The following document pertaining to the formation of
“Greater Israel” constitutes the cornerstone of powerful
Zionist factions within the current Netanyahu government, the
Likud party, as well as within the Israeli military and
intelligence establishment.
According to the founding father of Zionism Theodore Herzl,
“the area of the Jewish State stretches: “From the Brook of
Egypt to the Euphrates.” According to Rabbi Fischmann,
“The Promised Land extends from the River of Egypt up to
the Euphrates, it includes parts of Syria and Lebanon.”
When viewed in the current
context, the war on Iraq, the 2006 war on Lebanon, the 2011
war on Libya, the ongoing war on Syria, not to mention the
process of regime change in Egypt, must be understood in
relation to the Zionist Plan for the Middle East. The latter
consists in weakening and eventually fracturing neighboring
Arab states as part of an Israeli expansionist project.
“Greater Israel” consists in an area extending from the Nile
Valley to the Euphrates.
The Zionist project supports the Jewish settlement
movement. More broadly it involves a policy of excluding
Palestinians from Palestine leading to the eventual
annexation of both the West Bank and Gaza to the State of
Israel.
Greater Israel would create a number of proxy States. It
would include parts of Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, the Sinai, as
well as parts of Iraq and Saudi Arabia. (See map).
According to Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya in a 2011 Global
Research article, The Yinon Plan was a continuation of
Britain’s colonial design in the Middle East:
“[The Yinon plan] is an Israeli strategic plan to ensure
Israeli regional superiority. It insists and stipulates that
Israel must reconfigure its geo-political environment
through the balkanization of the surrounding Arab states
into smaller and weaker states.
Israeli strategists viewed Iraq as their biggest strategic
challenge from an Arab state. This is why Iraq was
outlined as the centerpiece to the balkanization of the
Middle East and the Arab World. In Iraq, on the basis of
the concepts of the Yinon Plan, Israeli strategists have
called for the division of Iraq into a Kurdish state and two
Arab states, one for Shiite Muslims and the other for Sunni
Muslims. The first step towards establishing this was a war
between Iraq and Iran, which the Yinon Plan discusses.
The Atlantic, in 2008, and the U.S. military’s Armed
Forces Journal, in 2006, both published widely circulated
maps that closely followed the outline of the Yinon Plan.
Aside from a divided Iraq, which the Biden Plan also calls
for, the Yinon Plan calls for a divided Lebanon, Egypt, and
Syria. The partitioning of Iran, Turkey, Somalia, and
Pakistan also all fall into line with these views. The Yinon
Plan also calls for dissolution in North Africa and forecasts
it as starting from Egypt and then spilling over into Sudan,
Libya, and the rest of the region.
Greater Israel” requires the breaking up of the existing Arab
states into small states.
“The plan operates on two essential premises. To survive,
Israel must 1) become an imperial regional power, and 2)
must effect the division of the whole area into small states
by the dissolution of all existing Arab states. Small here
will depend on the ethnic or sectarian composition of each
state. Consequently, the Zionist hope is that sectarian-
based states become Israel’s satellites and, ironically, its
source of moral legitimation… This is not a new idea, nor
does it surface for the first time in Zionist strategic
thinking. Indeed, fragmenting all Arab states into smaller
units has been a recurrent theme.” (Yinon Plan, see below)
Viewed in this context, the war on Syria is part of the process
of Israeli territorial expansion. Israeli intelligence working
hand in glove with the US, Turkey and NATO is directly
supportive of the Al Qaeda terrorist mercenaries inside Syria.
The Zionist Project also requires the destabilization of Egypt,
the creation of factional divisions within Egypt as
instrumented by the “Arab Spring” leading to the formation of
a sectarian based State dominated by the Muslim
Brotherhood.
The Zionist Plan for the Middle East
Translated and edited by
Israel Shahak
The Israel of Theodore Herzl (1904) and of Rabbi Fischmann
(1947)
In his Complete Diaries, Vol. II. p. 711, Theodore Herzl, the
founder of Zionism, says that the area of the Jewish State
stretches: “From the Brook of Egypt to the Euphrates.”
Rabbi Fischmann, member of the Jewish Agency for
Palestine, declared in his testimony to the U.N. Special
Committee of Enquiry on 9 July 1947: “The Promised Land
extends from the River of Egypt up to the Euphrates, it
includes parts of Syria and Lebanon.”
from
Oded Yinon’s
“A Strategy for Israel in the Nineteen Eighties”
Published by the
Association of Arab-American University Graduates, Inc.
Belmont, Massachusetts, 1982
Special Document No. 1 (ISBN 0-937694-56-8)
Table of Contents
The Association of Arab-American University Graduates finds
it compelling to inaugurate its new publication series, Special
Documents, with Oded Yinon’s article which appeared in
Kivunim (Directions), the journal of the Department of
Information of the World Zionist Organization. Oded Yinon is
an Israeli journalist and was formerly attached to the Foreign
Ministry of Israel. To our knowledge, this document is the
most explicit, detailed and unambiguous statement to date of
the Zionist strategy in the Middle East. Furthermore, it stands
as an accurate representation of the “vision” for the entire
Middle East of the presently ruling Zionist regime of Begin,
Sharon and Eitan. Its importance, hence, lies not in its
historical value but in the nightmare which it presents.
2
The plan operates on two essential premises. To survive,
Israel must
1) become an imperial regional power,
and 2)
must effect the division of the whole area into small states by
the dissolution of all existing Arab states. Small here will
depend on the ethnic or sectarian composition of each state.
Consequently, the Zionist hope is that sectarian-based states
become Israel’s satellites and, ironically, its source of moral
legitimation.
3
This is not a new idea, nor does it surface for the first time in
Zionist strategic thinking. Indeed, fragmenting all Arab states
into smaller units has been a recurrent theme. This theme
has been documented on a very modest scale in the AAUG
publication, Israel’s Sacred Terrorism (1980), by Livia
Rokach. Based on the memoirs of Moshe Sharett, former
Prime Minister of Israel, Rokach’s study documents, in
convincing detail, the Zionist plan as it applies to Lebanon
and as it was prepared in the mid-fifties.
