Excluding Hamas has been a failure

Ghassan Khatib

Ismail Haniyeh, the head of the Hamas-run government in Gaza, flies a kite during a walk along the Gaza shore. (Mohamad Al-Ostaz, Maan Images)

One year has passed since Hamas defeated the pro-Fateh security forces in Gaza. Since then there have been few serious attempts to reconcile the rival parties in order to allow the political reunification of the two parts of the Palestinian Authority territories, the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The fighting a year ago came only three months after a Saudi-brokered deal to establish a national unity government that had the full support and consent of other Arab countries including Egypt. The failure of that experience thus discouraged Arab countries from repeating such mediation efforts.

Most of the pressure for reconciliation came from the Palestinian public and civil society including political parties. Israel and the United States intentionally and publicly tried to prevent reconciliation. The feeling among most Palestinians is that Israel is very comfortable with the political division on the Palestinian side and the disintegration of the territory of a potential Palestinian state.

Indeed, Israel physically separated the West Bank from Gaza immediately after it evacuated Gaza of Israeli soldiers and settlers in 2005. That unilateral strategy was about consolidating its occupation of the West Bank while ridding itself of the densely populated Gaza Strip, thus answering Israeli fears over the so-called demographic threat.

Over the past year, we also witnessed a renewal of the political negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis during which Israel left the Palestinian Authority led by Mahmoud Abbas and Fateh with one of two choices: either dialogue and reconciliation with Hamas or negotiations and political process with Israel.

It's only now, when Abbas appears to have reached the conclusion that his negotiations with Israel are heading for deadlock that he made his recent initiative, inviting Hamas to enter into an unconditional dialogue.

It is possible that this is a tactic to put pressure on Israel to be more forthcoming in negotiations. It's also possible that Abbas has concluded that he has been chasing a mirage by negotiating with the Israelis while sacrificing his domestic front. It is possible that the two scenarios are valid at the same time.

Although it is still early days, the situation is reminiscent of that of Yasser Arafat a few years before his death. Arafat was significantly weakened domestically as a result of putting all his eggs in a peace process basket that could not prevent the continued expansion of illegal Jewish settlements. At the last moment, he decided to try to regain the confidence of his public, confidence he had sacrificed chasing the same mirage that Abbas has been chasing.

Even before Hamas' takeover of Gaza, the US had adopted its exclusion policy vis-a-vis the Islamist movement. This policy not only entailed refraining from having contacts with Hamas, the party that won Palestinian elections in 2006, but also entailed putting pressure on others to do the same. Notably, Washington joined Israel in pressuring Abbas not to talk to Hamas. There were clear direct and indirect messages that such a dialogue might jeopardize the different means of financial support the PA depends on.

The American exclusion strategy in Palestine is similar to its exclusion strategy in other parts of the Middle East and has failed. After one year in control of Gaza, Hamas is in direct negotiations with Egypt over borders and indirect negotiations with Israel over a ceasefire and exchange of prisoners. In addition, there is now a good chance of a dialogue between Fateh and Hamas that Egypt is preparing to host.

In fact, the isolation and siege imposed on Hamas in Gaza prevented a domestic dialogue among Palestinians while at the same time allowing all kinds of contacts with Hamas, including by many European countries. The siege has thus neither weakened Hamas nor prevented it from pursuing its armed resistance.

The approach that was adopted by the PA, Israel and the US toward Hamas and Gaza needs to be revised. On the one hand, there has to be some attention to the humanitarian and economic needs of Gazans as an alternative to the sanctions regime that has been harming the population and playing politically into the hands of Hamas.

In parallel, there has to be serious progress in the peace process and a radical change in Israeli behavior in the occupied West Bank so it becomes consistent with Israel's obligations under that process. This, most importantly, must include an end to the settlement expansion policy in the West Bank including occupied East Jerusalem. This is the only way to empower the peace camp in Palestine and reverse the trend of radicalization, thus creating an atmosphere conducive to reunifying the Palestinian territories under the leadership of that peace camp.