General Petraeus: “President Ahmadinejad and other
Iranian leaders promised to end their
support for the special
groups but the nefarious activities of
the Quds Force have continued.”
Senator Joseph Lieberman: “Is it fair to say that the Iranian-backed special
groups are responsible for the murder of hundreds of
American soldiers and thousands of
Iraqi soldiers and civilians?”
General Petraeus: “It certainly is…That is correct.”
General Petraeus testimony to
USA Senate April 8-9, 2008
"The Israeli flag is proudly displayed above the Sacred
Ark alongside the American flag…”( in an orthodox synagogue
in wealthy Georgetown, Washington DC. The entrance fee to
the synagogue is $1000 for a single holiday.) On each Sabbath
the prayers include the benediction for the Israeli Jewish
soldiers and the prayer for the welfare of the Israeli
government and its officials. Many Jewish American
Administration pray there. They not only don’t try to
conceal their religious affiliation, but go to great lengths
to demonstrate their Judaism since it may help their
careers greatly. The enormous Jewish influence in
Washington is not limited to the government. In the
Washingtonian, medias a very significant part of the
most important personages and of the presenters of
the most popular programs on the TV are warm Jews
…and let us not forget,in this context, the Jewish
predominance in the Washingtonian
academic institutions.”- Avinoam Bar-Yosef (the Israeli daily
newspaper)Ma’riv September 2, 1994
(translated by Israel Shahak)Introduction
When President Bush appointed General David Petraeus Commander (
head) of the Multinational Forces in Iraq, his appointment was hailed
by the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal and the Washington
Post as a brilliant decision: A general of impeccable academic and
battlefield credentials and a warrior and counter-insurgency (terrorist)
intellectual. The media and the President, the Republicans and
Democrats in the Senate and Congress, described his appointment as
‘America’s last best hope for salvation in Iraq’. Senator Hilary Clinton
joined the chorus of pro-war politicians in praise and support of
Petraeus’ ‘professionalism and war record’ in Northern Iraq.
In contrast, Admiral William Fallon, his predecessor and former
commander, had called Petraeus’ briefings ‘a piece of
brown-nosing chicken shit’.
In theory and strategy, in pursuit of defeating the Iraqi resistance,
General Petraeus was a disastrous failure, an outcome predictable
form the very nature of his appointment and his flawed wartime
reputation.
In the first instance Petraeus was a political appointment. He was one
of the few high military officials who shared Bush and the Zioncons’
assessment that the ‘war could be won’. Petraeus argued that his
experience in Northern Iraq were replicable throughout the rest of
the country. Moreover Petraeus, unlike most military analysts, was
willing to ignore the heavy costs of multiple prolonged tours of duty
on US troops. Petraeus willingness to ignore the larger costs of
prolonged military engagement in Iraq has weakened the capacity
of the US to sustain its world-wide imperial interests. For Petraeus,
sacrificing the overall cohesion and structure of the US military in
Iraq, the global interests of the empire and the US domestic budget
were worth securing Bush’s appointment as ‘Commander of the Forces
in Iraq’. Shortly after taking office and in the face of massive domestic
, international and Iraq demands for the withdrawal of US troops,
Petraeus took the path dictated by the US and pro Israeli militarists in
the Bush Administration and their powerful ‘Lobby’. He escalated the
war, by calling up more troops, what he euphemistically referred to
as ‘the surge’ – a massive call-up of 40,000 more mission-weary
infantry and marines.
An analysis and critique of the failure of military-driven imperialism
and its militarily dangerous consequences requires an objective
critical analysis of Petraeus’ media-inflated military record prior
to taking command. Equally important Petraeus close ideological
and political linkages with Israel’s militarist approach toward Iran
(and the rest of the Middle East countries opposing it) dates back
to his close collaboration with Israel’s (unofficial) military advisers
and intelligence operatives in Kurdish Northern Iraq.
