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Sunday, March 3

“Greater Israel”: The Zionist Plan for the Middle East The Oded Yinon Pla
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The following document pertaining to the formation of 

“Greater Israel” constitutes the cornerstone of powerful 

Zionist factions within the current Netanyahu government, the 

Likud party, as well as within the Israeli military and 

intelligence establishment.

According to the founding father of Zionism Theodore Herzl, 

“the area of the Jewish State stretches: “From the Brook of 

Egypt to the Euphrates.”  According to Rabbi Fischmann,  

“The Promised Land extends from the River of Egypt up to 

the Euphrates, it includes parts of Syria and Lebanon.”




When viewed in the current 

context, the war on Iraq, the 2006 war on Lebanon, the 2011 

war on Libya, the ongoing war on Syria, not to mention the 

process of regime change in Egypt, must be understood in 

relation to the Zionist Plan for the Middle East. The latter 

consists in weakening and eventually fracturing neighboring 

Arab states as part of an Israeli expansionist project.


“Greater Israel” consists in an area extending from the Nile 

Valley to the Euphrates.

The Zionist project supports the Jewish settlement 

movement. More broadly it involves a policy of excluding 

Palestinians from Palestine leading to the eventual 

annexation of both the West Bank and Gaza to the State of 

Israel.

Greater Israel would create a number of proxy States. It 

would include parts of Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, the Sinai, as 

well as parts of  Iraq and Saudi Arabia. (See map).


Research article,   The Yinon Plan was a continuation of 

Britain’s colonial design in the Middle East:

“[The Yinon plan] is an Israeli strategic plan to ensure 

Israeli regional superiority. It insists and stipulates that 

Israel must reconfigure its geo-political environment 

through the balkanization of the surrounding Arab states 

into smaller and weaker states.

Israeli strategists viewed Iraq as their biggest strategic 

challenge from an Arab state. This is why Iraq was 

outlined as the centerpiece to the balkanization of the 

Middle East and the Arab World. In Iraq, on the basis of 

the concepts of the Yinon Plan, Israeli strategists have 

called for the division of Iraq into a Kurdish state and two 

Arab states, one for Shiite Muslims and the other for Sunni 

Muslims. The first step towards establishing this was a war 

between Iraq and Iran, which the Yinon Plan discusses.

The Atlantic, in 2008, and the U.S. military’s Armed 

Forces Journal, in 2006, both published widely circulated 

maps that closely followed the outline of the Yinon Plan. 

Aside from a divided Iraq, which the Biden Plan also calls 

for, the Yinon Plan calls for a divided Lebanon, Egypt, and 

Syria. The partitioning of Iran, Turkey, Somalia, and 

Pakistan also all fall into line with these views. The Yinon 

Plan also calls for dissolution in North Africa and forecasts 

it as starting from Egypt and then spilling over into Sudan, 

Libya, and the rest of the region.


File:Greater israel.jpg

Greater Israel” requires the breaking up of the existing Arab 

states into small states.

“The plan operates on two essential premises. To survive, 

Israel must 1) become an imperial regional power, and 2) 

must effect the division of the whole area into small states 

by the dissolution of all existing Arab states. Small here 

will depend on the ethnic or sectarian composition of each 

state. Consequently, the Zionist hope is that sectarian-

based states become Israel’s satellites and, ironically, its 

source of moral legitimation…  This is not a new idea, nor 

does it surface for the first time in Zionist strategic 

thinking. Indeed, fragmenting all Arab states into smaller 

units has been a recurrent theme.” (Yinon Plan, see below)

Viewed in this context, the war on Syria is part of the process 

of Israeli territorial expansion. Israeli intelligence working 

hand in glove with the US, Turkey and NATO is directly 

supportive of the Al Qaeda terrorist mercenaries inside Syria.

The Zionist Project also requires the destabilization of Egypt, 

the creation of factional divisions within Egypt as 

instrumented by the “Arab Spring” leading to the formation of 

a sectarian based State dominated by the Muslim 

Brotherhood.




The Zionist Plan for the Middle East 


Translated and edited by

Israel Shahak

The Israel of Theodore Herzl (1904) and of Rabbi Fischmann

 (1947)
In his Complete Diaries, Vol. II. p. 711, Theodore Herzl, the 

founder of Zionism, says that the area of the Jewish State 

stretches: “From the Brook of Egypt to the Euphrates.”

Rabbi Fischmann, member of the Jewish Agency for 

Palestine, declared in his testimony to the U.N. Special 

Committee of Enquiry on 9 July 1947: “The Promised Land 

extends from the River of Egypt up to the Euphrates, it 

includes parts of Syria and Lebanon.”

from

Oded Yinon’s


“A Strategy for Israel in the Nineteen Eighties”


Published by the

Association of Arab-American University Graduates, Inc.

Belmont, Massachusetts, 1982

Special Document No. 1 (ISBN 0-937694-56-8)

Table of Contents


The Association of Arab-American University Graduates finds 

it compelling to inaugurate its new publication series, Special 

Documents, with Oded Yinon’s article which appeared in 

Kivunim (Directions), the journal of the Department of 

Information of the World Zionist Organization. Oded Yinon is 

an Israeli journalist and was formerly attached to the Foreign 

Ministry of Israel. To our knowledge, this document is the 

most explicit, detailed and unambiguous statement to date of 

the Zionist strategy in the Middle East. Furthermore, it stands 

as an accurate representation of the “vision” for the entire 

Middle East of the presently ruling Zionist regime of Begin, 

Sharon and Eitan. Its importance, hence, lies not in its 

historical value but in the nightmare which it presents.
2
The plan operates on two essential premises. To survive, 

Israel must 

1) become an imperial regional power, 

and 2) 

must effect the division of the whole area into small states by 

the dissolution of all existing Arab states. Small here will 

depend on the ethnic or sectarian composition of each state. 

Consequently, the Zionist hope is that sectarian-based states 

become Israel’s satellites and, ironically, its source of moral 

legitimation.

3

This is not a new idea, nor does it surface for the first time in 

Zionist strategic thinking. Indeed, fragmenting all Arab states 

into smaller units has been a recurrent theme. This theme 

has been documented on a very modest scale in the AAUG 

publication,  Israel’s Sacred Terrorism (1980), by Livia 

Rokach. Based on the memoirs of Moshe Sharett, former 

Prime Minister of Israel, Rokach’s study documents, in 

convincing detail, the Zionist plan as it applies to Lebanon 

and as it was prepared in the mid-fifties.