4
The first massive Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1978 bore
this plan out to the minutest detail. The second and more
barbaric and encompassing Israeli invasion of Lebanon on
June 6, 1982, aims to effect certain parts of this plan which
hopes to see not only Lebanon, but Syria and Jordan as well,
in fragments. This ought to make mockery of Israeli public
claims regarding their desire for a strong and independent
Lebanese central government. More accurately, they want a
Lebanese central government that sanctions their regional
imperialist designs by signing a peace treaty with them. They
also seek acquiescence in their designs by the Syrian, Iraqi,
Jordanian and other Arab governments as well as by the
Palestinian people. What they want and what they are
planning for is not an Arab world, but a world of Arab
fragments that is ready to succumb to Israeli hegemony.
Hence, Oded Yinon in his essay, “A Strategy for Israel in the
1980′s,” talks about “far-reaching opportunities for the first
time since 1967″ that are created by the “very stormy
situation [that] surrounds Israel.”
5
The Zionist policy of displacing the Palestinians from
Palestine is very much an active policy, but is pursued more
forcefully in times of conflict, such as in the 1947-1948 war
and in the 1967 war. An appendix entitled ”Israel Talks of a
New Exodus” is included in this publication to demonstrate
past Zionist dispersals of Palestinians from their homeland
and to show, besides the main Zionist document we present,
other Zionist planning for the de-Palestinization of Palestine.
6
It is clear from the Kivunim document, published in February,
1982, that the “far-reaching opportunities” of which Zionist
strategists have been thinking are the same “opportunities” of
which they are trying to convince the world and which they
claim were generated by their June, 1982 invasion. It is also
clear that the Palestinians were never the sole target of
Zionist plans, but the priority target since their viable and
independent presence as a people negates the essence of
the Zionist state. Every Arab state, however, especially those
with cohesive and clear nationalist directions, is a real target
sooner or later.
7
Contrasted with the detailed and unambiguous Zionist
strategy elucidated in this document, Arab and Palestinian
strategy, unfortunately, suffers from ambiguity and
incoherence. There is no indication that Arab strategists have
internalized the Zionist plan in its full ramifications. Instead,
they react with incredulity and shock whenever a new stage
of it unfolds. This is apparent in Arab reaction, albeit muted,
to the Israeli siege of Beirut. The sad fact is that as long as
the Zionist strategy for the Middle East is not taken seriously
Arab reaction to any future siege of other Arab capitals will
be the same.
Khalil Nakhleh
July 23, 1982
Foreward
by Israel Shahak
1
The following essay represents, in my opinion, the accurate
and detailed plan of the present Zionist regime (of Sharon
and Eitan) for the Middle East which is based on the division
of the whole area into small states, and the dissolution of all
the existing Arab states. I will comment on the military aspect
of this plan in a concluding note. Here I want to draw the
attention of the readers to several important points:
2
1. The idea that all the Arab states should be broken down,
by Israel, into small units, occurs again and again in Israeli
strategic thinking. For example, Ze’ev Schiff, the military
correspondent of Ha’aretz (and probably the most
knowledgeable in Israel, on this topic) writes about the “best”
that can happen for Israeli interests in Iraq: “The dissolution
of Iraq into a Shi’ite state, a Sunni state and the separation
of the Kurdish part” (Ha’aretz 6/2/1982). Actually, this aspect
of the plan is very old.
3
2. The strong connection with Neo-Conservative thought in
the USA is very prominent, especially in the author’s notes.
But, while lip service is paid to the idea of the “defense of the
West” from Soviet power, the real aim of the author, and of
the present Israeli establishment is clear: To make an
Imperial Israel into a world power. In other words, the aim of
Sharon is to deceive the Americans after he has deceived all
the rest.
4
3. It is obvious that much of the relevant data, both in the
notes and in the text, is garbled or omitted, such as the
financial help of the U.S. to Israel. Much of it is pure fantasy.
But, the plan is not to be regarded as not influential, or as
not capable of realization for a short time. The plan follows
faithfully the geopolitical ideas current in Germany of 1890-
1933, which were swallowed whole by Hitler and the Nazi
movement, and determined their aims for East Europe.
Those aims, especially the division of the existing states,
were carried out in 1939-1941, and only an alliance on the
global scale prevented their consolidation for a period of
time.
5
The notes by the author follow the text. To avoid confusion, I
did not add any notes of my own, but have put the
substance of them into this foreward and the conclusion at
the end. I have, however, emphasized some portions of the
text.
Israel Shahak
June 13, 1982
A Strategy for Israel in the Nineteen Eighties
by Oded Yinon
This essay originally appeared in Hebrew in KIVUNIM
(Directions), A Journal for Judaism and Zionism; Issue No,
14–Winter, 5742, February 1982, Editor: Yoram Beck.
Editorial Committee: Eli Eyal, Yoram Beck, Amnon Hadari,
Yohanan Manor, Elieser Schweid. Published by the
Department of Publicity/The World Zionist Organization,
Jerusalem.
1
At the outset of the nineteen eighties the State of Israel is in
need of a new perspective as to its place, its aims and
national targets, at home and abroad. This need has
become even more vital due to a number of central
processes which the country, the region and the world are
undergoing. We are living today in the early stages of a new
epoch in human history which is not at all similar to its
predecessor, and its characteristics are totally different from
what we have hitherto known. That is why we need an
understanding of the central processes which typify this
historical epoch on the one hand, and on the other hand we
need a world outlook and an operational strategy in
accordance with the new conditions. The existence,
prosperity and steadfastness of the Jewish state will depend
upon its ability to adopt a new framework for its domestic
and foreign affairs.
2
This epoch is characterized by several traits which we can
already diagnose, and which symbolize a genuine revolution
in our present lifestyle. The dominant process is the
breakdown of the rationalist, humanist outlook as the major
cornerstone supporting the life and achievements of
Western civilization since the Renaissance. The political,
social and economic views which have emanated from this
foundation have been based on several “truths” which are
presently disappearing–for example, the view that man as an
individual is the center of the universe and everything exists
in order to fulfill his basic material needs. This position is
being invalidated in the present when it has become clear
that the amount of resources in the cosmos does not meet
Man’s requirements, his economic needs or his demographic
constraints. In a world in which there are four billion human
beings and economic and energy resources which do not
grow proportionally to meet the needs of mankind, it is
unrealistic to expect to fulfill the main requirement of
Western Society, 1 i.e., the wish and aspiration for
boundless consumption. The view that ethics plays no part
in determining the direction Man takes, but rather his
material needs do–that view is becoming prevalent today as
we see a world in which nearly all values are disappearing.
