Abbas Don't You Dare Sell Out The Palestinians

Haniyeh urges Abbas to go to the ICC to prosecute Israel

MME

Deputy Head of the Hamas Political Bureau, Ismail Haniyeh, called on the Palestinian Authority President, Mahmoud Abbas, on Thursday evening, to sign the Rome Statute and join the ICC in order to prosecute "the Israeli war criminals".

In a press statement, Haniyeh said, "The Palestinian factions and Palestinian community all agree on the need for Abbas to go to the ICC and sign the Rome Statute in order to prosecute the leaders of the Zionist enemy for their crimes committed against the Palestinian people".

He added, "Hamas signed the document urging Abbas to sign the Rome Statute, and the signing of this is the right of all the victims. Stalling the signing of the Statute is considered a concession of their rights and offensive to the Palestinian people and their struggle."

On August 23, 2014, a member of the Hamas Political Bureau, Mousa Abu Marzouk, announced that his movement signed the document that President Abbas needed all the Palestinian factions to sign before going to sign the Rome Statute, enabling Palestine to join the ICC.

Palestine was granted international recognition in 2012 after it succeeded in getting the UN vote to accept is as an "observer state".

The Rome Statute is a treaty established by the ICC. It was adopted at a diplomatic conference in Rome on July 17 1998 and put into force on July 1 2002. As of May 2013, 122 states are party to the statute.

Signing this agreement is considered a step towards the Palestinian Authority and leadership heading to the ICC to prosecute Israel for its "violations" against the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

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Mishaal, Abbas discuss means of ending the Israeli aggression

DOHA, (PIC)-- Political bureau chairman of Hamas Khaled Mishaal conferred with PA chief Mahmoud Abbas on means of halting the Israeli aggression on the Gaza Strip.

Ezzet al-Resheq, political bureau member of Hamas, said on his Facebook page on Monday night that the meeting, attended by senior Hamas officials tackled the ongoing Israeli aggression that started July 7.

He said that efforts and contacts concerning the Israeli aggression on Gaza were discussed.

Consultations were made on fresh ideas and steps to stop the aggression and end the siege on Gaza, he added.

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Resistance conditions the minimum for any ceasefire agreement

GAZA, (PIC)-- Palestinian former Prime Minister and deputy head of Hamas's political bureau Ismail Haneyya said that "the terms of the resistance are the minimum conditions for any ceasefire agreement with the Israeli enemy."

In a brief statement issued on Monday Haneyya added, "The Palestinian people's sacrifices are our way to victory".

He pointed out that the Israeli enemy has been defeated on the borders of Gaza, stressing that the Palestinian resistance will meet all the Palestinian people's demands and aspirations.

On the other hand, diplomatic sources revealed that the US administration and Israeli authorities are looking for a new alternative mediator to Egypt in order to reach a ceasefire after the Palestinian resistance’s rejection to accept the Egyptian ceasefire initiative.

The sources, according to Hebrew daily Ha’aretz, added that the US is conducting regional contacts to reach an initiative accepted by all sides.

The sources said that senior American officials are working to end the crisis through indirect talks with resistance factions with the help of Qatar and Turkey’s mediation.

Senior US officials are expected to visit the region during the next two days for this reason, they added.

The sources reported that the US administration expressed its dissatisfaction with the Egyptian initiative especially that it was not discussed with Washington before its announcement on the media.

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Hamas rejects Egyptian-led peace deal - When dealing with Israel who could blame them

The Egyptian peace deal falls apart just hours after reports emerged that a de-escalation could be on the cards 

Hamas has rejected an Egyptian-backed ceasefire, saying that they will only end the fighting after a political deal is reached.

Hamas spokesperson Sami Abu Zuhri made the statement late Monday, following widespread reports that Hamas and Israel were both seriously considering the Egyptian proposal laid out earlier in the day.

Prior to Zuhri’s announcement, a deal to end the fighting in Gaza between Hamas and Israel appeared close with both sides reportedly mulling over an Egyptian plan that called for a period of “de-escalated” by 09.00 GMT Tuesday and for a full ceasefire to by 18.00 GMT.

There has as yet been no official reaction from the Israeli side, although prior to Hamas’ rejection there were media reports that the cabinet would discuss the Egyptian proposal at a cabinet security meeting on Tuesday.

Under the terms of the deal, Israel would have had to stop aerial, naval and ground operations against Gaza while promising not to launch a ground offensive or harm any further civilians, as per the text of a proposal put forward by Egypt’s Foreign Ministry.

However, Hama’s top representative in Lebanon Osama Hamdan, told CNN Arabic that the terms offered were not enough and that Hamas was determined to achieve more than this.

A few days into the fighting, Hamas issued four clear objectives for ending the fighting. Shortly before the deal was rejected, senior Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh appeared on television sounding determined.

"The Gaza blockade must be lifted so that our people live in freedom like all other peoples around the world," Haniyeh said in a televised speech aired on the pro-Hamas al-Aqsa TV, which he used to call for an end to the years-long Israeli blockade of Gaza.

A senior Hamas official told the Middle East Eye over the weekend that the group would no longer accept Egypt as a negotiator.

The official said Hamas will only consider Turkey or Qatar as potential go-betweens with Israel, a move that was seen as a departure from previous mediations where Egypt has played a vital negotiating role. Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi had originally claimed he wanted to negotiate a truce, but he angered many Palestinians by keeping the Rafah border crossing largely closed.

However, there is still hope for a revived plan involving the Egyptians with US Secretary of State John Kerry due to arrive in Cairo tomorrow where he is expected to push for a diplomatic solution to the crisis. Kerry is then expected to fly on to Qatar, a Western ally but one that maintains close relations with Hamas, Egyptian media reported.

The White House also stepped up its rhetoric. While it continued to defend Israel's "right" and "responsability" to defend its citizens, but spokesman Josh Earnest told reporters that, "Nobody wants to see a ground invasion because that would put more civilians at risk".  

An Arab League meeting about the crisis is also scheduled to take place in Cairo tomorrow. An Egyptian foreign ministry official told AFP that the meet was “aimed at finding a solution to stop the shedding of Palestinian civilians’ blood and to formulate a common Arab stance on the issue”.

More than 180 Palestinians have been killed and 1,385 injured since Israel launched Operation Protective Edge against Gaza exactly a week ago.

Early on Tuesday evening, as Operation Protective Edge entered its second week, Israeli air strikes and rocket continued to strike Gaza even while reports of the ceasefire began to emerge.

Hamas rockets also continued to fly toward Israel where they have largely caused minor injuries and damage. Monday evening saw the most serious incident of the week-long conflict so far with two sisters – aged 10 and 13 – being hospitalised following a rocket attack. The younger sister, 10-year-old Maram Wakili remains in critical condition.

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Hamas says Jerusalem the red line

Hamas calls for armed resistance to protect it… but how?