Petraeus’ Phony Success in Northern Iraq
Petraeus’ vaunted military successes in Northern Iraq – especially
in Nineveh province in Northern Iraq was based on the fact that it is
dominated by the Kurdish warlord tribal leaders and party bosses
eager to carve an independent country. The relative stability of the
region has little or nothing to do with Petraeus’ counter-insurgency
theories or policies and more to do with the high degree of Kurdish
‘independence’ or ‘separatism’ in the region. Put bluntly, the US and
Israeli military and financial backing of Kurdish separatism has
created a de facto independent Kurdish state, one based on the brutal
ethnic purging of large concentrations of Turkmen and Arab citizens.
General Petraeus, by giving license to Kurdish irredentist aspirations
for an ethnically purified ‘Greater Kurdistan’, encroaching on Turkey,
Iran and Syria, secured the loyalty of the Kurdish militias and especially
the deadly Peshmerga ‘special forces’ in eliminating resistance to the
US occupation in Nineveh. Moreover, the Peshmerga has provided the
US with special units to infiltrate the Iraqi resistance groups, and to
provoke intra-communal strife through incidents of terrorism against
the civilian population. In other words, General Petreaus’ ‘success’ in
Northern Iraq is not replicable in the rest of Iraq. In fact his very
success in carving off Kurd-dominated Iraq has heightened hostilities
in the rest of the country and provoked Turkish attacks in the region.
Petraeus: Armchair Strategist
His theory of ‘securing and holding’ territory presumes a highly motivated
and reliable military force capable of withstanding hostility from at least
eighty percent of the colonized population. Petraeus, like Bush and the
Zionist militarists ignore the fact that the morale of US soldiers in Iraq
and those scheduled to be sent to Iraq is very low. The ranks of those
who are seeking a quick exit from military service now include career
soldiers and non-commissioned officers – the backbone of the military
(Financial Times, March 3-4, 2007 p.2) The soldiers being recruited
include convicted felons, mentally unstable young men, uneducated
and impoverished immigrants and professional mercenaries.
Unauthorized absences (AWOLs) have shot up – 14,000 between
2000-2005 (FT ibid). In March 2007, over one thousand active-duty
and reserve soldiers and marines petitioned Congress for a US
withdrawal from Iraq. By April 2008, a record 69% opposed
Bush’s war strategy and economic policy (USA Today, April 22, 2008).
The opposition of retired and active Generals to Bush’s escalation of
troops percolates down the ranks to the ‘grunts’ on the ground,
especially among reservists on active duty whose tours of duty in Iraq
have been repeatedly extended (the ‘backdoor draft’). Demoralizing
prolonged stays or rapid rotation undermines any effort of
‘consolidating ties’ between US and Iraqi officers and certainly
undermines most efforts to win the confidence of the local population.
If the US troops are deeply troubled by the war in Iraq and increasingly
subject to desertion and demoralization, how less reliable is the
Iraqi mercenary army. Iraqis recruited on the basis of hunger and
unemployment (caused by the US war), with kinship, ethnic and
national ties to a free and independent Iraq do not make reliable
soldiers. Every serious expert has concluded that the divisions in
Iraqi society are reflected in the loyalties of the soldiers. The
attempt by Petraeus and US puppet Prime Minister Maliki to
invade Basra in Southern Iraq turned into a military fiasco as
thousands of Iraqi soldiers joined the insurgents.
General Petraeus could not count on his Iraqi troops, because scores
were defecting and perhaps thousands will in the future. An empty
drill field or worse a widespread barracks revolt is a credible scenario.
The continued high casualty rates among US soldiers and Iraqi civilians,
during his 18 months as Commander suggests that ‘holding and
securing’ Baghdad failed to alter the overall situation.