We are losing the ability to assess the simplest things,
especially when they concern the simple question of what is
Good and what is Evil.
3
The vision of man’s limitless aspirations and abilities shrinks
in the face of the sad facts of life, when we witness the
break-up of world order around us. The view which promises
liberty and freedom to mankind seems absurd in light of the
sad fact that three fourths of the human race lives under
totalitarian regimes. The views concerning equality and
social justice have been transformed by socialism and
especially by Communism into a laughing stock. There is no
argument as to the truth of these two ideas, but it is clear
that they have not been put into practice properly and the
majority of mankind has lost the liberty, the freedom and the
opportunity for equality and justice. In this nuclear world in
which we are (still) living in relative peace for thirty years, the
concept of peace and coexistence among nations has no
meaning when a superpower like the USSR holds a military
and political doctrine of the sort it has: that not only is a
nuclear war possible and necessary in order to achieve the
ends of Marxism, but that it is possible to survive after it, not
to speak of the fact that one can be victorious in it.2
4
The essential concepts of human society, especially those of
the West, are undergoing a change due to political, military
and economic transformations. Thus, the nuclear and
conventional might of the USSR has transformed the epoch
that has just ended into the last respite before the great
saga that will demolish a large part of our world in a multi-
dimensional global war, in comparison with which the past
world wars will have been mere child’s play. The power of
nuclear as well as of conventional weapons, their quantity,
their precision and quality will turn most of our world upside
down within a few years, and we must align ourselves so as
to face that in Israel. That is, then, the main threat to our
resources in the world, the Arab monopoly on oil, and the
need of the West to import most of its raw materials from the
Third World, are transforming the world we know, given that
one of the major aims of the USSR is to defeat the West by
gaining control over the gigantic resources in the Persian
Gulf and in the southern part of Africa, in which the majority
of world minerals are located. We can imagine the
dimensions of the global confrontation which will face us in
the future.
5
The Gorshkov doctrine calls for Soviet control of the oceans
and mineral rich areas of the Third World. That together with
the present Soviet nuclear doctrine which holds that it is
possible to manage, win and survive a nuclear war, in the
course of which the West’s military might well be destroyed
and its inhabitants made slaves in the service of Marxism-
Leninism, is the main danger to world peace and to our own
existence. Since 1967, the Soviets have transformed
Clausewitz’ dictum into “War is the continuation of policy in
nuclear means,” and made it the motto which guides all their
policies. Already today they are busy carrying out their aims
in our region and throughout the world, and the need to face
them becomes the major element in our country’s security
policy and of course that of the rest of the Free World. That
is our major foreign challenge.4
6
The Arab Moslem world, therefore, is not the major strategic
problem which we shall face in the Eighties, despite the fact
that it carries the main threat against Israel, due to its
growing military might. This world, with its ethnic minorities,
its factions and internal crises, which is astonishingly self-
destructive, as we can see in Lebanon, in non-Arab Iran and
now also in Syria, is unable to deal successfully with its
fundamental problems and does not therefore constitute a
real threat against the State of Israel in the long run, but
only in the short run where its immediate military power has
great import. In the long run, this world will be unable to
exist within its present framework in the areas around us
without having to go through genuine revolutionary changes.
The Moslem Arab World is built like a temporary house of
cards put together by foreigners (France and Britain in the
Nineteen Twenties), without the wishes and desires of the
inhabitants having been taken into account. It was arbitrarily
divided into 19 states, all made of combinations of minorites
and ethnic groups which are hostile to one another, so that
every Arab Moslem state nowadays faces ethnic social
destruction from within, and in some a civil war is already
live in Africa, mostly in Egypt (45 million today).
7
Apart from Egypt, all the Maghreb states are made up of a
mixture of Arabs and non-Arab Berbers. In Algeria there is
already a civil war raging in the Kabile mountains between
the two nations in the country. Morocco and Algeria are at
war with each other over Spanish Sahara, in addition to the
internal struggle in each of them. Militant Islam endangers
the integrity of Tunisia and Qaddafi organizes wars which
are destructive from the Arab point of view, from a country
which is sparsely populated and which cannot become a
powerful nation. That is why he has been attempting
unifications in the past with states that are more genuine,
like Egypt and Syria. Sudan, the most torn apart state in the
Arab Moslem world today is built upon four groups hostile to
each other, an Arab Moslem Sunni minority which rules over
a majority of non-Arab Africans, Pagans, and Christians. In
Egypt there is a Sunni Moslem majority facing a large
minority of Christians which is dominant in upper Egypt:
some 7 million of them, so that even Sadat, in his speech on
May 8, expressed the fear that they will want a state of their
own, something like a “second” Christian Lebanon in Egypt.
8
All the Arab States east of Israel are torn apart, broken up
and riddled with inner conflict even more than those of the
Maghreb. Syria is fundamentally no different from Lebanon
except in the strong military regime which rules it. But the
real civil war taking place nowadays between the Sunni
majority and the Shi’ite Alawi ruling minority (a mere 12% of
the population) testifies to the severity of the domestic
trouble.
9
Iraq is, once again, no different in essence from its
neighbors, although its majority is Shi’ite and the ruling
minority Sunni. Sixty-five percent of the population has no
say in politics, in which an elite of 20 percent holds the
power. In addition there is a large Kurdish minority in the
north, and if it weren’t for the strength of the ruling regime,
the army and the oil revenues, Iraq’s future state would be
no different than that of Lebanon in the past or of Syria
today. The seeds of inner conflict and civil war are apparent
today already, especially after the rise of Khomeini to power
in Iran, a leader whom the Shi’ites in Iraq view as their
natural leader.
10
All the Gulf principalities and Saudi Arabia are built upon a
delicate house of sand in which there is only oil. In Kuwait,
the Kuwaitis constitute only a quarter of the population. In
Bahrain, the Shi’ites are the majority but are deprived of
power. In the UAE, Shi’ites are once again the majority but
the Sunnis are in power. The same is true of Oman and
North Yemen. Even in the Marxist South Yemen there is a
sizable Shi’ite minority. In Saudi Arabia half the population is
foreign, Egyptian and Yemenite, but a Saudi minority holds
power.