Palestinian resistance to occupation is a legally protected right. For 33 years, Israel has administered a military occupation of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem in consistent and relentless defiance of the overwhelming will of the organized international community.

by Stuart Littlewood

The other day Hamas’s political chief, Khaled Meshaal, criticised the Palestinian Authority for “criminalizing armed resistance”.

He claimed that, by dropping the armed resistance option, Arab States and the PA had lost the ability to deter Israel and its never-ending violations.

He said that in Jerusalem Israel was trying to divide the sacred Al-Aqsa in a first step towards demolishing it, and the regime was using the turmoil in the Arab world as an opportunity to sneak through this “taboo action”. Apparently the Israeli authorities are going to impose some kind of ‘time-share’ arrangement between Jews and Muslims at the al-Aqsa Mosque, which sits on the al-Haram ash-Sharif (Noble Sanctuary), the third holiest site in Islam. The Israelis are also said to be planning to build a synagogue there. The move has been called  “an aggressive, advanced step that confirms Jewish designs on the al-Aqsa Mosque at all levels”. The Al-Aqsa is in the Old City, which is part of East Jerusalem and strictly speaking belongs to the Palestinians not Israel. However, it is still under illegal Israeli occupation and control.

It is necessary,  says Meshaal, to confront Israel’s plan to steal Jerusalem along with its Al-Aqsa Mosque (and, of course, the Church of the Holy Sepulchre and many other important places of worship), but the PA’s slavish security collaboration with the Israelis undermines the resistance option. “We need to take a clear stance, Jerusalem is a Red Line. Jerusalem is the soul of the cause.”

All factions must agree, Meshaal added, on a unified strategy and a unified goal to liberate and protect Jerusalem. “Our only path to liberation is resistance, and saving Jerusalem.”

Earlier in the year Meshaal declared that Hamas would change its spots and switch from armed resistance to popular uprising, Arab Spring style. On another occasion he said that although he considered armed resistance to be an essential element, it was a means not an end. There were other options available through diplomacy, media and charging the enemy to pay for his crimes.

The right to resist

So what are we to believe from these apparent contradictions? Is armed resistance for real?

Richard Falk, U.N. Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories

Richard Falk, professor emeritus of international law at Princeton University and  United Nations Special Rapporteur on human rights in the Palestinian territories, explained the position on resistance back in 2000:

“Palestinian resistance to occupation is a legally protected right. For 33 years, Israel has administered a military occupation of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem in consistent and relentless defiance of the overwhelming will of the organized international community.”

“The international consensus has been expressed through widely supported resolutions passed by the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations (hereafter UNSC and UNGA). UN Resolutions 242 and 338 affirmed the legal obligation of Israel to withdraw from Palestinian territories obtained in the 1967 Six Day War. This must be the end point of any peace process that can bring lasting peace. Until such time as Israel respects this obligation, the relevant principles of international law are contained in the Fourth Geneva Convention concerning the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (August 12, 1949), in particular those provisions of the Convention that require an occupying power to protect the status quo, human rights and prospects for self-determination of the occupied people, and oblige all signatories to enforce the Convention in the face of ‘grave breaches’. Since 1967 and during the current uprising, Israel has refused to accept this framework of legal obligations. Its refusal has been pronounced, blatant and undisguised. Not only has Israel failed to withdraw from the Occupied Territories, during the occupation Israel has ‘created facts’ — heavily armed settlements, bypass roads and security zones in the midst of a future Palestinian state — that seriously compromise basic Palestinian rights.”

Falk also provides a useful summary of the numerous UN legal directives and resolutions on Palestinian rights and Israeli duties in this long, dragged out conflict. http://www.merip.org/mer/mer217/international-law-al-aqsa-intifada

Writing 13 years ago, remember, he says: “In the absence of the political will to enforce the body of international law on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, resolutions and conventions cannot on their own bring justice to the peoples of Palestine and Israel. Equally importantly, the flagrant violation of international law daily accentuates the injustice to the Palestinian people, intensifies their suffering and cannot be ignored in any approach to conflict resolution. The severity of these violations, and their persistence and frequency, also establishes the foundation for an inquiry into whether an abusive structure of illegal prolonged belligerent occupation does not itself amount to the commission of crimes against humanity, beyond the specific wrongs alleged in relation to Geneva IV and international humanitarian law.”

Nothing has changed.

“Couldn’t hit a barn door”

Palestinian leaders are notoriously clueless about the media, public affairs and diplomacy. They won’t learn, won’t even make the effort. And that applies to both the PA and Hamas. The cost of their incompetence to ordinary Palestinians is incalculable. So they are left with having to fight, which they are entitled to do. But how successful have they been so far? And is armed resistance really a game they are equipped for?

In January 2009, after the launch of Operation Cast Lead (Israel’s infamous blitzkrieg on Gaza) the IDF’s ground troops closed in on the densely populated urban centres of Gaza. The conflict resulted in around 1,400 Palestinian and only 13 Israeli deaths (and 4 of those was from friendly fire). I saw Israeli accounts that said Hamas’s militia couldn’t hit a barn door, or words to that effect. The scorecard confirms it.

The decision by Israel to break off before “finishing the job” had more to do with a hostile press and international pressure (plus the fear of losing a few more precious Jewish lives) than the effectiveness of the Resistance.

Serious resistance has always been a tall order for the Palestinians and is now made doubly difficult by the antics of quislings like President Abbas and his chums in the PA. Furthermore the Red Line is not just East Jerusalem and the Old City with its Al-Aqsa Mosque. It is the internationally-recognised pre-1967 border running all around the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Armed Israelis have no business crossing it. Whenever they do, they deserve to meet the same fate as armed Palestinians going the other way. But resisting the Occupation surely means defending that Red Line – not terrorising Israeli civilians living on the other side, even if, like the residents of Sderot, they are on land allocated by the UN for a Palestinian state but stolen and ethnically cleansed at gunpoint by Jewish terrorists as soon as the mandated government’s (i.e. Britain’s) back was turned.

Most people understand the difference between resistance and terrorism. Only the Israelis and their US/UK stooges seem to be confused.

It starts at school, with ‘spotting’

While saluting the courage of the Resistance in such a terrifying situation and their extraordinary resilience under the cruel six-year siege, one is curious to know who’s in charge and how they are trained. For instance, do they have the sniper corps one would expect? Or is everybody in Gaza  pre-occupied with launching primitive, unguided, indiscriminate and largely ineffective rockets that simply give Hamas a bad name, and relying on booby-traps to halt Israeli incursions? Because that’s the picture they paint.

If you visit Gaza you’ll see plenty of guys standing around wearing a big smile and a Kalashnikov, like this affable pair I snapped outside Hamas HQ. But the much-loved AK is not the precision tool for the job we’re talking about here.