4

The first massive Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1978 bore 

this plan out to the minutest detail. The second and more 

barbaric and encompassing Israeli invasion of Lebanon on 

June 6, 1982, aims to effect certain parts of this plan which 

hopes to see not only Lebanon, but Syria and Jordan as well, 

in fragments. This ought to make mockery of Israeli public 

claims regarding their desire for a strong and independent 

Lebanese central government. More accurately, they want a 

Lebanese central government that sanctions their regional 

imperialist designs by signing a peace treaty with them. They 

also seek acquiescence in their designs by the Syrian, Iraqi, 

Jordanian and other Arab governments as well as by the 

Palestinian people. What they want and what they are 

planning for is not an Arab world, but a world of Arab 

fragments that is ready to succumb to Israeli hegemony. 

Hence, Oded Yinon in his essay, “A Strategy for Israel in the 

1980′s,” talks about “far-reaching opportunities for the first 

time since 1967″ that are created by the “very stormy 

situation [that] surrounds Israel.”

5

The Zionist policy of displacing the Palestinians from 

Palestine is very much an active policy, but is pursued more 

forcefully in times of conflict, such as in the 1947-1948 war 

and in the 1967 war. An appendix entitled  ”Israel Talks of a 

New Exodus” is included in this publication to demonstrate 

past Zionist dispersals of Palestinians from their homeland 

and to show, besides the main Zionist document we present, 

other Zionist planning for the de-Palestinization of Palestine.
6
It is clear from the Kivunim document, published in February, 

1982, that the “far-reaching opportunities” of which Zionist 

strategists have been thinking are the same “opportunities” of 

which they are trying to convince the world and which they 

claim were generated by their June, 1982 invasion. It is also 

clear that the Palestinians were never the sole target of 

Zionist plans, but the priority target since their viable and 

independent presence as a people negates the essence of 

the Zionist state. Every Arab state, however, especially those 

with cohesive and clear nationalist directions, is a real target 

sooner or later.

7

Contrasted with the detailed and unambiguous Zionist 

strategy elucidated in this document, Arab and Palestinian 

strategy, unfortunately, suffers from ambiguity and 

incoherence. There is no indication that Arab strategists have 

internalized the Zionist plan in its full ramifications. Instead, 

they react with incredulity and shock whenever a new stage 

of it unfolds. This is apparent in Arab reaction, albeit muted, 

to the Israeli siege of Beirut. The sad fact is that as long as 

the Zionist strategy for the Middle East is not taken seriously 

Arab reaction to any future siege of other Arab capitals will 

be the same.

Khalil Nakhleh

July 23, 1982
Foreward

by Israel Shahak
1
The following essay represents, in my opinion, the accurate 

and detailed plan of the present Zionist regime (of Sharon 

and Eitan) for the Middle East which is based on the division 

of the whole area into small states, and the dissolution of all 

the existing Arab states. I will comment on the military aspect 

of this plan in a concluding note. Here I want to draw the 

attention of the readers to several important points:

2
1. The idea that all the Arab states should be broken down, 

by Israel, into small units, occurs again and again in Israeli 

strategic thinking. For example, Ze’ev Schiff, the military 

correspondent of Ha’aretz (and probably the most 

knowledgeable in Israel, on this topic) writes about the “best” 

that can happen for Israeli interests in Iraq: “The dissolution 

of Iraq into a Shi’ite state, a Sunni state and the separation 

of the Kurdish part” (Ha’aretz 6/2/1982). Actually, this aspect 

of the plan is very old.

3
2. The strong connection with Neo-Conservative thought in 

the USA is very prominent, especially in the author’s notes. 

But, while lip service is paid to the idea of the “defense of the 

West” from Soviet power, the real aim of the author, and of 

the present Israeli establishment is clear: To make an 

Imperial Israel into a world power. In other words, the aim of 

Sharon is to deceive the Americans after he has deceived all 

the rest.
4

3. It is obvious that much of the relevant data, both in the 

notes and in the text, is garbled or omitted, such as the 

financial help of the U.S. to Israel. Much of it is pure fantasy. 

But, the plan is not to be regarded as not influential, or as 

not capable of realization for a short time. The plan follows 

faithfully the geopolitical ideas current in Germany of 1890-

1933, which were swallowed whole by Hitler and the Nazi 

movement, and determined their aims for East Europe

Those aims, especially the division of the existing states, 

were carried out in 1939-1941, and only an alliance on the 

global scale prevented their consolidation for a period of 

time.

5

The notes by the author follow the text. To avoid confusion, I 

did not add any notes of my own, but have put the 

substance of them into this foreward and the conclusion at 

the end. I have, however, emphasized some portions of the 

text.

Israel Shahak

June 13, 1982


A Strategy for Israel in the Nineteen Eighties


by Oded Yinon

This essay originally appeared in Hebrew in KIVUNIM 

(Directions), A Journal for Judaism and Zionism; Issue No, 

14–Winter, 5742, February 1982, Editor: Yoram Beck. 

Editorial Committee: Eli Eyal, Yoram Beck, Amnon Hadari, 

Yohanan Manor, Elieser Schweid. Published by the 

Department of Publicity/The World Zionist Organization

Jerusalem.
1

At the outset of the nineteen eighties the State of Israel is in 

need of a new perspective as to its place, its aims and 

national targets, at home and abroad. This need has 

become even more vital due to a number of central 

processes which the country, the region and the world are 

undergoing. We are living today in the early stages of a new 

epoch in human history which is not at all similar to its 

predecessor, and its characteristics are totally different from 

what we have hitherto known. That is why we need an 

understanding of the central processes which typify this 

historical epoch on the one hand, and on the other hand we 

need a world outlook and an operational strategy in 

accordance with the new conditions. The existence, 

prosperity and steadfastness of the Jewish state will depend 

upon its ability to adopt a new framework for its domestic 

and foreign affairs.

2

This epoch is characterized by several traits which we can 

already diagnose, and which symbolize a genuine revolution 

in our present lifestyle. The dominant process is the 

breakdown of the rationalist, humanist outlook as the major 

cornerstone supporting the life and achievements of 

Western civilization since the Renaissance. The political, 

social and economic views which have emanated from this 

foundation have been based on several “truths” which are 

presently disappearing–for example, the view that man as an 

individual is the center of the universe and everything exists 

in order to fulfill his basic material needs. This position is 

being invalidated in the present when it has become clear 

that the amount of resources in the cosmos does not meet 

Man’s requirements, his economic needs or his demographic 

constraints. In a world in which there are four billion human 

beings and economic and energy resources which do not 

grow proportionally to meet the needs of mankind, it is 

unrealistic to expect to fulfill the main requirement of 

Western Society, 1 i.e., the wish and aspiration for 

boundless consumption. The view that ethics plays no part 

in determining the direction Man takes, but rather his 

material needs do–that view is becoming prevalent today as 

we see a world in which nearly all values are disappearing. 

We are losing the ability to assess the simplest things, 

especially when they concern the simple question of what is 

Good and what is Evil.