11
Jordan is in reality Palestinian, ruled by a Trans-Jordanian
Bedouin minority, but most of the army and certainly the
bureaucracy is now Palestinian. As a matter of fact Amman
is as Palestinian as Nablus. All of these countries have
powerful armies, relatively speaking. But there is a problem
there too. The Syrian army today is mostly Sunni with an
Alawi officer corps, the Iraqi army Shi’ite with Sunni
commanders. This has great significance in the long run,
and that is why it will not be possible to retain the loyalty of
the army for a long time except where it comes to the only
common denominator: The hostility towards Israel, and today
even that is insufficient.
12
Alongside the Arabs, split as they are, the other Moslem
states share a similar predicament. Half of Iran’s population
is comprised of a Persian speaking group and the other half
of an ethnically Turkish group. Turkey’s population
comprises a Turkish Sunni Moslem majority, some 50%, and
two large minorities, 12 million Shi’ite Alawis and 6 million
Sunni Kurds. In Afghanistan there are 5 million
Shi’ites who constitute one third of the population. In Sunni
Pakistan there are 15 million Shi’ites who endanger the
existence of that state.
13
This national ethnic minority picture extending from Morocco
to India and from Somalia to Turkey points to the absence of
stability and a rapid degeneration in the entire region. When
this picture is added to the economic one, we see how the
entire region is built like a house of cards, unable to
withstand its severe problems.
14
In this giant and fractured world there are a few wealthy
groups and a huge mass of poor people. Most of the Arabs
have an average yearly income of 300 dollars. That is the
situation in Egypt, in most of the Maghreb countries except
for Libya, and in Iraq. Lebanon is torn apart and its economy
is falling to pieces. It is a state in which there is no
centralized power, but only 5 de facto sovereign authorities
(Christian in the north, supported by the Syrians and under
the rule of the Franjieh clan, in the East an area of direct
Syrian conquest, in the center a Phalangist controlled
Christian enclave, in the south and up to the Litani river a
mostly Palestinian region controlled by the PLO and Major
Haddad’s state of Christians and half a million Shi’ites). Syria
is in an even graver situation and even the assistance she
will obtain in the future after the unification with Libya will not
be sufficient for dealing with the basic problems of existence
and the maintenance of a large army. Egypt is in the worst
situation: Millions are on the verge of hunger, half the labor
force is unemployed, and housing is scarce in this most
densely populated area of the world. Except for the army,
there is not a single department operating efficiently and the
state is in a permanent state of bankruptcy and depends
entirely on American foreign assistance granted since the
peace.6
15
In the Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, Libya and Egypt there is the
largest accumulation of money and oil in the world, but
those enjoying it are tiny elites who lack a wide base of
support and self-confidence, something that no army can
guarantee. 7 The Saudi army with all its equipment cannot
defend the regime from real dangers at home or abroad, and
what took place in Mecca in 1980 is only an example. A sad
and very stormy situation surrounds Israel and creates
challenges for it, problems, risks but also far-reaching
opportunities for the first time since 1967. Chances are that
opportunities missed at that time will become achievable in
the Eighties to an extent and along dimensions which we
cannot even imagine today.
16
The “peace” policy and the return of territories, through a
dependence upon the US, precludes the realization of the
new option created for us. Since 1967, all the governments
of Israel have tied our national aims down to narrow political
needs, on the one hand, and on the other to destructive
opinions at home which neutralized our capacities both at
home and abroad. Failing to take steps towards the Arab
population in the new territories, acquired in the course of a
war forced upon us, is the major strategic error committed by
Israel on the morning after the Six Day War. We could have
saved ourselves all the bitter and dangerous conflict since
then if we had given Jordan to the Palestinians who live west
of the Jordan river. By doing that we would have neutralized
the Palestinian problem which we nowadays face, and to
which we have found solutions that are really no solutions at
all, such as territorial compromise or autonomy which
amount, in fact, to the same thing. 8 Today, we suddenly
face immense opportunities for transforming the situation
thoroughly and this we must do in the coming decade,
otherwise we shall not survive as a state.
17
In the course of the Nineteen Eighties, the State of Israel will
have to go through far-reaching changes in its political and
economic regime domestically, along with radical changes in
its foreign policy, in order to stand up to the global and
regional challenges of this new epoch. The loss of the Suez
Canal oil fields, of the immense potential of the oil, gas and
other natural resources in the Sinai peninsula which is
geomorphologically identical to the rich oil-producing
countries in the region, will result in an energy drain in the
near future and will destroy our domestic economy: one
quarter of our present GNP as well as one third of the
budget is used for the purchase of oil. 9 The search for raw
materials in the Negev and on the coast will not, in the near
future, serve to alter that state of affairs.
18
(Regaining) the Sinai peninsula with its present and
potential resources is therefore a political priority which is
obstructed by the Camp David and the peace agreements.
The fault for that lies of course with the present Israeli
government and the governments which paved the road to
the policy of territorial compromise, the Alignment
governments since 1967. The Egyptians will not need to
keep the peace treaty after the return of the Sinai, and they
will do all they can to return to the fold of the Arab world and
to the USSR in order to gain support and military assistance.
American aid is guaranteed only for a short while, for the
terms of the peace and the weakening of the U.S. both at
home and abroad will bring about a reduction in aid. Without
oil and the income from it, with the present enormous
expenditure, we will not be able to get through 1982 under
the present conditions and we will have to act in order to
return the situation to the status quo which existed in Sinai
prior to Sadat’s visit and the mistaken peace agreement
signed with him in March 1979. 10
19
Israel has two major routes through which to realize this
purpose, one direct and the other indirect. The direct option
is the less realistic one because of the nature of the regime
and government in Israel as well as the wisdom of Sadat
who obtained our withdrawal from Sinai, which was, next to
the war of 1973, his major achievement since he took power.