While the addition of 30,000 US troops saturating Baghdad initially
reduced civilian and military casualties there, fighting intensified in
other regions and cities. More important, the decline of violence had
less to do with Petraeus’ ‘surge’ and had more to do with the
temporary political cease-fire reached with the anti-occupation
forces of Muqtada al Sadr. This was clear when the US and its client
Prime Minister Maliki launched an offensive against Sadr’s forces in
March-April 2008 and casualties shot up, and even the US ‘Green
Zone bunker’ came under daily rocket attacks. After 18 months under
Commander Petraeus, the Iraqi troops showed little willingness to
fight their own compatriots engaged in resistance. Thousands
turned their arms over to the anti-colonial popular militias and
several hundreds joined them
Petraeus ‘rule book’ prioritizes “security and task sharing as a means
of empowering civilians and prompting national reconciliation.”
‘Security’ is elusive because what the US Commander considers
‘security’ is the free movement of US troops and collaborators based
on the insecurity of the colonized Iraqi majority. They continue to
subject the civilian Iraqis to arbitrary house-to-house searches,
break-ins and humiliating searches and arrests.
While the death toll of civilians declined from ‘hundreds a day’ to
‘hundreds a week’, it demonstrated Petraeus’ failure to achieve his
most elementary goal. ‘Task Sharing’ as defined by Petraeus and his
officers is a euphemism for Iraqi collaboration in ‘administrating’ his
orders. ‘Sharing’ involves a highly asymmetrical relation of power:
the US orders and the Iraqis comply. Petraeus defines the ‘task’ as
informing on insurgents. The Iraqi population is supposed to provide
‘information’ on their families, friends and compatriots, in other
words betray their own people. The concept sounded more feasible
in his manual than in practice. US troops still are ambushed on a
daily basis and insurgents, operating among the population, bomb
their armored carriers.
‘Empowering civilians’, another prominent concept in Petraeus’ manual,
assumed that those who ‘empower’ give up power to the ‘others’. In
other words, that the US military cedes territory, security, financial
resource management and allocation to a colonized people or to the
local armed forces. During his 18 months in command, it is the
‘empowered’ people who protect and support insurgents and oppose
the US occupation and its puppet regime. In fact what Commander
Petraeus really meant was ‘empowering’ a small minority of civilians
who were willing collaborators of an occupying army. They were
frequently the deadly target of the insurgents. The civilian minority
‘empowered’ by the Petraeus formula requires heavy US military
protection to withstand retaliation. In practice no neighborhood
civilian collaborators have been delegated real power and those who
were delegated authority, are dead, hiding or secretly allied with the
resistance.
Petraeus’ goal of ‘national reconciliation’ has been a total failure. The
Iraqi regime is paralyzed into squabbling sects and warlords.
Reconciliation between warring parties is not on the horizon. What
Petraeus fails to recognize, but even his puppet allies publicly state,
is that US colonization of Iraq is a blatant denial of the conditions for
reconciliation. Commander Petraeus and his army and the dictates of
the Zionist White House play off the warring parties undermining any
negotiation toward ‘conciliation’. Like all preceding colonial
commanders, Petraeus fails to recognize that Iraqi popular sovereignty
is the essential precondition for national reconciliation and stability.
Military imposed ‘reconciliation’ among warring collaborator groups
with no legitimacy among the Iraqi electorate has been a disaster.
Former Clintonite, Sarah Sewall (ex-Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense and Harvard-based ‘foreign affairs expert’) was ecstatic over
Petraeus’ appointment. Yet she claimed the ‘inadequate troop to task
ratio’ would undermine his strategy (Guardian March 6, 2007). The
‘troop to task ratio’ forms the entire basis of Israel and the Zioncon
Democratic Senators’ Hillary Clinton and Charles Schumer’s’ ‘critique’
of Bush’s Iraq policy. Their solution is ‘send more troops’. While
Petraeus did increase the troops with the surge, it is militarily and
politically unable to mobilize 500,000 more to meet Sewall’s ‘troop
to task ratio’. This argument begs the question: Inadequate numbers
of troops reflects the massiveness of popular opposition to the US
occupation. The need to improve the ‘ratio’ (greater number of troops)
is due to the level of mass Iraqi opposition and is directly related to
increasing neighborhood support for the Iraqi resistance. If the
majority of the population and the resistance did not oppose the
imperial armies, then any ratio would be adequate – down to a few
hundred soldiers hanging out in the Green Zone, the US Embassy
or some local brothels.
