"Punishing Hamas Has Backfired"

by Gareth Evans


Want leverage? Then engage the Islamist regime.

The policy of isolating Hamas and applying sanctions to Gaza has been a
predictable failure. Violence to both Gazans and Israelis is rising.
Economic conditions are ruinous, generating anger and despair. The
credibility of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas and other
pragmatic forces has been grievously damaged. The peace process is in
tatters.

Meanwhile, Hamas's hold on the Gaza Strip, purportedly the principal target
of the policy, has been strengthened. Since Hamas assumed full control in
June 2007 the already-tight sanctions, imposed following the Islamists'
January 2006 electoral victory, have been tightened further. Israel – upon
which Gazans depend almost entirely for relations with the outside world –
even curtailed cross-border passenger and goods traffic.

Israel has hardly been alone. The West Bank-based Palestinian Authority,
seeking to undermine Hamas's standing, has done its part to cut off Gaza and
prevent the normal functioning of government. Feeble protests aside, the
international community has at best been a model of passivity.

The logic behind the policy was that by putting pressure on Hamas, they
could prevent rocket launches into Israel. This would demonstrate to the
Palestinian people that Hamas could not deliver and ought not be trusted.
The hope was that the West Bank, buoyed by economic growth, a loosening of
Israeli security measures, not to mention a revived peace process, would
serve as an attractive countermodel. But the theory has not delivered on any
of these counts.

Within Gaza the debate about whether the sanctions have helped or hurt
Hamas's efforts to consolidate power is, for all intents and purposes, over.
The Islamist movement has come close to establishing an effective monopoly
on the use of force and a near-monopoly on open political activity. It has
refashioned the legal and legislative systems. And it enjoys freer rein to
shape society through management of the health, education, and religious
sectors.

By boycotting the security, judicial, and other government sectors, the
Palestinian Authority turned an intended punitive measure into an
unintentional gift, creating a vacuum that Hamas has filled. The absence of
any international involvement has meant the absence of leverage. The closure
of the crossings has caused the private sector to collapse, eroding ordinary
citizens' traditional coping mechanisms, increasing their dependence on
those who govern, and weakening a constituency traditionally loyal to the
Palestinian Authority.

Some will argue that the isolation policy is working because Hamas has lost
popularity, which even its leaders acknowledge. But intense public
frustration in the Gaza Strip cannot be the measure of success. Gazans may
not be satisfied with Hamas, but their anger continues to be directed at
Israel and the West, as well as at Fatah, which many see as complicit in the
siege.

As the sanctions hit the most vulnerable, Hamas finds ways to finance its
rule and invokes the siege to justify its more ruthless practices. Growing
poverty and hopelessness are boosting the appeal of jihadi groups,
particularly among Gazans under 16 years old, who make up half the
population.

It's time to stop digging this hole. Maintaining extreme pressure on Hamas
in the hope of undermining its rule or stopping the rockets has gone
nowhere. A new direction is needed – one that attempts to stabilize the
situation by engaging the movement with the immediate goal of reaching a
mutual cease-fire and the opening of Gaza's border crossings.

Of course, Israel has legitimate concerns about a cease-fire, as does the
Palestinian Authority about how a shift of direction would affect its
credibility. Hamas will not accept an end to hostilities if the closures
remain in place. To address these competing interests, the cease-fire should
entail reciprocal commitments to stop all attacks, an opening of the
crossings that recognizes Hamas's role while restoring a Palestinian
Authority presence in Gaza, and a credible international monitoring effort
to prevent arms smuggling from Egypt into Gaza.

While the continuation of the current policy may be easier to envision, so
are its consequences. The status quo is untenable. Israel cannot be expected
to accept rockets targeting its civilians. Hamas will not sit idly by as
Gaza is choked.

If current trends continue, we will see increased attacks against Israeli
towns and cities as well as the resumption of bombings and attacks inside
Israel, like the recent ghastly murder of the eight yeshiva students. Israel
will intensify its military incursions, targeted assassinations, and attacks
on key installations. And the peace process will vanish entirely,
discrediting pragmatic Palestinian leaders. The conflict could then spread
to the West Bank or even Lebanon.

Avoiding that worst-case scenario means sharply changing policy course.
Engaging Hamas may provide the Islamists with greater international
recognition, but acknowledging its role also could mean increasing leverage
on it. As it stands, Hamas has nothing to lose. Not surprisingly, it is
behaving that way.


Gareth Evans is president of the International Crisis Group. It's recent
report on Gaza and Hamas can be found at www.crisisgroup.org