Fateh's Mediocre Conference - Is Change Coming?

By Khalid Amayreh Journalist — Occupied Palestine

Did Abbas destroy Arafat's legacy by holding Fateh's Sixth Convention under the Israeli consent? (Reuters Photo) Despite internal and external obstacles, Fateh, the mainstream faction of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), was able to hold its much-heralded and long-awaited Sixth Convention in Bethlehem, the West Bank. Many in Fateh hail the convention as an important success, given the fact that the movement held its previous general convention in Tunis nearly 20 years ago. A few weeks ago, the group's second highest-ranking leader, Fateh's Secretary-General Farouk Kaddumi dropped a bombshell when he accused Fateh Chief Mahmoud Abbas of having connived with Israel to poison the late PLO leader Yasser Arafat. Abbas called the accusation a "canard" and a "cheap attempt to derail the convening Sixth congress". Moreover, Hamas made good on its threat to bar Fateh delegates in the Gaza Strip from traveling to the West Bank for participating in the Bethlehem conference. The desperate measure was meant to highlight the harsh crackdown on Hamas supporters and members in the West Bank at the hands of American-backed and -funded security agencies. Hence, the fact that the Palestinian Authority (PA) leadership has been able to overcome these obstacles and organize the convention without any major glitches could be viewed as, at least, a public relations victory for Chairman Abbas and his supporters. Nonetheless, many observers in Occupied Palestine view the outcome of the conference as mediocre at best, noting that the conference will eventually be proven more of a festive occasion than a serious policy-making body. Second Coming "Before Bethlehem convention, Abbas was weak and the executive committee was even weaker," contended Al-Masri. Palestinian columnist Hani Al-Masri gives Abbas credit for making sure that the conference did not implode from within. "Undoubtedly this was a success, but it will not solve numerous problems facing the Palestinian people and their enduring just cause," Al-Masri said. Al-Masri opines that the Bethlehem conference has enhanced the standing of Abbas. "Abbas has been strengthened, but so has the executive committee. Before Bethlehem, Abbas was weak and the executive committee was even weaker." Al-Masri believes that "Fateh is now in a better position to affect positive change, like insisting that negotiations with Israel will not be resumed unless there is a total freeze on the expansion of Jewish settlements." The Nablus-based commentator — who is close to the high echelons of Fateh, including many of the newly-elected executive committee members — disagrees with those who opine that reconciliation with Hamas has been rendered harder as a result of the convention. "There are those who claim that the make-up of the new executive committee is inimical to Hamas, but I disagree with this. I think that with the new committee, the chances for genuine reconciliation between Fateh and Hamas are going to be greater than ever before," contended Al-Masri. Platitudes Fateh's platform does not say in unmistakable language that the estimated 5 million refugees would have to be repatriated to their original homes. The Fateh's Sixth Convention published its political program, which basically reasserts the group's political standings on various issues defining the conflict with Israel. It demanded total Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967, including Al-Quds, reasserted the right of the return for millions of Palestinian refugees uprooted from their homes when Israel was created in 1948, and voiced refusal to recognize Israel as a Jewish state. However, the way these traditional standings were reasserted left a certain margin of ambiguity as to Fateh's determination to stick to these long-standing principles, often dubbed as "national basics". For example, the Fateh platform does not say explicitly if the group will accept or reject the concept of "land swap"; whereby the Zionist state would annex major Jewish colonies in the West Bank in return for compensating Palestinians with an undetermined swathe of land in 1948-Palestine (Mandate Palestine). The vagueness here is enforced and vindicated by the reported PA willingness to accept the concept of "land swap" as long as the "compensated land" will be equal in quality and quantity to the annexed ones. Many Palestinians would scoff at the very concept of land swap, arguing that it is extremely difficult to imagine a piece of land anywhere in Occupied Palestine that is equal in quality to usurped land in the vicinity of the Haram Al-Sharif (the Noble Sanctuary) in Al-Quds. The Haram Al-Sharif is the third most sacred Muslim sanctuary in the world, directly after the Sacred Mosque in Makkah and the Prophet's Mosque in Madina. Moreover, the Fateh platform, which was endorsed by the convention, does not say in unmistakable language that the estimated 5 million refugees would have to be repatriated to their original homes and places of residence in what is now Israel. It does mention the words "repatriation and indemnification", and it does not say that the repatriation