They are up against Israelis like these two (below), who are far better trained and tooled up. They were manning one of the Occupation Force’s hundreds of checkpoints designed to disrupt and fragment Palestinian society, choke the economy and generally make life intolerable. They happened to be reasonably friendly although a third, lurking in the shadows, had his gun on my back while I took the photo. Note the itchy finger positions. 

Let me recall some distant memories. When I was a boy here in England my school had a cadet force and an armoury that included .303 rifles and Brens. Some of the Lee-Enfields were sleeved to .22 for indoor target practice, although we preferred using the assortment of BSA Martini Internationals and heavy-barreled Mossbergs for serious target work.

I and others spent many lunch-hours and dark evenings on the armoury floor “spotting” with the Lee-Enfields (fitted with Singer aperture rear sights, if I remember correctly) – see here http://blog.modernmechanix.com/bulletless-rifle-practice-improves-aim/. “No bullets or powder are needed for an odd type of rifle practice demonstrated by British soldiers in the photograph above. A sergeant, seen at the right, holds a tiny target in front of one eye, and looks through a peep hole in the center to check the soldier’s aim by seeing that his gun sights line up with the bull’s-eye.”

One commenter says: “If this is the preferred way to practice aiming, wouldn’t it make good sense to have the bolt pulled out? If I was the one holding up the target, I’d make that the first requirement!”

Heck no. By all means drop the magazine but the bolt stays. The idea of spotting is for the trainer to check the shooter’s aim (1) before the shot, i.e. during the controlled breathing phase, (2) at the moment of squeezing off the shot, and (3) immediately afterwards.

A considerable number of boys were crack shots (at least on the range) by the age of 16. As for the Bren (a light machine gun) we were expected to strip and re-assemble this cutie in under 2 minutes (and nearer 1 minute if possible), blindfolded.

Can it really be so difficult to teach the rising generation of Palestinians to shoot straight? After all, their motivation must be sky-high. Armed Israelis, by now, should be wetting their pants at the thought of trespassing on designated Palestinian territory. But it will only happen when Hamas (or a disinfected and purified PA) produce marksmen in sufficient numbers and equip them with the right tool for the job. And it is surely not beyond the wit of the Palestinians to procure some decent bolt action rifles with scopes. I avoid the word ‘smuggle’, as they have a perfect right to import small arms for their defense.

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Stuart Littlewood is writer-photographer in the UK. His articles are published widely on the web. He is author of the book Radio Free Palestine. Stuart’s book Radio Free Palestine, with Foreword by Jeff Halper, tells the plight of the Palestinians under brutal occupation. “Radio Free Palestine is a cry form the heart, written in moral anger by a person who bothered to leave his comfortable surroundings far from the suffering of another people, the Palestinians, and share, witness, expose and protest in the strongest voice he could find at what he saw and heard, what so few others have even cared to see or hear.” It can now be read on the internet by visiting www.radiofreepalestine.org.uk.

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Kill Him Silently: Mossad's bungled assassination attempt on Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal

Kill Him Silently: Part 1 Al Jazeera World unveils the story behind Israeli secret service Mossad's bungled assassination attempt on Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal and the role the failed covert operation played in the rise of the Palestinian movement's rise to power.



 This two-part film features exclusive interviews with Meshaal himself as well as with Danny Yatom, the then head of the Mossad, who masterminded the attempt to kill the Hamas leader, and who later fled to Jordan with the antidote that saved Meshaal's life. The second part of the film shows events following the failed assassination attempt, including behind-the-scenes discussions during the diplomatic struggle involving Jordan, Israel and the US.
 

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Hamas calls on Hezbollah to withdraw its forces from Lebanon

The Islamic Resistance Movement in Palestine - Hamas - has issued a statement today describing Hezbollah's military intervention in Syria as contributing to the worsening climate of sectarian polarisation in the region. Hamas called on Hezbollah to withdraw its forces and urged it to maintain the compass of resistance only in the direction of the Israeli occupation.

On another level, Hamas reaffirmed in its statement the inalienable right of the Syrian people to attain their rights and aspirations in freedom and dignity. The movement described the Syrians as a 'noble people', who have always been sincere in their resistance and in the forefront of struggle and defiance. They have always shown solidarity with Arab and Islamic causes, the statement added.

Today's statement was issued following a meeting of Hamas' leadership in Cairo. It noted that the Palestinian cause remains the central issue of the Arab and Islamic nation and that resistance against the Zionist occupation is the basic mission. Hence it is necessary to keep the compass of resistance in the right direction, whatever the conditions and circumstances.

Still further, Hamas emphasised the need to preserve the unity of the Muslims and to avoid all forms of sectarian and ethnic polarization.

It is noted that the statement from Hamas comes days after Hezbollah's Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrullah, vowed to continue fighting in Syria alongside the forces loyal to the Assad regime. Hezbollahhad played a major role in the government's recapture of the strategic town of Qusayr.

Relations between Hamas and the Assad regime deteriorated after the escalation of the conflict in Syria. The movement's leaders have since left Syria where they had their headquarters.

- See more at: http://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/middle-east/6309-hamas-calls-on-hezbollah-to-withdraw-its-forces-from-lebanon#sthash.KzZ0hn58.dpuf

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Hamas in Gaza says it's learning from Arab Spring

By Karin Laub and Mohammed Daraghmeh

Associated Press

GAZA CITY, Gaza Strip—Bans on women smoking water pipes in public and male coiffeurs styling women's hair are no longer being strictly enforced in the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip, apparent signs of greater tolerance as the Islamic militant group acknowledges mistakes in seeking to impose a religious lifestyle.

In explaining the change, several senior members said Hamas has matured in five years in power and learned lessons from the Arab Spring. Islamic groups that have scored election victories in the wake of pro-democracy uprisings in the region now find themselves trying to allay fears they seek Islamic rule.

Since seizing Gaza, Hamas had largely silenced opponents and tried to impose stricter religious rules on an already conservative society. Modesty squads asked young couples seen in public to show proof of marriage, told beachgoers to put on more clothes and ordered shopowners to cover up mannequins. High school girls came under pressure from teachers to wear headscarves.

In recent months, there's been a change in atmosphere, say rights activists and even political rivals of Hamas.

"Things are freer than before," said Nasser Radwan, whose family restaurant is one of the places where women again come to smoke water pipes.

Hamas spokesman Fawzi Barhoum said "some mistakes were made" under Hamas rule, though he blamed individual security commanders and overzealous activists, not the government, for heavy-handed tactics.

"They don't represent the ideology and policy of the Hamas movement," Barhoum said. "Our policy is that we are not going to dictate anything to anyone."

Huda Naim, a Hamas legislator, said the movement took its cues from the pro-democracy revolts sweeping the Arab world, but also has learned it needs to be more tolerant of others.

It's not clear whether the changes are tactical, or whether they represent a true shift that will lead to more political freedom. Hamas has shut down offices of political rival Fatah, arrested activists and strictly controls the local media. However, in recent months, it has permitted rivals, including Fatah, to stage rallies that were previously banned.