3

The vision of man’s limitless aspirations and abilities shrinks 

in the face of the sad facts of life, when we witness the 

break-up of world order around us. The view which promises 

liberty and freedom to mankind seems absurd in light of the 

sad fact that three fourths of the human race lives under 

totalitarian regimes. The views concerning equality and 

social justice have been transformed by socialism and 

especially by Communism into a laughing stock. There is no 

argument as to the truth of these two ideas, but it is clear 

that they have not been put into practice properly and the 

majority of mankind has lost the liberty, the freedom and the 

opportunity for equality and justice. In this nuclear world in 

which we are (still) living in relative peace for thirty years, the 

concept of peace and coexistence among nations has no 

meaning when a superpower like the USSR holds a military 

and political doctrine of the sort it has: that not only is a 

nuclear war possible and necessary in order to achieve the 

ends of Marxism, but that it is possible to survive after it, not 

to speak of the fact that one can be victorious in it.2

4

The essential concepts of human society, especially those of 

the West, are undergoing a change due to political, military 

and economic transformations. Thus, the nuclear and 

conventional might of the USSR has transformed the epoch 

that has just ended into the last respite before the great 

saga that will demolish a large part of our world in a multi-

dimensional global war, in comparison with which the past 

world wars will have been mere child’s play. The power of 

nuclear as well as of conventional weapons, their quantity, 

their precision and quality will turn most of our world upside 

down within a few years, and we must align ourselves so as 

to face that in Israel. That is, then, the main threat to our 

existence and that of the Western world. 3 The war over 

resources in the world, the Arab monopoly on oil, and the 

need of the West to import most of its raw materials from the 

Third World, are transforming the world we know, given that 

one of the major aims of the USSR is to defeat the West by 

gaining control over the gigantic resources in the Persian 

Gulf and in the southern part of Africa, in which the majority 

of world minerals are located. We can imagine the 

dimensions of the global confrontation which will face us in 

the future.

5
The Gorshkov doctrine calls for Soviet control of the oceans 

and mineral rich areas of the Third World. That together with 

the present Soviet nuclear doctrine which holds that it is 

possible to manage, win and survive a nuclear war, in the 

course of which the West’s military might well be destroyed 

and its inhabitants made slaves in the service of Marxism-

Leninism, is the main danger to world peace and to our own 

existence. Since 1967, the Soviets have transformed 

Clausewitz’ dictum into “War is the continuation of policy in 

nuclear means,” and made it the motto which guides all their 

policies. Already today they are busy carrying out their aims 

in our region and throughout the world, and the need to face 

them becomes the major element in our country’s security 

policy and of course that of the rest of the Free World. That 

is our major foreign challenge.4

6

The Arab Moslem world, therefore, is not the major strategic 

problem which we shall face in the Eighties, despite the fact 

that it carries the main threat against Israel, due to its 

growing military might. This world, with its ethnic minorities, 

its factions and internal crises, which is astonishingly self-

destructive, as we can see in Lebanon, in non-Arab Iran and 

now also in Syria, is unable to deal successfully with its 

fundamental problems and does not therefore constitute a 

real threat against the State of Israel in the long run, but 

only in the short run where its immediate military power has 

great import. In the long run, this world will be unable to 

exist within its present framework in the areas around us 

without having to go through genuine revolutionary changes. 

The Moslem Arab World is built like a temporary house of 

cards put together by foreigners (France and Britain in the 

Nineteen Twenties), without the wishes and desires of the 

inhabitants having been taken into account. It was arbitrarily 

divided into 19 states, all made of combinations of minorites 

and ethnic groups which are hostile to one another, so that 

every Arab Moslem state nowadays faces ethnic social 

destruction from within, and in some a civil war is already 

raging. 5 Most of the Arabs, 118 million out of 170 million, 

live in Africa, mostly in Egypt (45 million today).
7
Apart from Egypt, all the Maghreb states are made up of a 

mixture of Arabs and non-Arab Berbers. In Algeria there is 

already a civil war raging in the Kabile mountains between 

the two nations in the country. Morocco and Algeria are at 

war with each other over Spanish Sahara, in addition to the 

internal struggle in each of them. Militant Islam endangers 

the integrity of Tunisia and Qaddafi organizes wars which 

are destructive from the Arab point of view, from a country 

which is sparsely populated and which cannot become a 

powerful nation. That is why he has been attempting 

unifications in the past with states that are more genuine, 

like Egypt and Syria. Sudan, the most torn apart state in the 

Arab Moslem world today is built upon four groups hostile to 

each other, an Arab Moslem Sunni minority which rules over 

a majority of non-Arab Africans, Pagans, and Christians. In 

Egypt there is a Sunni Moslem majority facing a large 

minority of Christians which is dominant in upper Egypt: 

some 7 million of them, so that even Sadat, in his speech on 

May 8, expressed the fear that they will want a state of their 

own, something like a “second” Christian Lebanon in Egypt.


8
All the Arab States east of Israel are torn apart, broken up 

and riddled with inner conflict even more than those of the 

Maghreb. Syria is fundamentally no different from Lebanon 

except in the strong military regime which rules it. But the 

real civil war taking place nowadays between the Sunni 

majority and the Shi’ite Alawi ruling minority (a mere 12% of 

the population) testifies to the severity of the domestic 

trouble.

9

Iraq is, once again, no different in essence from its 

neighbors, although its majority is Shi’ite and the ruling 

minority Sunni. Sixty-five percent of the population has no 

say in politics, in which an elite of 20 percent holds the 

power. In addition there is a large Kurdish minority in the 

north, and if it weren’t for the strength of the ruling regime, 

the army and the oil revenues, Iraq’s future state would be 

no different than that of Lebanon in the past or of Syria 

today. The seeds of inner conflict and civil war are apparent 

today already, especially after the rise of Khomeini to power 

in Iran, a leader whom the Shi’ites in Iraq view as their 

natural leader.

10

All the Gulf principalities and Saudi Arabia are built upon a 

delicate house of sand in which there is only oil. In Kuwait, 

the Kuwaitis constitute only a quarter of the population. In 

Bahrain, the Shi’ites are the majority but are deprived of 

power. In the UAE, Shi’ites are once again the majority but 

the Sunnis are in power. The same is true of Oman and 

North Yemen. Even in the Marxist South Yemen there is a 

sizable Shi’ite minority. In Saudi Arabia half the population is 

foreign, Egyptian and Yemenite, but a Saudi minority holds 

power.