Petraeus’ prescriptions borrowed heavily from the Vietnam War era,
especially General Creighton Abram’s, ‘Clear and Hold’
counter-insurgency doctrine. Abrams ordered a vast campaign of
chemical warfare spraying of thousands of hectares with the deadly
‘Agent Orange’ to ‘clear’ contested terrain. He approved of the Phoenix
Plan – the systematic assassination of 25,000 village leaders to ‘clear’
out local insurgents. Abrams implemented the program of ‘strategic
hamlets’, the forced re-location of millions of Vietnamese peasants into
concentration camps. In the end Abram’s plans to ‘clear and hold’ failed
because each measure extended and deepened popular hostility and
increased the number of recruits to the Vietnamese national liberation
army. Israel’s brutal occupation policies in the West Bank have followed
the same strategy with equally disastrous results, which doesn’t prevent
its advisers from selling it to the US military.
Petraeus is following the Abrams- Israeli doctrine with the same
disastrous civilian casualties. Large-scale bombing of densely
populated Shia and Sunni neighborhoods has taken place since he
took command. Mass arrests of suspected local leaders accompanied
by the tight military encirclement of entire neighborhoods. Arbitrary,
abusive house-to-house searches turn the poor sectors of Baghdad into
one big shooting gallery and concentration camp. Paraphrasing his
predecessor, General Creighton Abrams, Petraeus wants to ‘destroy
Iraq in order to save it’. In fact his policy is merely punishing the
civilians and deepening the hostility of the population. In contrast,
the insurgents blend into the huge slum neighborhood of Sadr City
population or into the surrounding provinces of Al-Anbar, Diyala, and
Salah and Din. Petraeus was able to ‘hold’ a people hostage with armored
vehicles but he has not been able to rule with guns. The failure of General
Creighton Abrams was not due to the lack of ‘political will’ in the US, as he
complained, but was due to the fact that ‘clearing’ a region of insurgents
is temporary, because the insurgency is founded on its capacity to blend
in with the people and then re-emerge to fight the occupation army.
Petraeus’ fundamental (and false) assumptions are based on the notion
that the ‘people’ and the ‘insurgents’ are two distinct and opposing groups.
He assumed that his ground forces and Iraqi mercenaries could
distinguish and exploit this divergence and ‘clear out’ the insurgents
and ‘hold’ the people. The four-year history of the US invasion,
occupation and imperial war, including his 18 months in command,
provides ample evidence to the contrary. With upward of 170,000
US troops and close to 200,000 Iraqi and over 50,000 foreign
mercenaries, Petraeus has failed to defeat the insurgency. The evidence
points to very strong, extensive and sustained civilian support for the
insurgency. The high ratio of civilian to insurgent killings by the
combined US-mercenary armies suggests that US troops have not
been able to distinguish (nor are interested in the difference) between
civilians and insurgents. Even the puppet government complains of
civilian killings and widespread destruction of popular neighborhoods
by US aerial bombing. The insurgency draws strong support from
extended kin ties, neighborhood friends and neighbors, religious
leaders, nationalists and patriots: these primary, secondary and
tertiary ties bind the insurgency to the population in a way which
can not be replicated by the US military or its puppet politicians.
Early on General Petraeus’ plan to ‘protect and secure the civilian
population’ was a failure. He flooded the streets of Baghdad with
armored vehicles but was quickly forced to acknowledge that the
‘anti-government…forces were regrouping north of the capital’.
Petraeus was condemned to play what Lt. General Robert Gaid
un-poetically called ‘whack-a-mole: Insurgents will be suppressed
in one area only to re-emerge somewhere else’.