Israel will not unilaterally break the treaty, neither today, nor
in 1982, unless it is very hard pressed economically and
politically and Egypt provides Israel with the excuse to take
the Sinai back into our hands for the fourth time in our short
history. What is left therefore, is the indirect option. The
economic situation in Egypt, the nature of the regime and its
pan-
Arab policy, will bring about a situation after April 1982 in
which Israel will be forced to act directly or indirectly in order
to regain control over Sinai as a strategic, economic and
energy reserve for the long run. Egypt does not constitute a
military strategic problem due to its internal conflicts and it
could be driven back to the post 1967 war situation in no
more than one day. 11
20
The myth of Egypt as the strong leader of the Arab World
was demolished back in 1956 and definitely did not survive
1967, but our policy, as in the return of the Sinai, served to
turn the myth into “fact.” In reality, however, Egypt’s power in
proportion both to Israel alone and to the rest of the Arab
World has gone down about 50 percent since 1967. Egypt is
no longer the leading political power in the Arab World and
is economically on the verge of a crisis. Without foreign
assistance the crisis will come tomorrow. 12 In the short run,
due to the return of the Sinai, Egypt will gain several
advantages at our expense, but only in the short run until
1982, and that will not change the balance of power to its
benefit, and will possibly bring about its downfall. Egypt, in
its present domestic political picture, is already a corpse, all
the more so if we take into account the growing Moslem-
Christian rift. Breaking Egypt down territorially into distinct
geographical regions is the political aim of Israel in the
Nineteen Eighties on its Western front.
21
Egypt is divided and torn apart into many foci of authority. If
Egypt falls apart, countries like Libya, Sudan or even the
more distant states will not continue to exist in their present
form and will join the downfall and dissolution of Egypt. The
vision of a Christian Coptic State in Upper Egypt alongside a
number of weak states with very localized power and without
a centralized government as to date, is the key to a historical
development which was only set back by the peace
agreement but which seems inevitable in the long run. 13
22
The Western front, which on the surface appears more
problematic, is in fact less complicated than the Eastern
front, in which most of the events that make the headlines
have been taking place recently. Lebanon’s total dissolution
into five provinces serves as a precendent for the entire Arab
world including Egypt, Syria, Iraq and the Arabian peninsula
and is already following that track. The dissolution of Syria
and Iraq later on into ethnically or religiously unqiue areas
such as in Lebanon, is Israel’s primary target on the Eastern
front in the long run, while the dissolution of the military
power of those states serves as the primary short term target.
Syria will fall apart, in accordance with its ethnic and religious
structure, into several states such as in present day Lebanon,
so that there will be a Shi’ite Alawi state along its coast, a
Sunni state in the Aleppo area, another Sunni state in
Damascus hostile to its northern neighbor, and the Druzes
who will set up a state, maybe even in our Golan, and
certainly in the Hauran and in northern Jordan. This state of
affairs will be the guarantee for peace and security in the
area in the long run, and that aim is already within our reach
today. 14
23
Iraq, rich in oil on the one hand and internally torn on the
other, is guaranteed as a candidate for Israel’s targets. Its
dissolution is even more important for us than that of Syria.
Iraq is stronger than Syria. In the short run it is Iraqi power
which constitutes the greatest threat to Israel. An Iraqi-
Iranian war will tear Iraq apart and cause its downfall at
home even before it is able to organize a struggle on a wide
front against us. Every kind of inter-Arab confrontation will
assist us in the short run and will shorten the way to the more
important aim of breaking up Iraq into denominations as in
Syria and in Lebanon. In Iraq, a division into provinces along
ethnic/religious lines as in Syria during Ottoman times is
possible. So, three (or more) states will exist around the
three major cities: Basra, Baghdad and Mosul, and Shi’ite
areas in the south will separate from the Sunni and Kurdish
north. It is possible that the present Iranian-Iraqi
confrontation will deepen this polarization. 15
24
The entire Arabian peninsula is a natural candidate for
dissolution due to internal and external pressures, and the
matter is inevitable especially in Saudi Arabia. Regardless of
whether its economic might based on oil remains intact or
whether it is diminished in the long run, the internal rifts and
breakdowns are a clear and natural development in light of
the present political structure. 16
25
Jordan constitutes an immediate strategic target in the short
run but not in the long run, for it does not constitute a real
threat in the long run after its dissolution, the termination of
the lengthy rule of King Hussein and the transfer of power to
the Palestinians in the short run.
26
There is no chance that Jordan will continue to exist in its
present structure for a long time, and Israel’s policy, both in
war and in peace, ought to be directed at the liquidation of
Jordan under the present regime and the transfer of power
to the Palestinian majority. Changing the regime east of the
river will also cause the termination of the problem of the
territories densely populated with Arabs west of the Jordan.
Whether in war or under conditions of peace, emigration from
the territories and economic demographic freeze in them, are
the guarantees for the coming change on both banks of the
river, and we ought to be active in order to accelerate this
process in the nearest future. The autonomy plan ought also
to be rejected, as well as any compromise or division of the
territories for, given the plans of the PLO and those of the
Israeli Arabs themselves, the Shefa’amr plan of September
1980, it is not possible to go on living in this country in the
present situation without separating the two nations, the
Arabs to Jordan and the Jews to the areas west of the river.
Genuine coexistence and peace will reign over the land only
when the Arabs understand that without Jewish rule
between the Jordan and the sea they will have neither
existence nor security. A nation of their own and security will
be theirs only in Jordan. 17
27
Within Israel the distinction between the areas of ’67 and the
territories beyond them, those of ’48, has always been
meaningless for Arabs and nowadays no longer has any
significance for us. The problem should be seen in its
entirety without any divisions as of ’67. It should be clear,
under any future political situation or military constellation,
that the solution of the problem of the indigenous Arabs will
come only when they recognize the existence of Israel in
secure borders up to the Jordan river and beyond it, as our
existential need in this difficult epoch, the nuclear epoch
which we shall soon enter. It is no longer possible to live with
three fourths of the Jewish population on the dense
shoreline which is so dangerous in a nuclear epoch.