11

Jordan is in reality Palestinian, ruled by a Trans-Jordanian 

Bedouin minority, but most of the army and certainly the 

bureaucracy is now Palestinian. As a matter of fact Amman 

is as Palestinian as Nablus. All of these countries have 

powerful armies, relatively speaking. But there is a problem 

there too. The Syrian army today is mostly Sunni with an 

Alawi officer corps, the Iraqi army Shi’ite with Sunni 

commanders. This has great significance in the long run, 

and that is why it will not be possible to retain the loyalty of 

the army for a long time except where it comes to the only 

common denominator: The hostility towards Israel, and today 

even that is insufficient.

12

Alongside the Arabs, split as they are, the other Moslem 

states share a similar predicament. Half of Iran’s population 

is comprised of a Persian speaking group and the other half 

of an ethnically Turkish group. Turkey’s population 

comprises a Turkish Sunni Moslem majority, some 50%, and 

two large minorities, 12 million Shi’ite Alawis and 6 million 

Sunni Kurds. In Afghanistan there are 5 million

Shi’ites who constitute one third of the population. In Sunni 

Pakistan there are 15 million Shi’ites who endanger the 


existence of that state.

13
This national ethnic minority picture extending from Morocco 

to India and from Somalia to Turkey points to the absence of 

stability and a rapid degeneration in the entire region. When 

this picture is added to the economic one, we see how the 

entire region is built like a house of cards, unable to 

withstand its severe problems.

14
In this giant and fractured world there are a few wealthy 

groups and a huge mass of poor people. Most of the Arabs 

have an average yearly income of 300 dollars. That is the 

situation in Egypt, in most of the Maghreb countries except 

for Libya, and in Iraq. Lebanon is torn apart and its economy 

is falling to pieces. It is a state in which there is no 

centralized power, but only 5 de facto sovereign authorities 

(Christian in the north, supported by the Syrians and under 

the rule of the Franjieh clan, in the East an area of direct 

Syrian conquest, in the center a Phalangist controlled 

Christian enclave, in the south and up to the Litani river a 

mostly Palestinian region controlled by the PLO and Major 

Haddad’s state of Christians and half a million Shi’ites). Syria 

is in an even graver situation and even the assistance she 

will obtain in the future after the unification with Libya will not 

be sufficient for dealing with the basic problems of existence 

and the maintenance of a large army. Egypt is in the worst 

situation: Millions are on the verge of hunger, half the labor 

force is unemployed, and housing is scarce in this most 

densely populated area of the world. Except for the army, 

there is not a single department operating efficiently and the 

state is in a permanent state of bankruptcy and depends 

entirely on American foreign assistance granted since the 

peace.6

15

In the Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, Libya and Egypt there is the 

largest accumulation of money and oil in the world, but 

those enjoying it are tiny elites who lack a wide base of 

support and self-confidence, something that no army can 

guarantee. 7 The Saudi army with all its equipment cannot 

defend the regime from real dangers at home or abroad, and 

what took place in Mecca in 1980 is only an example. A sad 

and very stormy situation surrounds Israel and creates 

challenges for it, problems, risks but also far-reaching 

opportunities for the first time since 1967. Chances are that 

opportunities missed at that time will become achievable in 

the Eighties to an extent and along dimensions which we 

cannot even imagine today.

16
The “peace” policy and the return of territories, through a 

dependence upon the US, precludes the realization of the 

new option created for us. Since 1967, all the governments 

of Israel have tied our national aims down to narrow political 

needs, on the one hand, and on the other to destructive 

opinions at home which neutralized our capacities both at 

home and abroad. Failing to take steps towards the Arab 

population in the new territories, acquired in the course of a 

war forced upon us, is the major strategic error committed by 

Israel on the morning after the Six Day War. We could have 

saved ourselves all the bitter and dangerous conflict since 

then if we had given Jordan to the Palestinians who live west 

of the Jordan river. By doing that we would have neutralized 

the Palestinian problem which we nowadays face, and to 

which we have found solutions that are really no solutions at 

all, such as territorial compromise or autonomy which 

amount, in fact, to the same thing. 8 Today, we suddenly 

face immense opportunities for transforming the situation 

thoroughly and this we must do in the coming decade, 

otherwise we shall not survive as a state.

17

In the course of the Nineteen Eighties, the State of Israel will 

have to go through far-reaching changes in its political and 

economic regime domestically, along with radical changes in 

its foreign policy, in order to stand up to the global and 

regional challenges of this new epoch. The loss of the Suez 

Canal oil fields, of the immense potential of the oil, gas and 

other natural resources in the Sinai peninsula which is 

geomorphologically identical to the rich oil-producing 

countries in the region, will result in an energy drain in the 

near future and will destroy our domestic economy: one 

quarter of our present GNP as well as one third of the 

budget is used for the purchase of oil. 9 The search for raw 

materials in the Negev and on the coast will not, in the near 

future, serve to alter that state of affairs.
18
(Regaining) the Sinai peninsula with its present and 

potential resources is therefore a political priority which is 

obstructed by the Camp David and the peace agreements

The fault for that lies of course with the present Israeli 

government and the governments which paved the road to 

the policy of territorial compromise, the Alignment 

governments since 1967. The Egyptians will not need to 

keep the peace treaty after the return of the Sinai, and they 

will do all they can to return to the fold of the Arab world and 

to the USSR in order to gain support and military assistance. 

American aid is guaranteed only for a short while, for the 

terms of the peace and the weakening of the U.S. both at 

home and abroad will bring about a reduction in aid. Without 

oil and the income from it, with the present enormous 

expenditure, we will not be able to get through 1982 under 

the present conditions and we will have to act in order to 

return the situation to the status quo which existed in Sinai 

prior to Sadat’s visit and the mistaken peace agreement 

signed with him in March 1979. 10


19
Israel has two major routes through which to realize this 

purpose, one direct and the other indirect. The direct option 

is the less realistic one because of the nature of the regime 

and government in Israel as well as the wisdom of Sadat 

who obtained our withdrawal from Sinai, which was, next to 

the war of 1973, his major achievement since he took power. 