General Petraeus made the presumptuous assertion that the Iraqi
civilian population did not know that the ‘special operations’ forces
of the Occupation, which he directed, is responsible for fomenting
much of the ethno-religious conflict. Investigative reporter
Max Fuller in his detailed examination of documents, stressed that
the vast majority of atrocities…attributed to ‘rogue’ Shiite or
Sunni militias “were in fact the work of government-controlled
commandos of ‘special forces’, trained by the Americans, ‘advised’
by Americans and run largely by former CIA agents”
(Chris Floyd ‘Ulster on the Euphrates: The Anglo-American
Dirty War’, www.truthout.org/docs.
2006/021307J.sthml). Petraeus’ attempt to play ‘Good Cop/Bad Cop’
in order to ‘divide and rule’ has been unable to weaken the opposition
and has instead destabilized and fragmented the Maliki regime. While
Petraeus was able to temporarily buy the loyalty of some Northern
Sunni tribal leaders, their dubious loyalties depends on multi-million
dollar weekly payoffs.
In theory Petraeus recognized the broader political context of the war
: “There is no military solution to a problem like that in Iraq, to the
insurgency… In Iraq, military action is necessary to help improve
security…but it is insufficient. There needs to be a political aspect”
(BBC 3/8/2007). Yet the key ‘political aspect’ as he put it, is the
reduction, not escalation, of US troops, the ending of the endless
assaults on civilian neighborhoods, the termination of the special
operations and assassinations designed to foment ethnic-religious
conflict, and above all a timetable to withdraw US troops and dismantl
the chain of US military bases. During his 18 month tenure, Petraeus
increased the number of troops, increased the bombing of the very
people he was supposed to win over and fortified the 102 acres of US
bases. General Petraeus was not willing or in a position to implement or
design the appropriate political context for ending the conflict because
of his blind implementation of the Bush-Zionist ‘war to victory’ policy.
The gap between Petraeus’ ‘theoretical’ discourse on the centrality of
politics and his practice of prioritizing military victory can be
explained by his desire to please the Bush-Zioncons in Washington in
order to advance his own military career (and future political ambitions).
The result was an exceptionally mediocre military performance,
underwritten by dismal political failures and the achievement of his
personal ambitions.
In April 2008, the Bush Administration named Petraeus as head of the
US Central Command, overseeing the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia
and the reast of the Horn of Africa. Petraeus replaced Navy Admiral
William Fallon who was forced to resign his command by the White
House and the Zioncons over his opposition to their war plans against
Iran. Even prior to his retirement Fallon had expressed his contempt for
Petraeus’ shameful truckling to the Zionists in Northern Iraq and the Bush
‘ Know Nothings’ in charge of Iraq and Iran policy planning. It is clear that
Petraeus ensured his promotion on April 16, 2008, through his senate
testimony, one week earlier (April 8-9, 2008) with his bellicose speech
implicating Iran in the fighting deaths of US troops in Iraq. With the purge
and intimidation of military officials not willing to act as White
House/Zionist poodles, Petraeus had few competitors. Petraeus’ promotion
to the top military post, just days after his senate testimony pointing to war
with Iran could not be attributed to his( failed) military performance, but to
his slavish adherence to Bush’s and Israel’s push for heightened
confrontation with Iran. Blaming Iran for his failed military policies served
a double purpose – it covered up his incompetence and it secured the
support of leading Zionist Senators like Joseph Lieberman.
Petraeus reference to the “need to engage in talks with some groups of
insurgents” fell on deaf ears. His proposal was seen by the insurgents as
a continuation of the divide and conquer (or ‘salami’) tactics. The only
‘talks’ Petraeus secured were with tribal leaders who demanded millions
of dollars up front. Otherwise he failed to attract any sector of the
insurgency. Petraeus proved to be an armchair tactician, wise on
public relations ‘techniques’, but mediocre in coming to grips with
the ‘decolonization’ political framework in which tactics might work.