28
Dispersal of the population is therefore a domestic strategic
aim of the highest order; otherwise, we shall cease to exist
within any borders. Judea, Samaria and the Galilee are our
sole guarantee for national existence, and if we do not
become the majority in the mountain areas, we shall not rule
in the country and we shall be like the Crusaders, who lost
this country which was not theirs anyhow, and in which they
were foreigners to begin with. Rebalancing the country
demographically, strategically and economically is the
highest and most central aim today. Taking hold of the
mountain watershed from Beersheba to the Upper Galilee is
the national aim generated by the major strategic
consideration which is settling the mountainous part of the
country that is empty of Jews today. l8
29
Realizing our aims on the Eastern front depends first on the
realization of this internal strategic objective. The
transformation of the political and economic structure, so as
to enable the realization of these strategic aims, is the key to
achieving the entire change. We need to change from a
centralized economy in which the government is extensively
involved, to an open and free market as well as to switch
from depending upon the U.S. taxpayer to developing, with
our own hands, of a genuine productive economic
infrastructure. If we are not able to make this change freely
and voluntarily, we shall be forced into it by world
developments, especially in the areas of economics, energy,
and politics, and by our own growing isolation. l9
30
From a military and strategic point of view, the West led by
the U.S. is unable to withstand the global pressures of the
USSR throughout the world, and Israel must therefore stand
alone in the Eighties, without any foreign assistance, military
or economic, and this is within our capacities today, with no
compromises. 20 Rapid changes in the world will also bring
about a change in the condition of world Jewry to which Israel
will become not only a last resort but the only existential
option. We cannot assume that U.S. Jews, and the
communities of Europe and Latin America will continue to
exist in the present form in the future. 21
31
Our existence in this country itself is certain, and there is no
force that could remove us from here either forcefully or by
treachery (Sadat’s method). Despite the difficulties of the
mistaken “peace” policy and the problem of the Israeli Arabs
and those of the territories, we can effectively deal with these
problems in the foreseeable future.
Conclusion
1
Three important points have to be clarified in order to be
able to understand the significant possibilities of realization
of this Zionist plan for the Middle East, and also why it had
to be published.
2
The Military Background of The Plan
The military conditions of this plan have not been mentioned
above, but on the many occasions where something very like
it is being “explained” in closed meetings to members of the
Israeli Establishment, this point is clarified. It is assumed that
the Israeli military forces, in all their branches, are
insufficient for the actual work of occupation of such wide
territories as discussed above. In fact, even in times of
intense Palestinian “unrest” on the West Bank, the forces of
the Israeli Army are stretched out too much. The answer to
that is the method of ruling by means of “Haddad forces” or
of “Village Associations” (also known as “Village Leagues”):
local forces under “leaders” completely dissociated from the
population, not having even any feudal or party structure
(such as the Phalangists have, for example). The “states”
proposed by Yinon are “Haddadland” and “Village
Associations,” and their armed forces will be, no doubt, quite
similar. In addition, Israeli military superiority in such a
situation will be much greater than it is even now, so that
any movement of revolt will be “punished” either by mass
humiliation as in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, or by
bombardment and obliteration of cities, as in Lebanon now
(June 1982), or by both. In order to ensure this, the plan, as
explained orally, calls for the establishment of Israeli
garrisons in focal places between the mini states, equipped
with the necessary mobile destructive forces. In fact, we
have seen something like this in Haddadland and we will
almost certainly soon see the first example of this system
functioning either in South Lebanon or in all Lebanon.
3
It is obvious that the above military assumptions, and the
whole plan too, depend also on the Arabs continuing to be
even more divided than they are now, and on the lack of any
truly progressive mass movement among them. It may be
that those two conditions will be removed only when the plan
will be well advanced, with consequences which can not be
foreseen.
4
Why it is necessary to publish this in Israel?
The reason for publication is the dual nature of the Israeli-
Jewish society: A very great measure of freedom and
democracy, specially for Jews, combined with expansionism
and racist discrimination. In such a situation the Israeli-
Jewish elite (for the masses follow the TV and Begin’s
speeches) has to be persuaded. The first steps in the
process of persuasion are oral, as indicated above, but a
time comes in which it becomes inconvenient. Written
material must be produced for the benefit of the more stupid
“persuaders” and “explainers” (for example medium-rank
officers, who are, usually, remarkably stupid). They then
“learn it,” more or less, and preach to others. It should be
remarked that Israel, and even the Yishuv from the Twenties,
has always functioned in this way. I myself well remember
how (before I was “in opposition”) the necessity of war with
was explained to me and others a year before the 1956 war,
and the necessity of conquering “the rest of Western
Palestine when we will have the opportunity” was explained
in the years 1965-67.
5
Why is it assumed that there is no special risk from the
outside in the publication of such plans?
Such risks can come from two sources, so long as the
principled opposition inside Israel is very weak (a situation
which may change as a consequence of the war on
Lebanon) : The Arab World, including the Palestinians, and
the United States. The Arab World has shown itself so far
quite incapable of a detailed and rational analysis of Israeli-
Jewish society, and the Palestinians have been, on the
average, no better than the rest. In such a situation, even
those who are shouting about the dangers of Israeli
expansionism (which are real enough) are doing this not
because of factual and detailed knowledge, but because of
belief in myth. A good example is the very persistent belief in
the non-existent writing on the wall of the Knesset of the
Biblical verse about the Nile and the Euphrates. Another
example is the persistent, and completely false declarations,
which were made by some of the most important Arab
leaders, that the two blue stripes of the Israeli flag symbolize
the Nile and the Euphrates, while in fact they are taken from
the stripes of the Jewish praying shawl (Talit). The Israeli
specialists assume that, on the whole, the Arabs will pay no
attention to their serious discussions of the future, and the
Lebanon war has proved them right. So why should they not
continue with their old methods of persuading other Israelis?
6
In the United States a very similar situation exists, at least
until now. The more or less serious commentators take their
information about Israel, and much of their opinions about it,
from two sources. The first is from articles in the “liberal”
American press, written almost totally by Jewish admirers of
Israel who, even if they are critical of some aspects of the
Israeli state, practice loyally what Stalin used to call “the
constructive criticism.” (In fact those among them who claim
also to be “Anti-Stalinist” are in reality more Stalinist than
Stalin, with Israel being their god which has not yet failed).
In the framework of such critical worship it must be assumed
that Israel has always “good intentions” and only “makes
mistakes,” and therefore such a plan would not be a matter
for discussion–exactly as the Biblical genocides committed
by Jews are not mentioned. The other source of information,
The Jerusalem Post, has similar policies. So long, therefore,
as the situation exists in which Israel is really a “closed
society” to the rest of the world, because the world wants to
close its eyes, the publication and even the beginning of the
realization of such a plan is realistic and feasible.