Israel will not unilaterally break the treaty, neither today, nor 

in 1982, unless it is very hard pressed economically and 

politically and Egypt provides Israel with the excuse to take 

the Sinai back into our hands for the fourth time in our short 

history. What is left therefore, is the indirect option. The 

economic situation in Egypt, the nature of the regime and its 

pan-


Arab policy, will bring about a situation after April 1982 in 

which Israel will be forced to act directly or indirectly in order 

to regain control over Sinai as a strategic, economic and 

energy reserve for the long run. Egypt does not constitute a 

military strategic problem due to its internal conflicts and it 

could be driven back to the post 1967 war situation in no 

more than one day. 11

20
The myth of Egypt as the strong leader of the Arab World 

was demolished back in 1956 and definitely did not survive 

1967, but our policy, as in the return of the Sinai, served to 

turn the myth into “fact.” In reality, however, Egypt’s power in 

proportion both to Israel alone and to the rest of the Arab 

World has gone down about 50 percent since 1967. Egypt is 

no longer the leading political power in the Arab World and 

is economically on the verge of a crisis. Without foreign 

assistance the crisis will come tomorrow. 12 In the short run, 

due to the return of the Sinai, Egypt will gain several 

advantages at our expense, but only in the short run until 

1982, and that will not change the balance of power to its 

benefit, and will possibly bring about its downfall. Egypt, in 

its present domestic political picture, is already a corpse, all 

the more so if we take into account the growing Moslem-

Christian rift. Breaking Egypt down territorially into distinct 

geographical regions is the political aim of Israel in the 

Nineteen Eighties on its Western front.
21
Egypt is divided and torn apart into many foci of authority. If 

Egypt falls apart, countries like Libya, Sudan or even the 

more distant states will not continue to exist in their present 

form and will join the downfall and dissolution of Egypt. The 

vision of a Christian Coptic State in Upper Egypt alongside a 

number of weak states with very localized power and without 

a centralized government as to date, is the key to a historical 

development which was only set back by the peace 

agreement but which seems inevitable in the long run. 13


22
The Western front, which on the surface appears more 

problematic, is in fact less complicated than the Eastern 

front, in which most of the events that make the headlines 

have been taking place recently. Lebanon’s total dissolution 

into five provinces serves as a precendent for the entire Arab 

world including Egypt, Syria, Iraq and the Arabian peninsula 

and is already following that track. The dissolution of Syria 

and Iraq later on into ethnically or religiously unqiue areas 

such as in Lebanon, is Israel’s primary target on the Eastern 

front in the long run, while the dissolution of the military 

power of those states serves as the primary short term target. 

Syria will fall apart, in accordance with its ethnic and religious 

structure, into several states such as in present day Lebanon, 

so that there will be a Shi’ite Alawi state along its coast, a 

Sunni state in the Aleppo area, another Sunni state in 

Damascus hostile to its northern neighbor, and the Druzes 

who will set up a state, maybe even in our Golan, and 

certainly in the Hauran and in northern Jordan. This state of 

affairs will be the guarantee for peace and security in the 

area in the long run, and that aim is already within our reach 

today. 14

23


Iraq, rich in oil on the one hand and internally torn on the 

other, is guaranteed as a candidate for Israel’s targets. Its 

dissolution is even more important for us than that of Syria. 

Iraq is stronger than Syria. In the short run it is Iraqi power 

which constitutes the greatest threat to Israel. An Iraqi-

Iranian war will tear Iraq apart and cause its downfall at 

home even before it is able to organize a struggle on a wide 

front against us. Every kind of inter-Arab confrontation will 

assist us in the short run and will shorten the way to the more 

important aim of breaking up Iraq into denominations as in 

Syria and in Lebanon. In Iraq, a division into provinces along 

ethnic/religious lines as in Syria during Ottoman times is 

possible. So, three (or more) states will exist around the 

three major cities: Basra, Baghdad and Mosul, and Shi’ite 

areas in the south will separate from the Sunni and Kurdish 

north. It is possible that the present Iranian-Iraqi 

confrontation will deepen this polarization. 15
24
The entire Arabian peninsula is a natural candidate for 

dissolution due to internal and external pressures, and the 

matter is inevitable especially in Saudi Arabia. Regardless of 

whether its economic might based on oil remains intact or 

whether it is diminished in the long run, the internal rifts and 

breakdowns are a clear and natural development in light of 

the present political structure. 16

25
Jordan constitutes an immediate strategic target in the short 

run but not in the long run, for it does not constitute a real 

threat in the long run after its dissolution, the termination of 

the lengthy rule of King Hussein and the transfer of power to 

the Palestinians in the short run.


26
There is no chance that Jordan will continue to exist in its 

present structure for a long time, and Israel’s policy, both in 

war and in peace, ought to be directed at the liquidation of 

Jordan under the present regime and the transfer of power 

to the Palestinian majority. Changing the regime east of the 

river will also cause the termination of the problem of the 

territories densely populated with Arabs west of the Jordan. 

Whether in war or under conditions of peace, emigration from 

the territories and economic demographic freeze in them, are 

the guarantees for the coming change on both banks of the 

river, and we ought to be active in order to accelerate this 

process in the nearest future. The autonomy plan ought also 

to be rejected, as well as any compromise or division of the 

territories for, given the plans of the PLO and those of the 

Israeli Arabs themselves, the Shefa’amr plan of September 

1980, it is not possible to go on living in this country in the 

present situation without separating the two nations, the 

Arabs to Jordan and the Jews to the areas west of the river

Genuine coexistence and peace will reign over the land only 

when the Arabs understand that without Jewish rule 

between the Jordan and the sea they will have neither 

existence nor security. A nation of their own and security will 

be theirs only in Jordan. 17

27
Within Israel the distinction between the areas of ’67 and the 

territories beyond them, those of ’48, has always been 

meaningless for Arabs and nowadays no longer has any 

significance for us. The problem should be seen in its 

entirety without any divisions as of ’67. It should be clear, 

under any future political situation or military constellation, 

that the solution of the problem of the indigenous Arabs will 

come only when they recognize the existence of Israel in 

secure borders up to the Jordan river and beyond it, as our 

existential need in this difficult epoch, the nuclear epoch 

which we shall soon enter. It is no longer possible to live with 

three fourths of the Jewish population on the dense 

shoreline which is so dangerous in a nuclear epoch.


28

Dispersal of the population is therefore a domestic strategic 

aim of the highest order; otherwise, we shall cease to exist 

within any borders. Judea, Samaria and the Galilee are our 

sole guarantee for national existence, and if we do not 

become the majority in the mountain areas, we shall not rule 

in the country and we shall be like the Crusaders, who lost 

this country which was not theirs anyhow, and in which they 

were foreigners to begin with. Rebalancing the country 

demographically, strategically and economically is the 

highest and most central aim today. Taking hold of the 

mountain watershed from Beersheba to the Upper Galilee is 

the national aim generated by the major strategic 

consideration which is settling the mountainous part of the 

country that is empty of Jews today. l8


29
Realizing our aims on the Eastern front depends first on the 

realization of this internal strategic objective. The 

transformation of the political and economic structure, so as 

to enable the realization of these strategic aims, is the key to 

achieving the entire change. We need to change from a 

centralized economy in which the government is extensively 

involved, to an open and free market as well as to switch 

from depending upon the U.S. taxpayer to developing, with 

our own hands, of a genuine productive economic 

infrastructure. If we are not able to make this change freely 

and voluntarily, we shall be forced into it by world 

developments, especially in the areas of economics, energy, 

and politics, and by our own growing isolation. l9


30

From a military and strategic point of view, the West led by 

the U.S. is unable to withstand the global pressures of the 

USSR throughout the world, and Israel must therefore stand 

alone in the Eighties, without any foreign assistance, military 

or economic, and this is within our capacities today, with no 

compromises. 20 Rapid changes in the world will also bring 

about a change in the condition of world Jewry to which Israel 

will become not only a last resort but the only existential 

option. We cannot assume that U.S. Jews, and the 

communities of Europe and Latin America will continue to 

exist in the present form in the future. 21

31
Our existence in this country itself is certain, and there is no 

force that could remove us from here either forcefully or by 

treachery (Sadat’s method). Despite the difficulties of the 

mistaken “peace” policy and the problem of the Israeli Arabs 

and those of the territories, we can effectively deal with these 

problems in the foreseeable future.

