihilism. All the while, the
siege of Gaza has left a trail of untold pain and suffering.
If the Western powers don't engage Hamas, they will never know if it can evolve into an
open, tolerant and peaceful social movement. The jury is still out on whether the Islamist
movement can make that painful and ideologically costly transition. But the claim that
engaging Hamas legitimizes it does not carry much weight; the organization derives its
legitimacy from the Palestinian people, a mandate resoundingly confirmed in the free and fair
elections of 2006.
To break the impasse and prevent gains by more extremist factions, the Obama
administration and Congress should support a unified Palestinian government that could
negotiate peace with Israel. Whatever they think of its ideology, US officials should
acknowledge that Hamas is a legitimately elected representative of the Palestinian people,
and that any treaty signed by a rump Fatah/PA will not withstand the test of time. And instead
of twisting Cairo's arms in a rejectionist direction, Washington should encourage its Egyptian
ally to broker a truce between Hamas and Fatah and thus repair the badly frayed Palestinian
governing institutions. If the Obama administration continues to shun engagement with
Hamas, Europe ought to take the lead in establishing an official connection. European
governments have already dealt with Lebanon's Hezbollah, a group similar to Hamas in some
respects, and they possess the skills, experience and political weight to help broker a viable
peace settlement.
Like it or not, Hamas is the most powerful organization in the occupied territories. It is deeply
entrenched in Palestinian society. Neither Israel nor the Western powers can wish it away.
The good news, if my reading is correct, is that Hamas has changed, is willing to meet some
of the Quartet's conditions and is making domestic political preparations for further changes.
But if Hamas is not engaged, and if the siege of Gaza and Palestinian suffering continue
without hope of ending the political impasse, there is a real danger of a regional war.
About Fawaz A. Gerges
Fawaz A. Gerges is a professor of Middle Eastern politics and international relations at the
London School of Economics and Political Science at the University of London. His most
recent book is Journey of the Jihadist: Inside Muslim Militancy (Harcourt).
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