will have to be to what is now Israel. Israel is adamantly opposed to the return of a significant number of Palestinian refugees to their former towns and villages on the ground that their repatriation would upset "the demographic balance" and seriously undermine the Jewish identity of the Zionist state. Marwan Barghouthi was elected to a leading post in President Mahmoud Abbas's Fatah faction, (Reuters Photo) The Israeli obduracy in this regard, which is squarely inconsistent with international law, had forced the PA leadership to accept vague proposals, according to which only a symbolic return of a few hundred thousands of refugees will happen. In this case, repatriation would be implemented in several decades to ensure that the return would not unsettle the "demographic balance" of Israel. This is why it is enormously likely that the PLO and Fateh leadership will opt to redefine the concept of repatriation and the right of return to include — if not mainly confined to — the return of refugees to a prospective Palestinian state. Interestingly, Abbas in his keynote speech to the conference on August 4, 2009 defended the "merits" of Oslo Accords, saying that "Oslo enabled us to return 300,000 Palestinian refugees to their homeland". In truth, the 300,000 thousand displaced Palestinians returned not to their original homes and villages from which they were driven out in 1948, but rather to the West Bank, where tens of thousands of other refugees have been living in one of the most squalid conditions ever since the Nakba 61 years ago. The Rift with Hamas Fateh cannot resist Israel and enjoys its privileges at the same time. It was noted from the very inception that the convention was more interested in winning the public opinion battle against Hamas than in adopting radicalized positions vis-à-vis Israel. True, a plethora of speeches spoke of Palestinians' right to resort to the armed struggle against Israel. However, it was amply clear that the references to the armed struggle were rhetorical in nature. The reason for that is simple; Fateh cannot resist Israel and enjoys its privileges at the same time. Indeed, Fateh realizes that the very convening of its convention could not have been held without Israeli consent and cooperation. Hence, any serious contemplation of resuming armed struggle by Fateh against Israel would radically redefine and alter the existing equation between Israel; the occupying power, and the Palestinian Authority that is dominated and run by Fateh. Unfortunately, the convention did not seem to reconcile with Hamas, a requirement without which no genuine peace process can be pursued. In fact, some prominent Fateh members were heard threatening Hamas with force if it did not end its rule in Gaza. Luckily, some other Fateh leaders quickly backtracked on this saber-rattling, saying that Fateh would never use physical force to restore Palestinian unity. For example, Rafik Natshe, a former speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council and now the head of Fateh's disciplinary court, told IslamOnline.net, "we only adopt dialog as the only way to resolve differences. The use of force is not Fateh's way to establish national unity." However, Fateh is, as it has always been, a marketplace of ideas, and one can never be sure if Natshe's assurances can be taken for granted. Challenges Some of the powerful committee's new members happen to hold relatively conciliatory stances toward Hamas. It is probably too early to judge Fateh after Bethlehem. The movement seems to have a new shape, having elected 14 new members to its new executive committee. However, some of the newly elected members are of ill repute, having been thoroughly involved in security coordination with Israel against the forces of resistance in Occupied Palestine. Moreover, Fateh itself is only one player at the Palestinian arena, and its ability to affect change is inextricably entwined with Israel's willingness to end the 42-year-old occupation of the West Bank, Al-Quds, and Gaza Strip. What is clear, though, is that the ability of Fateh to achieve its declared goals, with regard to ending the Israeli occupation and establishing statehood, depends on its willingness to reconcile with Hamas. However, this is a task that some of the newly elected executive committee members are not truly keen to achieve, at least for the foreseeable future. However, there is a glimmer of hope. Some of the powerful committee's new members, like Jebril Rajoub, Mahmoud Al-Alul, Marwan Barghouthi, and Abu Maher Ghuneim happen to hold relatively conciliatory stances toward Hamas. This may eventually vindicate the Bethlehem conference. Otherwise, the election of new faces could ultimately prove utterly insignificant if the old policies persisted as many critics suspect they will.

Khalid Amayreh is a journalist living in Palestine. He obtained his MA in journalism from the University of Southern Illinois in 1983. Since the 1990s, Mr. Amayreh has been working and writing for several news outlets among which is Aljazeera.net, Al-Ahram Weekly, Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), and Middle East International. He can be reached through politics.indepth@iolteam.com.