Gaza and Lebanon: On Brink of Israeli War? The Survival of Israel's Iron Wall

The Survival of Israel's Iron Wall

By Ramzy Baroud Journalist

It was the war in Gaza late December 2008 that tried to assure the Israeli military supremacy. (Reuters Photo)

The Israeli military may be much less effective in winning wars than it was in the past, thanks to the stiffness of the Arab resistance. However, its military strategists are as shrewd and unpredictable as ever.

The recent rhetoric that has escalated from Israel suggests that a future war with Lebanon will most likely target Syria as well. While this does not necessarily mean that Israel actually intends to target either of these countries in the near future, it is certainly the type of language that often precedes Israeli military maneuvers.

Deciphering the available clues regarding the nature of Israel's immediate military objectives is not always easy, but it is possible.

Possible Indicators

Israel's definition of "existence" could only be ensured by its uncontested military dominance at all fronts.

One indicator that could serve as a foundation for any serious prediction of Israel's actions is Israel's historical tendency to seek a perpetual state of war. Peace, real peace, has never been a long-term policy.

"Unlike many others, I consider that peace is not a goal in itself, but only a means to guarantee our existence," claimed Yossi Peled, a former army general and a current cabinet minister in Benjamin Netanyahu's right-wing government.

Israeli official policy — military or otherwise— is governed by the same Zionist diktats that long preceded the establishment of the state of Israel. If anything has changed since early Zionists outlined their vision, it was the interpretation of those directives. The substance has remained intact.

For example, Zionist visionary, Vladimir Jabotinsky stated in 1923 that the Zionist "colonization can… continue and develop only under the protection of a force independent of the local population — an iron wall which the native population cannot break through."

He was not then referring to an actual wall. While his vision took on various manifestations throughout the years, in 2002 it was translated into a real wall aimed at prejudicing any just solution with the Palestinians.

Recently, unfortunately, Egypt has started building its own steel wall along its border with the war-devastated and impoverished Gaza Strip.

One thing we all know by now is that Israel is a highly militarized country. Its definition of "existence" could only be ensured by its uncontested military dominance at all fronts.

Thus, the devastating link between Palestine and Lebanon makes any analysis of Israel's military intents in Gaza — that excludes Lebanon and Syria — is seriously incomplete.

Consider, for example, the unprecedented Israeli crackdown on the Second Palestinian Uprising that started in September 2000.

Israel will raise the stakes, and will try to draw Syria in, and push for a regional war.

How is that linked to Lebanon? Israel had been freshly defeated by the Lebanese resistance, led by Hizbullah, and was forced to end its occupation of most of South Lebanon in May 2000.

Israel wanted to send an unmistakable message to Palestinians that this defeat was in fact not a defeat at all, and that any attempt at duplicating the Lebanese resistance model in Palestine would be ruthlessly suppressed. Israel's exaggeration in the use of its highly sophisticated military to stifle a largely popular revolution was extremely costly to Palestinians in terms of human toll.

Israel's 34-day war on Lebanon in July 2006 was an Israeli attempt at destroying Arab resistance, and restoring its metaphorical iron wall. It backfired, resulting in a real — not figurative — Israeli defeat. Israel, then, did what it does best. It used its superior air force, destroyed much of Lebanon's civilian infrastructure and killed more than 1,200 people, mostly civilians. The resistance, with humble means, killed more than 160 Israelis, mostly soldiers during combat.

Reviving the Iron Wall

Israel's military strategists knew well that their war crimes in Gaza were a clumsy attempt at regaining national confidence.

Not only did Hizbollah have penetrated the Israeli iron wall, it had also filled it with holes. It challenged, like never before, the Israeli army's notion of invincibility and illusion of security — a something that went horribly wrong in Lebanon.

Since then, the Israeli army, intelligence, propagandists, and politicians have been in constant preparation for another showdown. Nevertheless, before such pending battle, the nation needed to renew its faith in its army and government intelligence; thus, it was the war in Gaza late December 2008.

As appalling as it was for Israeli families to gather en masse near the Israeli-Gaza border, and watch giddily as Gaza and Gazans were blown to smithereens, the act was most rational.

The victims of the war may have been Palestinians in Gaza, but the target audience was Israelis. The brutal and largely one-sided war united Israelis, including their self-proclaimed leftist parties in one rare moment of solidarity. Here was proof that the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) still had enough strength to report military achievements.

Of course, Israel's military strategists knew well that their war crimes in Gaza were a clumsy attempt at regaining national confidence. The tightly-lipped politicians and army generals wanted to give the impression that all was working according to plan. However, the total media blackout, and the orchestrated footage of Israeli soldiers flashing military signs and waving flags on their way back to Israel were clear indications of an attempt to improve a problematic image.

Thus, Yossi Peled's calculated comments on January 23: "In my estimation, understanding, and knowledge, it is almost clear to me that it is a matter of time before there is a military clash in the north." Further, he claimed, "We are heading toward a new confrontation, but I do not know when it will happen, just as we did not know when the second Lebanon war would erupt."

Peled is of course right. There will be a new confrontation. New strategies will be employed. Israel will raise the stakes, and will try to draw Syria in, and push for a regional war. A Lebanon that defines itself based on the terms of resistance — following the failure to politically co-opt Hizbollah — is utterly unacceptable from the Israeli viewpoint.

Peled might be creating a measured distraction from efforts aimed at igniting yet another war — against the besieged resistance in Gaza, or something entirely different.

Hamas' recent announcement that its senior military leader Mahmoud Al- Mabhouh was killed in January in Dubai at the hands of the Israeli intelligence is also an indication of the involved efforts of Israel that goes much further than specific boundaries.

Will it be Gaza or Lebanon first? Israel is sending mixed messages, and deliberately so. Hamas, Hizbollah, and their supporters understand well the Israeli tactic, and they must be preparing for the various possibilities. They know Israel cannot live without its iron walls, and are determined to prevent any more from being built at their expense.