Conclusion
1
Three important points have to be clarified in order to be 

able to understand the significant possibilities of realization 

of this Zionist plan for the Middle East, and also why it had 

to be published.
2

The Military Background of The Plan

The military conditions of this plan have not been mentioned 

above, but on the many occasions where something very like 

it is being “explained” in closed meetings to members of the 

Israeli Establishment, this point is clarified. It is assumed that 

the Israeli military forces, in all their branches, are 

insufficient for the actual work of occupation of such wide 

territories as discussed above. In fact, even in times of 

intense Palestinian “unrest” on the West Bank, the forces of 

the Israeli Army are stretched out too much. The answer to 

that is the method of ruling by means of “Haddad forces” or 

of “Village Associations” (also known as “Village Leagues”): 

local forces under “leaders” completely dissociated from the 

population, not having even any feudal or party structure 

(such as the Phalangists have, for example). The “states” 

proposed by Yinon are “Haddadland” and “Village 

Associations,” and their armed forces will be, no doubt, quite 

similar. In addition, Israeli military superiority in such a 

situation will be much greater than it is even now, so that 

any movement of revolt will be “punished” either by mass 

humiliation as in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, or by 

bombardment and obliteration of cities, as in Lebanon now 

(June 1982), or by both. In order to ensure this, the plan, as 

explained orally, calls for the establishment of Israeli 

garrisons in focal places between the mini states, equipped 

with the necessary mobile destructive forces. In fact, we 

have seen something like this in Haddadland and we will 

almost certainly soon see the first example of this system 

functioning either in South Lebanon or in all Lebanon.
3

It is obvious that the above military assumptions, and the 

whole plan too, depend also on the Arabs continuing to be 

even more divided than they are now, and on the lack of any 

truly progressive mass movement among them. It may be 

that those two conditions will be removed only when the plan 

will be well advanced, with consequences which can not be 

foreseen.
4

Why it is necessary to publish this in Israel?

The reason for publication is the dual nature of the Israeli-

Jewish society: A very great measure of freedom and 

democracy, specially for Jews, combined with expansionism 


and racist discrimination. In such a situation the Israeli-

Jewish elite (for the masses follow the TV and Begin’s 

speeches) has to be persuaded. The first steps in the 

process of persuasion are oral, as indicated above, but a 

time comes in which it becomes inconvenient. Written 

material must be produced for the benefit of the more stupid 

“persuaders” and “explainers” (for example medium-rank 

officers, who are, usually, remarkably stupid). They then 

“learn it,” more or less, and preach to others. It should be 

remarked that Israel, and even the Yishuv from the Twenties, 

has always functioned in this way. I myself well remember 

how (before I was “in opposition”) the necessity of war with 

was explained to me and others a year before the 1956 war, 

and the necessity of conquering “the rest of Western 

Palestine when we will have the opportunity” was explained 

in the years 1965-67.

5
Why is it assumed that there is no special risk from the 

outside in the publication of such plans?

Such risks can come from two sources, so long as the 

principled opposition inside Israel is very weak (a situation 

which may change as a consequence of the war on 

Lebanon) : The Arab World, including the Palestinians, and 

the United States. The Arab World has shown itself so far 

quite incapable of a detailed and rational analysis of Israeli-

Jewish society, and the Palestinians have been, on the 

average, no better than the rest. In such a situation, even 

those who are shouting about the dangers of Israeli 

expansionism (which are real enough) are doing this not 

because of factual and detailed knowledge, but because of 

belief in myth. A good example is the very persistent belief in 

the non-existent writing on the wall of the Knesset of the 

Biblical verse about the Nile and the Euphrates. Another 

example is the persistent, and completely false declarations, 

which were made by some of the most important Arab 

leaders, that the two blue stripes of the Israeli flag symbolize 

the Nile and the Euphrates, while in fact they are taken from 

the stripes of the Jewish praying shawl (Talit). The Israeli 

specialists assume that, on the whole, the Arabs will pay no 

attention to their serious discussions of the future, and the 

Lebanon war has proved them right. So why should they not 

continue with their old methods of persuading other Israelis?



6

In the United States a very similar situation exists, at least 

until now. The more or less serious commentators take their 


information about Israel, and much of their opinions about it, 

from two sources. The first is from articles in the “liberal” 

American press, written almost totally by Jewish admirers of 

Israel who, even if they are critical of some aspects of the 

Israeli state, practice loyally what Stalin used to call “the 

constructive criticism.” (In fact those among them who claim 

also to be “Anti-Stalinist” are in reality more Stalinist than 

Stalin, with Israel being their god which has not yet failed). 

In the framework of such critical worship it must be assumed 

that Israel has always “good intentions” and only “makes 

mistakes,” and therefore such a plan would not be a matter 

for discussion–exactly as the Biblical genocides committed 

by Jews are not mentioned. The other source of information, 

The Jerusalem Post, has similar policies. So long, therefore, 

as the situation exists in which Israel is really a “closed 

society” to the rest of the world, because the world wants to 

close its eyes, the publication and even the beginning of the 

realization of such a plan is realistic and feasible.


Israel Shahak


June 17, 1982 Jerusalem

About the Translator

Israel Shahak is a professor of organic chemistly at Hebrew 

University in Jerusalem and the chairman of the Israeli 

League for Human and Civil Rights. He published The 

Shahak Papers, collections of key articles from the Hebrew 

press, and is the author of numerous articles and books, 

among them Non-Jew in the Jewish State. His latest book is 

Israel’s Global Role: Weapons for Repression, published by 

the AAUG in 1982. Israel Shahak: (1933-2001)

Notes

 1. American Universities Field Staff. Report No.33, 1979. 

According to this research, the population of the world will 

be 6 billion in the year 2000. Today’s world population can 

be broken down as follows: China, 958 million; India, 635 

million; USSR, 261 million; U.S., 218 million Indonesia, 140 

million; Brazil and Japan, 110 million each. According to the 

figures of the U.N. Population Fund for 1980, there will be, in 

2000, 50 cities with a population of over 5 million each. The 

population ofthp;Third World will then be 80% of the world 

population. According to Justin Blackwelder, U.S. Census 

Office chief, the world population will not reach 6 billion 

because of hunger.