There are no signs Hamas is softening its stance toward Israel -- the movement refuses to recognize the Jewish state or rule out violence against it -- or that it is breaking its alliance with financial benefactor Iran and with Syria, its longtime host. Hamas has reduced its presence in Syria following President Bashar Assad's crackdown on anti-government protesters, but continues to maintain a foothold there.

Hamas won Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006, defeating Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas' Fatah faction. After failed power-sharing attempts, Hamas seized Gaza a year later, defeating Abbas' forces and leaving him with only the West Bank. Acrimony intensified as dueling governments in the two territories cracked down on rivals.

Hamas is the only wing of the pan-Arab Muslim Brotherhood movement that has had a chance to rule, and its performance is of interest following the Brotherhood's strong showings in recent elections in Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco. The Brotherhood faces concerns in the West and among local secular groups that the Islamists, despite their embrace of democracy, might gradually try to establish strict theocracies.Continued...

The views expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of this Blog!

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Hamas condemns murder of Italian ISM activist

GAZA, (PIC) The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) has denounced in the strongest terms the kidnapping and subsequent murder of Italian peace activist Vittori Arrigoni, stressing that what has happened is “serious and shameful” and that “what this group has perpetrated does not reflect the culture or customs of the Palestinian people who are open to [friendship] with all [people]”

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Erekat: Hamas is a legitimate Palestinian national movement

Dr. Saeb Erekat of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation has rejected the Israeli Prime Minister’s demand for the Palestinian leadership in Ramallah to choose between Israel or Hamas.

The ex-Chief Negotiator of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation has rejected the Israeli Prime Minister’s demand for the Palestinian leadership in Ramallah to choose between Israel or Hamas. Dr. Saeb Erekat said that such a choice is rejected and it is “completely unacceptable” for Benjamin Netanyahu to call for it.

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Did The US Supply Israel With Information Enabling Murder Of Hamas Officials?

By Wikileaks US Cables

-- US requests "details of travel plans such as routes and vehicles used by Palestinian Authority leaders and HAMAS members."

Reference ID	Date	Classification	Origin
08STATE116392	2008-10-31 15:03	SECRET//NOFORN	Secretary of State

R 311525Z OCT 08FM SECSTATE WASHDCTO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV AMCONSUL JERUSALEM INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN AMEMBASSY BEIRUT AMEMBASSY CAIRO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS AMEMBASSY RIYADH DIA WASHINGTON DC//DHI-1B/CLM//DP//CIA WASHINGTON DC//NHTC// 0000