Petraeus Double Discourse
Commander Petraeus was quick to grasp the difficulty of his colonial
mission. Just a month after taking command, he engaged in the same
sophistry and double discourse of any colonial general confronted with
an unwinable war. To keep the flow of funds and troops from Washington
he talked of the “reduction of killings and discontent in Baghdad”,
cleverly omitting the increase of civilian and US deaths elsewhere. He
mentioned ‘a few encouraging signs’ but also admited that it is ‘too early
to discern significant trends’ (Aljazeera 3/8/2007). In other words the
‘encouraging signs’ he expressed to the White House were of no military
importance!
From the beginning Petraeus gave himself an open-ended mission by
extending the time frame to secure Baghdad. He shifted the goal posts
from days and weeks to ‘months’ and years. Playing with indefinite
time frames in which to evaluate his performance , was a coy way to
prepare the US public for prolonged warfare – with few positive
results. There is nothing like a failed general acting as a political
panderer covering his ass in anticipation of military defeat.
As a military intellectual Petraeus surely has read George Orwell’s ‘1984’
because he was so fluent in double-speak. In one breath he spoke of “no
immediate need to request more US troops to be sent to Iraq’, on the
other he called for 30,000 additional troops as part of what he called
‘the surge’. In March 2008, he spoke of big advances in security and
one month later he demanded a ‘pause’ because the puppet regime
and army were not capable of defending themselves without US backing.
Petraeus’ political manipulation of troop numbers and his blatant lies
about the security situation in Iraq prepared the ground for a greater
military escalation in the region. “Right now we do not see other
requests (for troops) looming out there. That’s not to say that some
emerging mission or emerging task will not require that, and if it
does then we will ask for that (my emphasis)” (AlJazeera, 3/8/2006).
First there’s a ‘surge’ then there is an ‘emerging mission’ and suddenly
there are another fifty thousand troops on the ground and in the meat
-grinder that is Iraq, seven battleship and aircraft carriers off the
Persian and Lebanese coasts, thousands more troops in Afghanistan
and $175 billion dollars in military spending added to the 2008
federal budget.
Petraeus Political Ambitions
The General is a fine master of ‘double speak’. Yet despite superb
media performances before his colleagues in the White House and
Congress, Petraeus’ military strategy is doomed to go down the
same road of political-military defeat as his predecessors in Indo-China.
His military police have jailed tens of thousands of civilians and killed
and injured many more. They were interrogated, tortured and perhaps
some were ‘broken’. But many more took their place turning the Green
Zone into a war zone under siege. Petraeus real security policy through
intimidation ‘held’ only as long as the armored cars patrolled each
neighborhood, pointing their cannons at every building. That proved
to be a temporary solution. As soon as the troops moved on, the
insurgents returned. The insurgents re-emerge after a week because
they live and work there, whereas the Marines do not and neither do
the Iraqi collaborators dare. Petraeus ran a costly colonial army,
which suffers endless casualties and, which is not politically sustainable.
Petraeus knows that, so he chose a political route upward and out of
immediate command in Iraq, shifting the burden for failure to his
replacement Lieutenant General Ray Odierno.
General Petraeus realized his long-term political ambitions
exceeded his military abilities. Militarism is a stepping-stone to
a higher post in Washington. Since only winning generals or draft
dodgers are elected President, Petraeus, like McCain, must
present failure as success.
In his Senate testimony of April 8-9, 2008, Petraeus lied to Congress
and the American people about the US military failures, fabricating
accounts of progress, in order to bolster the sagging fortunes of his
political patron, President Bush. His Senate testimony and press
conferences were designed to bolster Bush’s total loss of credibility:
he claimed that the war was being won, Iraq was stabilized, security
and peace were ‘around the corner’ and that we should go to war
with Iran.
If the media uncritically swallowed Petraeus testimony, the public
didn’t and a host of former generals and admirals were chagrined,
embarrassed and outraged that he was advancing his career by
sucking up to President Bush and Israel at the expense of the troops
serving under him.