 2. Soviet nuclear policy has been well summarized by two 

American Sovietologists: Joseph D. Douglas and Amoretta 

M. Hoeber, Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War, (Stanford, Ca., 

Hoover Inst. Press, 1979). In the Soviet Union tens and 

hundreds of articles and books are published each year 

which detail the Soviet doctrine for nuclear war and there is 

a great deal of documentation translated into English and 

published by the U.S. Air Force,including USAF: Marxism-

Leninism on War and the Army: The Soviet View, Moscow, 

1972; USAF: The Armed Forces ofthe Soviet State. Moscow, 

1975, by Marshal A. Grechko. The basic Soviet approach to 

the matter is presented in the book by Marshal Sokolovski 

published in 1962 in Moscow: Marshal V. D. Sokolovski, 

Military Strategy, Soviet Doctrine and Concepts(New York, 

Praeger, 1963).


 3. A picture of Soviet intentions in various areas of the world 

can be drawn from the book by Douglas and Hoeber, ibid. 

For additional material see: Michael Morgan, “USSR’s 

Minerals as Strategic Weapon in the Future,” Defense and 

Foreign Affairs, Washington, D.C., Dec. 1979.


 4. Admiral of the Fleet Sergei Gorshkov, Sea Power and the 

State, London, 1979. Morgan, loc. cit. General George S. 

Brown (USAF) C-JCS, Statement to the Congress on the 

Defense Posture of the United States For Fiscal Year 1979

p. 103; National Security Council, Review of Non-Fuel 

Mineral Policy, (Washington, D.C. 1979,); Drew Middleton, 

The New York Times, (9/15/79); Time, 9/21/80.


 5. Elie Kedourie, “The End of the Ottoman Empire,” Journal 

of Contemporary History, Vol. 3, No.4, 1968.


 6. Al-Thawra, Syria 12/20/79, Al-Ahram,12/30/79, Al Ba’ath

Syria, 5/6/79. 55% of the Arabs are 20 years old and 

younger, 70% of the Arabs live in Africa, 55% of the Arabs 

under 15 are unemployed, 33% live in urban areas, Oded 

Yinon, “Egypt’s Population Problem,” The Jerusalem 

Quarterly, No. 15, Spring 1980.


 7. E. Kanovsky, “Arab Haves and Have Nots,” The 

Jerusalem Quarterly, No.1, Fall 1976, Al Ba’ath, Syria, 

5/6/79.


 8. In his book, former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin said that 

the Israeli government is in fact responsible for the design of 

American policy in the Middle East, after June ’67, because 

of its own indecisiveness as to the future of the territories 

and the inconsistency in its positions since it established the 

background for Resolution 242 and certainly twelve years 

later for the Camp David agreements and the peace treaty 

with Egypt. According to Rabin, on June 19, 1967, President 

Johnson sent a letter to Prime Minister Eshkol in which he 

did not mention anything about withdrawal from the new 

territories but exactly on the same day the government 

resolved to return territories in exchange for peace. After the 

Arab resolutions in Khartoum (9/1/67) the government 

altered its position but contrary to its decision of June 19, did 

not notify the U.S. of the alteration and the U.S. continued to 

support 242 in the Security Council on the basis of its earlier 

understanding that Israel is prepared to return territories. At 

that point it was already too late to change the U.S. position 

and Israel’s policy. From here the way was opened to peace 

agreements on the basis of 242 as was later agreed upon in 

Camp David. See Yitzhak Rabin. Pinkas Sherut, (Ma’ariv 

1979) pp. 226-227.


 9. Foreign and Defense Committee Chairman Prof. Moshe 

Arens argued in an interview (Ma ‘ariv,10/3/80) that the 

Israeli government failed to prepare an economic plan before 

the Camp David agreements and was itself surprised by the 

cost of the agreements, although already during the 

negotiations it was possible to calculate the heavy price and 

the serious error involved in not having prepared the 

economic grounds for peace.


The former Minister of Treasury, Mr. Yigal Holwitz, stated 

that if it were not for the withdrawal from the oil fields, Israel 

would have a positive balance of payments (9/17/80). That 

same person said two years earlier that the government of 

Israel (from which he withdrew) had placed a noose around 

his neck. He was referring to the Camp David agreements 

(Ha’aretz, 11/3/78). In the course of the whole peace 

negotiations neither an expert nor an economics advisor was 

consulted, and the Prime Minister himself, who lacks 

knowledge and expertise in economics, in a mistaken 

initiative, asked the U.S. to give us a loan rather than a 

grant, due to his wish to maintain our respect and the 

respect of the U.S. towards us. See Ha’aretz1/5/79. 

Jerusalem Post, 9/7/79. Prof Asaf Razin, formerly a senior 

consultant in the Treasury, strongly criticized the conduct of 

the negotiations; Ha’aretz, 5/5/79. Ma’ariv, 9/7/79. As to 

matters concerning the oil fields and Israel’s energy crisis, 

see the interview with Mr. Eitan Eisenberg, a government 

advisor on these matters, Ma’arive Weekly, 12/12/78. The 

Energy Minister, who personally signed the Camp David 

agreements and the evacuation of Sdeh Alma, has since 

emphasized the seriousness of our condition from the point 

of view of oil supplies more than once…see Yediot Ahronot

7/20/79. Energy Minister Modai even admitted that the 

government did not consult him at all on the subject of oil 

during the Camp David and Blair House negotiations. 

Ha’aretz, 8/22/79.


10. Many sources report on the growth of the armaments 

budget in Egypt and on intentions to give the army 

preference in a peace epoch budget over domestic needs for 

which a peace was allegedly obtained. See former Prime 

Minister Mamduh Salam in an interview 12/18/77, Treasury 

Minister Abd El Sayeh in an interview 7/25/78, and the paper 

Al Akhbar, 12/2/78 which clearly stressed that the military 

budget will receive first priority, despite the peace. This is 

what former Prime Minister Mustafa Khalil has stated in his 

cabinet’s programmatic document which was presented to 

Parliament, 11/25/78. See English translation, ICA, FBIS, 

Nov. 27. 1978, pp. D 1-10.


According to these sources, Egypt’s military budget 

increased by 10% between fiscal 1977 and 1978, and the 

process still goes on. A Saudi source divulged that the 

Egyptians plan to increase their militmy budget by 100% in 

the next two years; Ha’aretz, 2/12/79 and Jerusalem Post

1/14/79.