S E C R E T STATE 116392   NOFORN  E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2033 TAGS: PINR KSPR ECON KPAL PREL PTER XFSUBJECT: (S) REPORTING AND COLLECTION NEEDS: PALESTINIAN ISSUES  REF: A. 08 STATE 001379      ¶B. 08 STATE 64936   Classified By: CATHERINE BROWN, DAS, INR/IPC. REASON: 1.4(C).  ¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY:  This cable provides the full text of the new National HUMINT Collection Directive (NHCD) on Palestinian Issues (paragraph 3-end) and encourages Department personnel at post to assist in compiling Palestinian biographic information (paragraph 2).  ¶A. (S/NF) The NHCD results from a recent Washington review of reporting and collection needs for Palestinian Issues and sets forth a list of priorities intended to guide participating USG agencies as they allocate resources and update plans to collect information on Palestinian Issues. The priorities may also help the Embassy manage reporting and collection, including formulation of Mission Strategic Plans (MSPs).  ¶B. (S/NF) This NHCD is compliant with the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), which was established in response to NSPD-26 of February 24, 2003.  If needed, GRPO can provide further background on the NIPF and the use of NIPF abbreviations (shown in parentheses following each sub-issue below) in NHCDs.  ¶C. (S/NF) Important information responsive to the NHCD often is available to non-State members of the Country Team whose agencies participated in the review leading to the NHCD's issuance.  COMs, DCMs, and State reporting officers can assist by coordinating with other Country Team members to encourage relevant reporting through their own or State Department channels.  ¶2. (S/NF) State biographic reporting - including on Palestinians:  ¶A.  (S/NF) The intelligence community relies on State reporting officers for much of the biographical information collected worldwide.  Informal biographic reporting via email and other means is vital to the community's collection efforts and can be sent to the INR/B (Biographic) office for dissemination to the IC.  State reporting officers are encouraged to report on noteworthy Palestinians as information becomes available.  ¶B.  (S/NF) When it is available, reporting officers should include as much of the following information as possible: office and organizational titles; names, position titles and other information on business cards; numbers of telephones, cell phones, pagers and faxes; compendia of contact information, such as telephone directories (in compact disc or electronic format if available) and e-mail listings; internet and intranet "handles", internet e-mail addresses, web site identification-URLs; credit card account numbers; frequent flyer account numbers; work schedules, and other relevant biographical information.  ¶3. (S/NF) Palestinian NHCD outline - priority issues:        ¶A. Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process             1) Conflict Resolution and Palestinian Relations             with Israel (SRCC-1)             2) Final Status Issues (SRCC-1)             3) Perceptions of US Role in the Peace Process             (SRCC-1)             4) Role of Regional Neighbors (SRCC-1)             5) Role of International Community in the Peace             Process (SRCC-1)        ¶B. Palestinian Leadership and Governance             1) Governance Issues (DEPS-1)             2) Security Forces' Capabilities (DEPS-1)             3) Palestinian Leadership (LEAD-1)             4) Fatah-HAMAS Relationship (LEAD-1)             5) Economic and Financial Stability (ECFS-2)             6) Civil Society and the Rule of Law (DEPS-1)             7) US, Regional, and International Foreign             Policy (FPOL-4)        ¶C. Palestinian Internal Security and Control             1) Palestinian Counterterrorism Capabilities and             Response (TERR-2)             2) Role of Palestinian Authority Security             Organs/Individuals in Terrorism (TERR-2)             3) Intelligence Services and Security Forces             (CINT-5)       4) Illegal Activities (MONY-4)        ¶D. Terrorism and Islamic Activism             1) International and Indigenous Terrorist             Activities (TERR-2)             2) Internal and External Support for Palestinian             Terrorists (TERR-2)             3) Islamic Activism (DEPS-1)             4) Threats Against American Citizens (TERR-2)        ¶E. Palestinian Social Development and Infrastructure             1) Human Rights (HRWC-3)             2) Demographics (DEMG-3)             3) Water Management (ENVR-4)             4) Infectious Disease and Health (HLTH-5)             5) Civilian Infrastructure (INFR-3)        ¶F. Government of Israel Plans, Policies, and Actions             1) Israeli Leadership Plans and Intentions on             the Peace Process (LEAD-1)             2) Conflict Resolution (SRCC-1)             3) Government of Israel Security Issues (SRCC-1)             4) Military Response to Palestinians and             Terrorism (FMCC-2)             5) Settlements (SRCC-1)             6) US and International Community (FPOL-3)        ¶G. Information Infrastructure and Telecommunications       Systems (INFR-3)  ¶4. (S/NF) Palestinian NHCD - Full text  -- reporting and collection needs under priority areas listed in paragraph 3 above:  ¶A. Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process        1) Conflict Resolution and Palestinian Relations with Israel (SRCC-1). --Key positions, negotiating strategies, red lines, and points of flexibility of Fatah-affiliated Palestinian Authority elements, HAMAS, and other Palestinian parties concerned with the peace process, conflict resolution, and future dealings with Israel. --Negotiating positions for Palestinian talks with Israel on bilateral issues, particularly the extent of Palestinian Authority control in Jerusalem, right of return of Palestinian refugees to Israel, Israeli settlements in the West Bank, and East Jerusalem, exchanges of territory, borders and security, and "end of claims". --Attitudes of the general public toward Palestinian-Israeli talks. --Attitudes of Palestinian security forces toward peace negotiations with and attacks on Israel inside Israel and the Palestinian territories. --Details of all formal and informal channels, used by the Palestinian leaders to discuss peace steps with Israel. --Palestinian perceptions of and relations with Israeli leaders and negotiating counterparts. --Palestinian positions on negotiations with Israel regarding water, transportation and energy infrastructure issues, access to the Israeli economy, and safe passage between areas of Israeli and Palestinian control.        2) Final Status Issues (SRCC-1). --Details regarding final-status arrangements on issues of security, borders and border crossings, and refugees. --Information regarding final-status agreements on water, economics, legal matters and prisoners, infrastructure and environment, and Jerusalem (including sovereignty, governance, and access to/control of the "Holy Basin").        3) Perceptions of US Role in the Peace Process (SRCC-1). --Palestinian leadership and citizen perceptions regarding the US role and efforts to influence the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. --Palestinian plans, intentions and efforts to influence US positions on the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. Palestinian  efforts to galvanize regional and international support to influence US positions on the Palestinian-Israeli peace negotiations. --Palestinian plans, intentions, objectives and activities related to US policies and programs on the peace process including extent of support for US and other counterterrorism efforts.        4) Role of Regional Neighbors (SRCC-1). --Palestinian perceptions of the policies of regional neighbors (Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, Libya and other Arab states and Iran) regarding a Palestinian-Israeli peace settlement. --Views and perceptions of regional neighbors on the impact a Palestinian-Israeli peace settlement would have on neighboring Palestinian populations. --Palestinian views of other countries' plans and efforts to support or oppose the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. --Palestinian perceptions of plans and efforts by individual regional neighbors to facilitate or hinder the development of institutions needed for a free and democratic Palestinian state. --Palestinian views about plans and efforts of Syria or Lebanon to resolve border disputes with Israel.        5) Role of International Community in the Peace Process (SRCC-1). --Palestinian perceptions about policies, plans, efforts and support for strategies and positions on Palestinian-Israeli issues from European Union members, especially France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Russia and multilateral bodies, including the Quartet (United States, European Union, United Nations, and Russia), the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Arab League, and the United Nations. --Palestinian views on amounts and uses of international assistance provided to the Palestinian Authority as part of bilateral or multilateral negotiations.   ¶B. Palestinian Leadership and Governance        1) Governance Issues (DEPS-1). --Status and relative strength of factions within the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and internal decision-making processes of these factions. --Relations between the Palestinian Authority and the PLO and its factions. --PLO and HAMAS finances and sources of funding. --Evidence regarding the effectiveness of the Palestinian Authority in governing areas under Palestinian Authority control; status of political reform and influence of President. --Indications of challenges to Palestinian Authority rule. Extent of popular loyalty to Palestinian Authority leadership. --Information on municipal government structures, independent local power bases, and relationships between the Palestinian leadership and local leaders. --Plans and intentions of the Palestinian Authority to consider or reject the formation of a new Palestinian National Unity Government. --Details on efforts of HAMAS to exert influence over Palestinians to consolidate their support. --Attitudes, plans, and tactics of Islamist and secular groups to determine or affect the choice of a successor to the current Palestinian Authority President. --Level of Palestinian support for HAMAS elected officials. --Palestinian perceptions of the Palestinian legislative council and its ability to exercise power.         