Petraeus Panders to Israel’s Fifth Column:
The Iran Threat
By the spring of 2008, as the war turned from bad to worse,
as the insurgency grew in power and his leadership and strategy
was transparently a sham, Petraeus played his last formidable political
card. To sustain his position and cover up his defeats in Basra, and his
inability to lower US casualties or even defend the Green Zone, he
blamed Iran. It was Petraeus who charged Iranian weapons were
blowing up US armored carriers; Iranian agents were training the Iraqi
resistance and defeating his army of 200,000 Iraqi collaborators.
Petraeus could not face the fact that he was losing Iraq. He deflected
attention from the failure of his entire military-political strategy in
Iraq by dragging in Iran as a key military player.
In pointing to Iran, Petraeus played the dangerous game of echoing
the Israeli line and providing support for a military attack on Iran
promoted by the leadership of the Major American Jewish
Organizations.
Even while Petraeus was covering up his failure by blaming Iran, the
Iraqi puppet government was praising the Iranian government for
helping to stabilize the country, using its influence on the Shia militias
to hold their fire. Puppet Prime Minister Maliki invited the Iranian
President to Baghdad, signed trade agreements and praised their
co-operation and efforts to stabilize the country.
The only organized group, which took up Petraeus’, campaign to
blame Iran for the US defeats was the Zionist Power Configuration
in the US. In the Congress, media and public forums, Zionists amplified
and backed Petraeus. They see him as a critical ally in countering the
National Intelligence Report absolving Iran of having a program to
develop nuclear weapons. No other high military commander, in
Europe or the US, took up Petraeus call to arms against Iran…except
the Israeli military command. It is a sad commentary on the state of
the US military when generals advance to the highest posts by
flattering and propagandizing for the most discredited American
president in memory and advance the agenda of power brokers for
a foreign power.
General Petraeus, in his advance from Commander of US and ‘allied’ forces
in Iraq to head of the US Central Command overseeing current US wars in
Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia and overseeing future wars with Iran, Lebanon
and Syria, has left behind a bitter legacy of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi
civilian deaths, an unreliable Iraqi ‘quisling’ army, a failed client regime
and a vast US bunker under constant attack. Every military official and
most experts know that he was ‘Bush’s man’ and his advances were very
much a product of the White House and its pro-Israel backers in the
Congress.
Conclusion
The advance of Petraeus is a victory of the Zionist Power Configuration
in its quest for American military leaders willing to pursue Israel’s
agenda of sanctions and war against Iran. That is why the ZPC was a
factor in the ousting of Admiral William Fallon, and why the main
propaganda bulletin (the Daily Alert) of the Presidents of Major
American Jewish Organizations worked for and hailed his promotion
to military overseer of the Middle East wars. AIPAC and their bought
and bonded Senators ensured Petraeus an easy time during his
confirmation hearing and his unanimous endorsement. His appointment
marks the first time that the Zionist Power Configuration has trumped
the views and opinions of the majority of active and retired American
military officers. How far Petraeus will go in ‘paying back’ his debt to
his long-term Zionist backers for his meteoric rise remains to be seen.
What is certain is that they will demand that he line up with the State
of Israel in pushing forth toward a war with Iran.
It is neither military honor, nor patriotism, which will restrain
Petraeus from pursuing the Zionist War for Israel agenda – but
his future presidential ambitions. He will have to calculate
whether a second Middle East war, which will please Israel and
billionaire American (?) Zionist political fundraisers can offset
voter discontent resulting from a war in which the price of oil
will rise to $300 dollars a barrel and cost several tens of
thousands of American casualties, will further his political
ambitions.
The US has degenerated into a sorry state of affairs when its future
course depends on the political calculus of a feckless General, a failed
counter-insurgency ‘expert’ and ambitious politician pandering to
billionaire political contributors working for a foreign colonial power.
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