11. Most of the economic estimates threw doubt on Egypt’s 

ability to reconstruct its economy by 1982. See Economic 

Intelligence Unit, 1978 Supplement, “The Arab Republic of 

Egypt”; E. Kanovsky, “Recent Economic Developments in 

the Middle East,” Occasional Papers, The Shiloah Institution, 

June 1977; Kanovsky, “The Egyptian Economy Since the 

Mid-Sixties, The Micro Sectors,” Occasional Papers, June 

1978; Robert McNamara, President of World Bank, as 

reported in Times, London, 1/24/78.


12. See the comparison made by the researeh of the 


Institute for Strategic Studies in London, and research 

camed out in the Center for Strategic Studies of Tel Aviv 

University, as well as the research by the British scientist, 

Denis Champlin, Military Review, Nov. 1979, ISS: The 

Military Balance 1979-1980, CSS; Security Arrangements in 

Sinai…by Brig. Gen. (Res.) A Shalev, No. 3.0 CSS; The 

Military Balance and the Military Options after the Peace 

Treaty with Egypt, by Brig. Gen. (Res.) Y. Raviv, No.4, Dec. 

1978, as well as many press reports including El Hawadeth

London, 3/7/80; El Watan El Arabi, Paris, 12/14/79.


13. As for religious ferment in Egypt and the relations 

between Copts and Moslems see the series of articles 

published in the Kuwaiti paper, El Qabas, 9/15/80. The 

English author Irene Beeson reports on the rift between 

Moslems and Copts, see: Irene Beeson, Guardian, London, 

6/24/80, and Desmond Stewart, Middle East Internmational

London 6/6/80. For other reports see Pamela Ann Smith, 

Guardian, London, 12/24/79; The Christian Science Monitor 

12/27/79 as well as Al Dustour, London, 10/15/79; El Kefah 

El Arabi, 10/15/79.


 14. Arab Press Service, Beirut, 8/6-13/80. The New 

Republic, 8/16/80, Der Spiegel as cited by Ha’aretz, 3/21/80, 

and 4/30-5/5/80; The Economist, 3/22/80; Robert Fisk, 

Times, London, 3/26/80; Ellsworth Jones, Sunday Times

3/30/80.



 15.  J.P.  Peroncell  Hugoz,  Le  Monde,  Paris  4/28/80;  Dr.  

Abbas  Kelidar,  Middle  East  Review,  Summer  1979;

Conflict Studies, ISS, July 1975; Andreas Kolschitter, Der 

Zeit, (Ha’aretz, 9/21/79) Economist Foreign Report, 10/10/79, 

Afro-Asian Affairs, London, July 1979.


 16. Arnold Hottinger, “The Rich Arab States in Trouble,” The 

New York Review of Books, 5/15/80; Arab Press Service

Beirut, 6/25-7/2/80; U.S. News and World Report, 11/5/79 as 

well as El Ahram, 11/9/79; El Nahar El Arabi Wal Duwali

Paris 9/7/79; El Hawadeth, 11/9/79; David Hakham, Monthly 

Review, IDF, Jan.-Feb. 79.


 17. As for Jordan’s policies and problems see El Nahar El 

Arabi Wal Duwali, 4/30/79, 7/2/79; Prof. Elie Kedouri, Ma’ariv 

6/8/79; Prof. Tanter, Davar 7/12/79; A. Safdi, Jerusalem 


Post, 5/31/79; El Watan El Arabi 11/28/79; El Qabas

11/19/79. As for PLO positions see: The resolutions of the 

Fatah Fourth Congress, Damascus, August 1980. The 

Shefa’amr program of the Israeli Arabs was published in 

Ha’aretz, 9/24/80, and by Arab Press Report 6/18/80. For 

facts and figures on immigration of Arabs to Jordan, see 

Amos Ben Vered, Ha’aretz, 2/16/77; Yossef Zuriel, Ma’ariv 

1/12/80. As to the PLO’s position towards Israel see Shlomo 

Gazit, Monthly Review; July 1980; Hani El Hasan in an 

interview, Al Rai Al’Am, Kuwait 4/15/80; Avi Plaskov, “The 

Palestinian Problem,” Survival, ISS, London Jan. Feb. 78; 

David Gutrnann, “The Palestinian Myth,” Commentary, Oct. 

75; Bernard Lewis, “The Palestinians and the PLO,” 

Commentary Jan. 75; Monday Morning, Beirut, 8/18-21/80; 

Journal of Palestine Studies, Winter 1980.


 18. Prof. Yuval Neeman, “Samaria–The Basis for Israel’s 

Security,” Ma’arakhot 272-273, May/June 1980; Ya’akov 

Hasdai, “Peace, the Way and the Right to Know,” Dvar 

Hashavua, 2/23/80. Aharon Yariv, “Strategic Depth–An Israeli 

Perspective,” Ma’arakhot 270-271, October 1979; Yitzhak 

Rabin, “Israel’s Defense Problems in the Eighties,” 

Ma’arakhot October 1979.


 19. Ezra Zohar, In the Regime’s Pliers (Shikmona, 1974); 

Motti Heinrich, Do We have a Chance Israel, Truth Versus 

Legend (Reshafim, 1981).


 20. Henry Kissinger, “The Lessons of the Past,” The 

Washington Review Vol 1, Jan. 1978; Arthur Ross, “OPEC’s 

Challenge to the West,” The Washington Quarterly, Winter, 

1980; Walter Levy, “Oil and the Decline of the West,” Foreign 

Affairs, Summer 1980; Special Report–”Our Armed Forees-

Ready or Not?” U.S. News and World Report 10/10/77; 

Stanley Hoffman, “Reflections on the Present Danger,” The 

New York Review of Books 3/6/80; Time 4/3/80; Leopold 

Lavedez “The illusions of SALT” Commentary Sept. 79; 

Norman Podhoretz, “The Present Danger,” Commentary 

March 1980; Robert Tucker, “Oil and American Power Six 

Years Later,” Commentary Sept. 1979; Norman Podhoretz, 

“The Abandonment of Israel,” Commentary July 1976; Elie 

Kedourie, “Misreading the Middle East,” Commentary July 

1979.

 21. According to figures published by Ya’akov Karoz, Yediot 

Ahronot, 10/17/80, the sum total of anti-Semitic incidents 

recorded in the world in 1979 was double the amount 

recorded in 1978. In Germany, France, and Britain the 

number of anti-Semitic incidents was many times greater in 

that year. In the U.S. as well there has been a sharp 

increase in anti-Semitic incidents which were reported in that 

article. For the new anti-Semitism, see L. Talmon, “The New 

Anti-Semitism,” The New Republic, 9/18/1976; Barbara 

Tuchman, “They poisoned the Wells,”Newsweek 2/3/75.
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