2) Security Forces' Capabilities (DEPS-1). --Plans, intentions, and willingness to sustain efforts to reform the security forces. --Relations between the security forces and foreign security services, especially for cooperation, training, information sharing, and funding including efforts to target terrorist or extremist threats to the peace process. --Changes in the senior leadership of the Palestinian Authority security forces, including the general intelligence organization (Mukhabarat) and the Preventive Security Organization (PSO). --Leadership dynamics and power relationships among the Palestinian Authority security forces; relations between civilian leaders and security forces commanders. --Level of responsiveness of security forces to civilian control. --Decision-making processes and rules of engagement of the security forces in specific security situations. --Organizational structure of the Palestinian Authority security forces. --Command, control, communications, and intelligence infrastructure of Palestinian Authority security forces. --Information on personnel strength, budget, weapons, training, force readiness, targeting, tactics, transportation, and logistics of the Palestinian Authority security forces.         3) Palestinian Leadership (LEAD-1). --Goals and strategies of Palestinian officials in the West Bank and Gaza to insure/undermine the viability of a democratic Palestinian state. --Plans and intentions of Palestinian President to call elections. --Role of the Prime Minister. --Identification of key advisers to the Palestinian Authority President and Prime Minister and their respective areas of influence. --Decision making processes within the Palestinian Authority leadership, including the roles of key ministries and the views of their leaders on priority issues for the government.  --Palestinian leadership attitudes toward and perceptions of the US. --Status of the current Palestinian Authority president's and prime minister's health. --Identification of possible successors to the current Palestinian Authority president, views of these possible successors, and those of other Palestinian leaders outside the government, on Palestinian-Israeli issues and information on the relationships of these possible successors with key Palestinian groups and Israel.        4) Fatah-HAMAS Relationship (LEAD-1). --Fatah-affiliated Palestinian Authority leadership and HAMAS efforts to resolve issues related to reconciliation or to continue competition. --HAMAS reaction to peace negotiation efforts.  Relationship between the Palestinian leadership, to include the Presidency, and HAMAS officials in Gaza and rejectionist elements. --Leadership plans and efforts in Gaza and the West Bank to unify or maintain the division between the two territories. --Efforts by the Palestinian Authority leadership to involve HAMAS elected officials in negotiating strategies for the peace process. --Details of travel plans such as routes and vehicles used by Palestinian Authority leaders and HAMAS members. --Biographical, financial and biometric information on key PA and HAMAS leaders and representatives, to include the young guard inside Gaza, the West Bank and outside.         5) Economic and Financial Stability (ECFS-2). --Economic decision-making processes within the Palestinian Authority government and plans and actions to implement economic reform, liberalization, and development. --Palestinian Authority budget allocations and funding streams. --Details about employment data and government plans and efforts to increase employment. --Plans by Palestinian officials and Palestinian businessmen in the West Bank and Gaza for coping with economic downturns caused by political problems. --Data on Palestinian trade with Israel and Jordan. --Data on the impact of border closures and Palestinian-Israeli violence on economic development, including on the livelihoods of Palestinians with jobs in Israel or Jordan. --Information on levels of financial savings by Palestinians and their ability to withstand prolonged economic hardship. --Palestinian efforts to develop trading relationships with non-Israeli buyers and attract foreign investment. --Plans and efforts to seek funding from international relief organizations. --Palestinian plans and efforts to develop and exploit natural gas reserves off the coast of Gaza. --Plans to develop or expand energy infrastructure, including petroleum and natural gas storage/distribution facilities and electric utilities. --Financial flows from Diaspora Palestinians and the motivations for such investment. --Information on close ties between business families and politicians. --Corrupt practices by businessmen and politicians. --Trends in the business practices of local Palestinian businessmen, such as changes in enterprise ownership and control mechanisms and shifts in contract bidding methods. --Plans and efforts to counteract Israeli closure policies. --Palestinian perceptions regarding fulfillment of aid pledges from Donors' Conference.         6) Civil Society and the Rule of Law (DEPS-1). --Plans and intentions of leaders of the Palestinian Authority to encourage political openness, protect civil liberties, and promote fiscal transparency. --Plans and actions of Palestinian Authority to implement judicial and financial reforms. --Details about the Palestinian justice system and Palestinian attitudes towards the Palestinian Basic Law and Sharia/Islamic law. --Capability and commitment of Palestinian officials and organizations to maintain order and confront threats posed by extremist and terrorist groups, clans, and criminal organizations. --Details of plans and programs intended to promote and maintain public order. --Attitudes and influence of key Palestinian interest groups on Palestinian plans, policies and actions aimed at promoting the rule of law and public order. --HAMAS and other Palestinian efforts to apply Sharia and promote Islamic alternatives in civil society. --Details on HAMAS' social welfare network to include hospitals, education systems, textbooks, libraries and social services in the Palestinian territories and their funding sources in the region and worldwide; efforts by PIJ and other Palestinian organizations to provide similar services and details of their sources of funding. --Financial systems used by HAMAS charities in Europe to move funds to the Middle East. --Popular attitudes towards HAMAS and other organizations that provide social services. --Views and attitudes of the younger generation on HAMAS and their control of municipalities as well as their social service programs. --Evidence of control of the media by Fatah-affiliated Palestinian Authority or HAMAS to influence the Palestinian population. --Details on development of political parties, labor unions, and/or worker groups.        7) US, Regional, and International Foreign Policy (FPOL-4). --Efforts by the Palestinian Authority to gain support for its strategies and positions on Palestinian-Israeli issues from the US. --Palestinian Authority's objectives and strategies on key issues in US-Palestinian relationship and views on future of US relations. --Information on Palestinian Authority negotiating positions before discussions with the US and views of Palestinian officials after discussions with the US. --Popular attitudes toward and perceptions of the US.  ¶C. Palestinian Internal Security and Control        1) Palestinian Counterterrorism Capabilities and Response (TERR-2). --Palestinian counterterrorism and internal security policies, plans, attitudes, commitment and actions in dealing with extremists and terrorist groups, and clans. --Actions, ability and willingness of the Palestinian security services in the West Bank and Gaza to thwart terrorist attacks and maintain public order. --Palestinian plans, intentions, objectives and activities regarding support to and cooperation with US counterterrorism efforts. --Cooperation between Palestinian security and intelligence services and Israeli counterparts on terrorism, including targeting efforts, technical operations, surveillance, interrogation, capture and prosecution of known terrorists. --Attitudes and influence of key Palestinian interest groups on Palestinian counterterrorism plans, policies and actions. --Views of Palestinian Authority President, his advisers, Palestinian Authority security chiefs and senior Palestinian officials toward the US and its counterterrorism policies; perceptions of US expectations for Palestinian cooperation in counterterrorism campaign.        2) Role of Palestinian Authority Security Organs/Individuals in Terrorism (TERR-2). --Ties between the security forces and Palestinian Authority leaders and other groups, including Palestinian political parties, militias, and rejectionist and terrorist groups. --Participation by Palestinian Authority security forces personnel in attacks against Israeli targets outside Israel and the Palestinian Territories. --Links between intelligence services and terrorist groups. --Locations of neighborhoods controlled by rejectionist and terrorist groups. --Indications of cooperation between Palestinian intelligence services and terrorist groups.        