Israel Shahak
June 17, 1982 Jerusalem
About the Translator
Israel Shahak is a professor of organic chemistly at Hebrew
University in Jerusalem and the chairman of the Israeli
League for Human and Civil Rights. He published The
Shahak Papers, collections of key articles from the Hebrew
press, and is the author of numerous articles and books,
among them Non-Jew in the Jewish State. His latest book is
Israel’s Global Role: Weapons for Repression, published by
the AAUG in 1982. Israel Shahak: (1933-2001)
Notes
According to this research, the population of the world will
be 6 billion in the year 2000. Today’s world population can
be broken down as follows: China, 958 million; India, 635
million; USSR, 261 million; U.S., 218 million Indonesia, 140
million; Brazil and Japan, 110 million each. According to the
figures of the U.N. Population Fund for 1980, there will be, in
2000, 50 cities with a population of over 5 million each. The
population ofthp;Third World will then be 80% of the world
population. According to Justin Blackwelder, U.S. Census
Office chief, the world population will not reach 6 billion
because of hunger.
American Sovietologists: Joseph D. Douglas and Amoretta
M. Hoeber, Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War, (Stanford, Ca.,
Hoover Inst. Press, 1979). In the Soviet Union tens and
hundreds of articles and books are published each year
which detail the Soviet doctrine for nuclear war and there is
a great deal of documentation translated into English and
published by the U.S. Air Force,including USAF: Marxism-
Leninism on War and the Army: The Soviet View, Moscow,
1972; USAF: The Armed Forces ofthe Soviet State. Moscow,
1975, by Marshal A. Grechko. The basic Soviet approach to
the matter is presented in the book by Marshal Sokolovski
published in 1962 in Moscow: Marshal V. D. Sokolovski,
Military Strategy, Soviet Doctrine and Concepts(New York,
Praeger, 1963).
can be drawn from the book by Douglas and Hoeber, ibid.
For additional material see: Michael Morgan, “USSR’s
Minerals as Strategic Weapon in the Future,” Defense and
Foreign Affairs, Washington, D.C., Dec. 1979.
State, London, 1979. Morgan, loc. cit. General George S.
Brown (USAF) C-JCS, Statement to the Congress on the
Defense Posture of the United States For Fiscal Year 1979,
p. 103; National Security Council, Review of Non-Fuel
Mineral Policy, (Washington, D.C. 1979,); Drew Middleton,
The New York Times, (9/15/79); Time, 9/21/80.
of Contemporary History, Vol. 3, No.4, 1968.
Syria, 5/6/79. 55% of the Arabs are 20 years old and
younger, 70% of the Arabs live in Africa, 55% of the Arabs
under 15 are unemployed, 33% live in urban areas, Oded
Yinon, “Egypt’s Population Problem,” The Jerusalem
Quarterly, No. 15, Spring 1980.
Jerusalem Quarterly, No.1, Fall 1976, Al Ba’ath, Syria,
5/6/79.
the Israeli government is in fact responsible for the design of
American policy in the Middle East, after June ’67, because
of its own indecisiveness as to the future of the territories
and the inconsistency in its positions since it established the
background for Resolution 242 and certainly twelve years
later for the Camp David agreements and the peace treaty
with Egypt. According to Rabin, on June 19, 1967, President
Johnson sent a letter to Prime Minister Eshkol in which he
did not mention anything about withdrawal from the new
territories but exactly on the same day the government
resolved to return territories in exchange for peace. After the
Arab resolutions in Khartoum (9/1/67) the government
altered its position but contrary to its decision of June 19, did
not notify the U.S. of the alteration and the U.S. continued to
support 242 in the Security Council on the basis of its earlier
understanding that Israel is prepared to return territories. At
that point it was already too late to change the U.S. position
and Israel’s policy. From here the way was opened to peace
agreements on the basis of 242 as was later agreed upon in
Camp David. See Yitzhak Rabin. Pinkas Sherut, (Ma’ariv
1979) pp. 226-227.
Arens argued in an interview (Ma ‘ariv,10/3/80) that the
Israeli government failed to prepare an economic plan before
the Camp David agreements and was itself surprised by the
cost of the agreements, although already during the
negotiations it was possible to calculate the heavy price and
the serious error involved in not having prepared the
economic grounds for peace.
The former Minister of Treasury, Mr. Yigal Holwitz, stated
that if it were not for the withdrawal from the oil fields, Israel
would have a positive balance of payments (9/17/80). That
same person said two years earlier that the government of
Israel (from which he withdrew) had placed a noose around
his neck. He was referring to the Camp David agreements
(Ha’aretz, 11/3/78). In the course of the whole peace
negotiations neither an expert nor an economics advisor was
consulted, and the Prime Minister himself, who lacks
knowledge and expertise in economics, in a mistaken
initiative, asked the U.S. to give us a loan rather than a
grant, due to his wish to maintain our respect and the
respect of the U.S. towards us. See Ha’aretz1/5/79.
Jerusalem Post, 9/7/79. Prof Asaf Razin, formerly a senior
consultant in the Treasury, strongly criticized the conduct of
the negotiations; Ha’aretz, 5/5/79. Ma’ariv, 9/7/79. As to
matters concerning the oil fields and Israel’s energy crisis,
see the interview with Mr. Eitan Eisenberg, a government
advisor on these matters, Ma’arive Weekly, 12/12/78. The
Energy Minister, who personally signed the Camp David
agreements and the evacuation of Sdeh Alma, has since
emphasized the seriousness of our condition from the point
of view of oil supplies more than once…see Yediot Ahronot,
7/20/79. Energy Minister Modai even admitted that the
government did not consult him at all on the subject of oil
during the Camp David and Blair House negotiations.
Ha’aretz, 8/22/79.
10. Many sources report on the growth of the armaments
budget in Egypt and on intentions to give the army
preference in a peace epoch budget over domestic needs for
which a peace was allegedly obtained. See former Prime
Minister Mamduh Salam in an interview 12/18/77, Treasury
Minister Abd El Sayeh in an interview 7/25/78, and the paper
Al Akhbar, 12/2/78 which clearly stressed that the military
budget will receive first priority, despite the peace. This is
what former Prime Minister Mustafa Khalil has stated in his
cabinet’s programmatic document which was presented to
Parliament, 11/25/78. See English translation, ICA, FBIS,
Nov. 27. 1978, pp. D 1-10.
According to these sources, Egypt’s military budget
increased by 10% between fiscal 1977 and 1978, and the
process still goes on. A Saudi source divulged that the
Egyptians plan to increase their militmy budget by 100% in
the next two years; Ha’aretz, 2/12/79 and Jerusalem Post,
1/14/79.
11. Most of the economic estimates threw doubt on Egypt’s
ability to reconstruct its economy by 1982. See Economic
Intelligence Unit, 1978 Supplement, “The Arab Republic of
Egypt”; E. Kanovsky, “Recent Economic Developments in
the Middle East,” Occasional Papers, The Shiloah Institution,
June 1977; Kanovsky, “The Egyptian Economy Since the
Mid-Sixties, The Micro Sectors,” Occasional Papers, June
1978; Robert McNamara, President of World Bank, as
reported in Times, London, 1/24/78.
12. See the comparison made by the researeh of the
Institute for Strategic Studies in London, and research
camed out in the Center for Strategic Studies of Tel Aviv
University, as well as the research by the British scientist,
Denis Champlin, Military Review, Nov. 1979, ISS: The
Military Balance 1979-1980, CSS; Security Arrangements in
Sinai…by Brig. Gen. (Res.) A Shalev, No. 3.0 CSS; The
Military Balance and the Military Options after the Peace
Treaty with Egypt, by Brig. Gen. (Res.) Y. Raviv, No.4, Dec.
1978, as well as many press reports including El Hawadeth,
London, 3/7/80; El Watan El Arabi, Paris, 12/14/79.
13. As for religious ferment in Egypt and the relations
between Copts and Moslems see the series of articles
published in the Kuwaiti paper, El Qabas, 9/15/80. The
English author Irene Beeson reports on the rift between
Moslems and Copts, see: Irene Beeson, Guardian, London,
6/24/80, and Desmond Stewart, Middle East Internmational,
London 6/6/80. For other reports see Pamela Ann Smith,
Guardian, London, 12/24/79; The Christian Science Monitor
12/27/79 as well as Al Dustour, London, 10/15/79; El Kefah
El Arabi, 10/15/79.
14. Arab Press Service, Beirut, 8/6-13/80. The New
Republic, 8/16/80, Der Spiegel as cited by Ha’aretz, 3/21/80,
and 4/30-5/5/80; The Economist, 3/22/80; Robert Fisk,
Times, London, 3/26/80; Ellsworth Jones, Sunday Times,
3/30/80.
15. J.P. Peroncell Hugoz, Le Monde, Paris 4/28/80; Dr.
Abbas Kelidar, Middle East Review, Summer 1979;
Conflict Studies, ISS, July 1975; Andreas Kolschitter, Der
Zeit, (Ha’aretz, 9/21/79) Economist Foreign Report, 10/10/79,
Afro-Asian Affairs, London, July 1979.
16. Arnold Hottinger, “The Rich Arab States in Trouble,” The
New York Review of Books, 5/15/80; Arab Press Service,
Beirut, 6/25-7/2/80; U.S. News and World Report, 11/5/79 as
well as El Ahram, 11/9/79; El Nahar El Arabi Wal Duwali,
Paris 9/7/79; El Hawadeth, 11/9/79; David Hakham, Monthly
Review, IDF, Jan.-Feb. 79.
17. As for Jordan’s policies and problems see El Nahar El
Arabi Wal Duwali, 4/30/79, 7/2/79; Prof. Elie Kedouri, Ma’ariv
6/8/79; Prof. Tanter, Davar 7/12/79; A. Safdi, Jerusalem
Post, 5/31/79; El Watan El Arabi 11/28/79; El Qabas,
11/19/79. As for PLO positions see: The resolutions of the
Fatah Fourth Congress, Damascus, August 1980. The
Shefa’amr program of the Israeli Arabs was published in
Ha’aretz, 9/24/80, and by Arab Press Report 6/18/80. For
facts and figures on immigration of Arabs to Jordan, see
Amos Ben Vered, Ha’aretz, 2/16/77; Yossef Zuriel, Ma’ariv
1/12/80. As to the PLO’s position towards Israel see Shlomo
Gazit, Monthly Review; July 1980; Hani El Hasan in an
interview, Al Rai Al’Am, Kuwait 4/15/80; Avi Plaskov, “The
Palestinian Problem,” Survival, ISS, London Jan. Feb. 78;
David Gutrnann, “The Palestinian Myth,” Commentary, Oct.
75; Bernard Lewis, “The Palestinians and the PLO,”
Commentary Jan. 75; Monday Morning, Beirut, 8/18-21/80;
Journal of Palestine Studies, Winter 1980.
18. Prof. Yuval Neeman, “Samaria–The Basis for Israel’s
Security,” Ma’arakhot 272-273, May/June 1980; Ya’akov
Hasdai, “Peace, the Way and the Right to Know,” Dvar
Hashavua, 2/23/80. Aharon Yariv, “Strategic Depth–An Israeli
Perspective,” Ma’arakhot 270-271, October 1979; Yitzhak
Rabin, “Israel’s Defense Problems in the Eighties,”
Ma’arakhot October 1979.
19. Ezra Zohar, In the Regime’s Pliers (Shikmona, 1974);
Motti Heinrich, Do We have a Chance Israel, Truth Versus
Legend (Reshafim, 1981).
20. Henry Kissinger, “The Lessons of the Past,” The
Washington Review Vol 1, Jan. 1978; Arthur Ross, “OPEC’s
Challenge to the West,” The Washington Quarterly, Winter,
1980; Walter Levy, “Oil and the Decline of the West,” Foreign
Affairs, Summer 1980; Special Report–”Our Armed Forees-
Ready or Not?” U.S. News and World Report 10/10/77;
Stanley Hoffman, “Reflections on the Present Danger,” The
New York Review of Books 3/6/80; Time 4/3/80; Leopold
Lavedez “The illusions of SALT” Commentary Sept. 79;
Norman Podhoretz, “The Present Danger,” Commentary
March 1980; Robert Tucker, “Oil and American Power Six
Years Later,” Commentary Sept. 1979; Norman Podhoretz,
“The Abandonment of Israel,” Commentary July 1976; Elie
Kedourie, “Misreading the Middle East,” Commentary July
1979.
21. According to figures published by Ya’akov Karoz, Yediot
Ahronot, 10/17/80, the sum total of anti-Semitic incidents
recorded in the world in 1979 was double the amount
recorded in 1978. In Germany, France, and Britain the
number of anti-Semitic incidents was many times greater in
that year. In the U.S. as well there has been a sharp
increase in anti-Semitic incidents which were reported in that
article. For the new anti-Semitism, see L. Talmon, “The New
Anti-Semitism,” The New Republic, 9/18/1976; Barbara
Tuchman, “They poisoned the Wells,”Newsweek 2/3/75.
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