3) Intelligence Services and Security Forces (CINT-5). --Plans, intentions, key focus and rivalries of senior PA security force officials, including the General Intelligence Organization (Mukhabarat), the Preventive Security Organization (PSO), Military Intelligence (Istikhbarat), the National Security Force (NSF), and the Civil Police, as well as HAMAS's Security Support Force in the Gaza strip. --Command, control, communications, and intelligence infrastructure of Palestinian Authority security forces. --Indications of counterintelligence operations conducted by the security forces against foreign intelligence services operating in or through Palestinian Authority areas. --Information on signals intercept capabilities and targets, decryption capabilities, intercept sites and collection hardware, and intercept operation successes. --Plans and efforts to illicitly collect classified, sensitive, commercial proprietary, or protected technology information from US companies or government agencies. --Counterintelligence organization plans, efforts, and abilities, and warning of their use against US personnel. Details on security forces' penetrations of Palestinian rejectionist groups including electronic penetrations. --Technological capabilities, targets, and activities of Palestinian security forces. --Unit deployments and locations, infrastructure and facilities of Palestinian Authority security forces. --Details on processes used by Palestinian Authority security forces to acquire weapons and equipment, either legally or illegally. --Intentions by Palestinian security force leaders or rogue elements to use new capabilities against Israel or the US.        4) Illegal Activities (MONY-4). --Indications of levels of corruption among Fatah-affiliated Palestinian Authority and/or HAMAS leaders. --Individuals, governments, organizations, routes, and methods involved in arms smuggling, human trafficking/smuggling, money laundering and corruption in financial transactions in support of illegal activities. --Information on illegal weapons transactions with Israelis. --Activities of Palestinian gangs and irregular militia forces' involvement in crime and terrorism.  ¶D. Terrorism and Islamic Activism        1) International and Indigenous Terrorist Activities (TERR-2). --Structure and internal dynamics of HAMAS militant wing (Izz al-Din al-Qassam Battalions), the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), and Popular Resistance Committees, Army of Islam, and other terrorist groups with a presence in the Gaza Strip or the West Bank, including leadership, membership, decision making processes, command and control, and factions. --Popular support for rejectionist groups. --Tactics, techniques, and operating methods of Palestinian terrorist groups, including tradecraft, counterintelligence measures, recruitment activities, underground facilities, operational tasking, and travel, infiltrations into Israel, disinformation, denial and deception techniques, and training. --Plans and intentions for, and extent and details of Lebanese Hizballah activities in Palestinian areas or within Israel, including retaliation for the deaths of Hizballah senior military leaders. --Relationship between Palestinian terrorist groups and al-Qa'ida, and indications of interest by Palestinian terrorist groups to work with global jihadists. --Indications of interest by Palestinian terrorist groups in the acquisition or use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, longer range missiles, or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). --Communications systems used by senior leaders of Palestinian terrorist groups to direct and control subordinates and field operatives. --Use of Inmarsat, fax machines, cellular telephones, and computer communications, including the Internet, to conduct terrorist activities.        2) Internal and External Support for Palestinian Terrorists (TERR-2). --Evidence of Palestinian popular support for Palestinian and other terrorist groups; Palestinian public perceptions of rocket attacks against Israel. --Contacts and relations between Palestinian terrorist groups and other terrorist or rejectionist groups, especially Lebanese Hizballah, al-Qa'ida, and elements of the Arab population in Israel; influence of Islamic militants. --Extent and nature of control, sponsorship, and financial support of Palestinian terrorist groups by Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Egypt, or other countries. --Plans and intentions, capabilities and motivations of Palestinian terrorist groups and/or their state sponsors to conduct attacks against US, Israeli, Jordanian, Palestinian, or other western or allied targets. --Encouragement from state sponsors to conduct attacks against US, Israeli, Jordanian, Palestinian, or other western or allied targets. --Support mechanisms for Palestinian terrorist or rejectionist groups, including identities of key individuals and mechanisms for procuring and moving funds and weapons. --Smuggling between Gaza and the outside world, including routes and methodologies; information on weapons shipments into territories via tunnels, and maritime means for terrorist use. --Contacts and relations between HAMAS militants, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Popular Resistance Committees, Popular Front  for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), Lebanese Hizballah, Fatah al-Islam (FAI), and other known or emergent terrorist or rejectionist groups in the region, and elements of the Palestinian Authority. --Attitudes and motivations of the Palestinian Authority leadership regarding the activities of HAMAS, al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and other terrorist or rejectionist groups. --Evidence of Palestinian Authority's, or PA senior officials' prior knowledge of, funding of, authorization of, or participation in popular unrest, violent outbreaks, or terrorist acts. --Financial support to NGO's from foreign governments, to include Venezuela and Turkey. --Contacts and cooperation between NGOs and terrorist groups, especially HAMAS charities and any political/humanitarian entities suspected of passing funds to militants.        3) Islamic Activism (DEPS-1). --Details about Islamic reformer, oppositionist and militant (activist) leaders, organizations, adherents, and supporters, including objectives, plans and strategies, tactics, and efforts to achieve goals. --Plans and efforts of internal or external Islamic activists to affect governance in Palestinian areas. --Islamic activist plans and efforts to develop political parties or organize opposition to the governing authorities. --Relations and cooperation among internal and external Islamic activists. --Cohesion and divisions within and among Islamic activist groups. --Influence of religious leaders on Islamic activist leaders, adherents, and supporters. --Islamic activist influence on national leadership, military and security services, educational institutions, government agencies, and NGOs. --Islamic activist use of public media, including the use of internet web forums, to achieve strategic, tactical and/or operational objectives. --HAMAS ownership of broadcasting stations.  Government plans and efforts to support or defeat Islamic activist efforts. --HAMAS contacts or connections with Muslim Brotherhood in other countries. --Details of HAMAS connections to HAMAS external leadership in Damascus; HAMAS financial ties to external funding offices such as Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.        4) Threats Against American Citizens (TERR-2). --Indications of Americans (officials, tourists, or residents) becoming targets of any terrorist groups operating in or near Israel, West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. --Palestinian terrorist groups' perceptions of US vulnerabilities and their perceptions of how the United States would respond to attacks against the homeland or US interests overseas. --Palestinian authorities' response to terrorist threats and attacks against the US interests, persons or facilities. --Policies, plans, and efforts regarding cooperation by Palestinian or Israeli officials with the US and regional neighbors concerning US POW/MIA accounting and recovery efforts and capabilities to assist or cooperate in recovery efforts.  ¶E. Palestinian Social Development and Infrastructure        1) Human Rights (HRWC-3). --Palestinian data and perception of the humanitarian impact of Israel's closure of Gaza and lack of freedom of movement in the West Bank due to security checkpoints, the barrier, and other obstacles to free movement. --Details about HAMAS and the Palestinian Authority's facilitation of humanitarian operations in the West Bank and Gaza. --Information on treatment of prisoners or detainees from opposition groups. --Palestinian intelligence and security forces' attitudes toward and participation in torture, and other human rights violations.        2) Demographics (DEMG-3). --Population data for Palestinian areas and Palestinian Diaspora. --Details about, and changes to, key demographic indicators, such as birth rate, fertility rate, mortality rate, and internal migration. --Palestinian leadership's view of demographic trends; use of data in consideration of two-state solution. --Palestinian officials' efforts to deal with the 'youth bulge' and resultant educational, training, and employment challenges. --Efforts by Palestinian Authority or HAMAS officials or institutions to co-opt the youth.        3) Water Management (ENVR-4). --Plans and intentions of Palestinian officials in West Bank and Gaza to confront environmental issues, particularly problems with water and waste management. --Palestinian perceptions of efforts to mitigate the impact of power shortages on sewer treatment and other civil services. --Palestinian strategies and efforts regarding water management and protection of infrastructure against attack. --Details about annual water use, and renewable surface and groundwater reserves. --Cooperation and disputes with other states regarding regional water resources to include the aquifers. --Details about plans and efforts to augment supplies from non-conventional sources, such as desalination plants.        4) Infectious Disease and Health (HLTH-5). --Information on the effects of Palestinian-Israeli violence on public health conditions in Palestinian-controlled areas. --Details about prevalence, and outbreaks of infectious disease to include HIV and avian flu H5N1. --Palestinian Authority plans and efforts to prevent and manage outbreaks. --Statistical information on the incidence of chronic and infectious disease among various population groups (Gaza, West Bank, Bedouin, urban, agricultural areas, and so forth).  --Details about location and level of contaminants in air, water, food, and soil, including threat to health from accidental or intentional release of toxic industrial chemicals. --Military and civilian medical capabilities and infrastructure. --Details about HAMAS and other Palestinian groups' medical assistance to Palestinians.        5) Civilian Infrastructure (INFR-3). --Information on location and condition of power plants, roads, hospitals, waste treatment facilities and financial institutions in the Palestinian areas. --Information on Palestinian access to fuel for power plants.  --Palestinian perceptions of efforts to deal with impact of power shortages and efforts to mitigate power shortages on sewer treatment and other civil services.  ¶F. Government of Israel Plans, Policies, and Actions        1) Israeli Leadership Plans and Intentions on the Peace Process (LEAD-1). --Government of Israel (GOI) leadership's negotiating positions, strategies, and goals in interactions with the Fatah-affiliated Palestinian Authority officials, with supporters or elements affiliated with HAMAS, and with other Palestinian parties concerned with the peace process. --Israeli leaders' perceptions of and relations with Palestinian leaders and negotiating counterparts.  Evidence of informal channels, either sanctioned or unsanctioned by the Israeli leadership, to discuss peace steps with Palestinian leaders. --Israeli leadership views and intentions regarding the impact of their negotiations with Syria on their negotiations with the Palestinians. --Israel's decision-making process for launching military operations and determining retaliation for terrorist attacks.  --Israeli leaders' involvement in decisions on response to terrorist attacks. --Israeli leadership intentions and strategy toward managing the US relationship; views of prime minister and advisors toward the US and its counterterrorism policies.  Israeli thoughts and views on impact of Israeli domestic politics, including changes in GOI leadership, on GOI approach to and conduct of the peace process and negotiations.        2) Conflict Resolution (SRCC-1). --Negotiating positions for Israeli talks with Palestinians on bilateral issues, particularly the extent of Israeli control of Jerusalem, right of return of Palestinian refugees to Israel, Israeli settlements in the West Bank and east Jerusalem, exchanges of territory, and "end of claims". --GOI views and positions on final-status issues; water rights, transportation and energy infrastructure issues, access to the Israeli economy, security, and safe passage between areas of Israeli and Palestinian control, legal matters and prisoners, and Jerusalem (including sovereignty, governance, and access to/control of the "Holy Basin"). --Attitudes of the Israeli public, including Israeli Arabs, toward Israeli-Palestinian talks.  Efforts by opposition parties or members of the ruling coalition to influence government positions on the peace process. --Attitudes of Israeli security forces toward peace negotiations with Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. Current plans and intentions regarding Palestinian access and movement, in particular, access and movement with economic consequences, e.g. movement of produce, access to fields, and movement of commercial goods between Palestinian villages.        3) Government of Israel Security Issues (SRCC-1). --Government of Israel (GOI) views and assessments of military strengths and vulnerabilities. --Perceptions of threats posed by Palestinian rejectionists, including the potential for conflict with their state sponsors, Syria and Iran, and Lebanon. --GOI negotiating positions, strategies, and goals in interactions with Syria, and Lebanon, especially on final status issues. --Israeli views of an Egyptian or Jordanian role in the context of final status issues. --Israeli views on a future regional security pact. --GOI plans, intentions and reactions to Palestinian intentions to develop Gaza off-shore natural gas reserves. GOI plans and actions to continue construction of security fence including views on boundaries, funding constraints, and external influences on decision-making. --GOI plans and actions to implement agreements with Palestinians on bilateral security measures and to implement unilateral security measures over Israeli- and Palestinian-controlled areas. --Views and actions on prisoner swaps/releases; information on Israel's treatment of Palestinian prisoners or detainees, including interrogation methods. --Information on and motivations for any increased Israeli population emigration from Israel.        4) Military Response to Palestinians and Terrorism (FMCC-2). --Details on Israel Defense Forces (IDF) operations underway or planned against the HAMAS-controlled Palestinian militants in Gaza, terrorists, or terrorist infrastructure, including targeted assassinations and tactics/techniques used by ground and air units. --Israeli efforts to counter short-range rockets and mortars.  --IDF preparations to conduct increased operations against Palestinian targets in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Lebanon. --Impact of Israeli efforts against rocket attacks on Israeli views of security. --IDF preparations to conduct combat operations against Hizballah or Syrian targets along Israel's northern border or inside Lebanon or Syria. --IDF units, equipment, maintenance levels, training, morale, and operational readiness. --IDF tactics, techniques and procedures for conducting conventional and unconventional counterinsurgency and counterterrorist operations. --Israeli assessment of the impact of reserve duty in the territories on IDF readiness.        5) Settlements (SRCC-1). --Evidence of Government of Israel support for or opposition to actions to limit and/or reduce settlement and outpost growth and construction. --Information on leaders of the Israeli settlement establishment, including Golan settlers, their ideology, motivations and who they claim to represent. --Divisions among the various settlement groups. --Details on settlement-related budgets and subsidies. Settlers' relationship with the Israeli political and military establishment including their lobbying and settlement methods. --Golan settlers' views of any potential peace agreement with Syria. --Support for settlers within Israeli society. --Indications of Israeli extremist groups becoming more active. --Perceptions of US demands or requirements of Israeli government regarding, security fences and settlements.        6) US and International Community (FPOL-3). --Israeli perceptions of US peace process approach; indications of critical or hostile reaction to US policies and views of Israeli leadership after discussions with the US. --Attitudes of key political and military officials concerning the state of the relationship with the US. --Plans to influence views and positions of academics, journalists, and business, religious and professional organizations towards the US and the US-Israeli relationship.  --Views of and responses to role of the Quartet. --Israeli plans and intentions to support US positions in the UN and other international fora. --Israeli support for US Iraq/Iran policies and US policies and attitudes toward other Middle Eastern countries, and European Union countries; relations with Russia, China, Turkey, Pakistan and India.  ¶G. Information Infrastructure and Telecommunications Systems (INFR-3). --Current specifications, vulnerabilities, capabilities, and planned upgrades to national telecommunications infrastructure, networks, and technologies used by government and military authorities, intelligence and security services, and the public sector. --Details about command, control, and communications systems and facilities. --National leadership use of and dependencies on a dedicated telecommunications infrastructure. --Details about national and regional telecommunications policies, programs, regulations, and training. --Information about current and planned upgrades to public sector communications systems and technologies used by government, military personnel, and the civil sector, including cellular phone networks, mobile satellite phones, very small aperture terminals (VSAT), trunked and mobile radios, pagers, prepaid calling cards, firewalls, encryption, international connectivity, use of electronic data interchange, and cable and fiber networks. --Information about wireless infrastructure, cellular communications capabilities and makes and models of cellular phones and their operating systems, to include second generation and third generation systems. --Details about the use of satellites for telecommunication purposes, including planned system upgrades. --Details about internet and intranet use and infrastructure, including government oversight. --Details about foreign and domestic telecommunications service providers and vendors. --Plans and efforts to acquire US export-controlled telecommunications equipment and technology. --Plans and efforts to export or transfer state-of-the art telecommunications equipment and technology. --Details about information repositories associated with radio frequency identification (RFID)-enabled systems used for passports, government badges, and transportation systems.  --Official and personal phone numbers, fax numbers, and e-mail addresses of principal civilian and military leaders. 

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