There are enough reasons to believe that the current
escalation between Israel and Hamas in Gaza will continue.
There are also reasons to believe that the two sides are
pursuing both short- and long-term political objectives
for such an escalation.
Separating Gaza from the West Bank, both de facto and
de jure, is one component of the unilateral Israeli
strategy that started with the withdrawal from Gaza.
Israel hopes thereby, among other things, to undermine
Palestinian aspirations to establish a state in all the
occupied Palestinian territory that includes the West
Bank and East Jerusalem.
This plan, however, was interrupted by Hamas' victory
in parliamentary elections in 2006 and then further by
the movement's military takeover of Gaza in 2007.
Israel could not allow Gaza under Hamas control to be
opened to the world through Egypt, because that would
not only increase Hamas' chances of survival but also
allow the Islamist movement to grow in both political
and military strength. Hence, Israel modified its strategy
and decided to impose a full closure on the impoverished
strip to suffocate Hamas as well as the people of Gaza.
It was a very shortsighted tactic. Instead of prompting
resistance to Hamas control, Israel's draconian closure on
Gaza only prompted greater sympathy for the movement
and Gazans in general from the Arab public and internationally.
The pressure it created on life in Gaza finally culminated in
the very public breach of the Gaza-Egypt border in
January that was seen in most quarters as a clear
victory for Hamas. This in turn has now forced another
Israeli rethink, hence Israel is now escalating the situation
in Gaza in preparation for implementing a military solution
to its problem of Hamas control there.
But Hamas, in turn, also cannot live with the status
quo created by Israel and the international community
under which it has been confined to Gaza and has not
been able to live up to the basic expectations its people
have of it and of any Palestinian leadership. The January
23 breach of the border with Egypt was an attempt by
the movement to relieve the pressure on it and Gaza
in general.
This too was a short-term victory. Egypt could not
accept that one of its sovereign borders was forced
open and insisted that the border be resealed and only
opened again under the 2005 Agreement on Movement
and Access between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.
Having succeeded only for a short while to open the
border, Hamas then decided that a military escalation,
by responding strongly to Israeli attacks, would provide
a reasonable way out of the impasse.
With both sides pursuing escalation, a major
confrontation seems all but inevitable. There is much
speculation about the exact scope and nature of such a
confrontation and the level of resistance it will be met with,
but a major Israeli incursion and possibly an attempt at
fully re-occupying the Gaza Strip would seem likely.
Israeli objectives for the current escalation range from
crushing Hamas and ending its control over the Gaza
Strip to deterring any further rocket strikes across the
border. Hamas too has a range of objectives. First, the
movement seeks to be perceived as the main Palestinian
force fighting the Israeli occupation and this way to
establish itself as the counterpart to Israel on the
Palestinian side. This is also an important domestic
objective in light of the fact that Palestinians have
been fighting this illegal Israeli occupation for the
past 41 years, whatever the nature of their leadership.
But another Hamas objective is to avoid a major
confrontation by convincing Israel that getting rid of
the movement is impossible no matter how much force
Israel uses. Hence, for Israel to end the rocket attacks
it has to reach an understanding with Hamas. Hamas
has consistently called for a ceasefire as an alternative
to the ongoing escalation. Its ceasefire proposal, when
looked at carefully, is not very different from the interim
arrangements that the PLO leadership has been trying
to reach with Israel. Hamas is proposing ending
hostilities between the two sides in return for an end to
Israeli control over the West Bank and Gaza and an end
to all settlement expansions. The only difference is that
Hamas does not want this to be an official agreement
but rather an understanding. Furthermore, Hamas does
not want to pursue an end-of-all-claims agreement but
rather a ceasefire for a limited but significant period of
time that, depending on which version one reads,
ranges betwe! en 15 and 30 years.
Hamas has been inspired by Hizballah. Hizballah has
been able to reach some kind of military balance with
Israel that convinced Israel to leave the movement
alone in return for an end to the katyusha attacks.
Hamas is trying to reach a similar balance of deterrence,
and while there is a huge military difference in the
comparative strengths of Hizballah and Hamas, one
factor stands out: If Israel wants to crush Hamas,
the price will include a full and comprehensive
re-occupation of the Gaza Strip, of which Israel already
has very long and bitter experience.
The only alternative to these two scenarios--
a full confrontation or a ceasefire--is if Israel decides
to return to deal with the Palestinians as one central
body and territory. This will require ending the
international and Israeli opposition to the resumption
of the intra-Palestinian dialogue that could be mediated
by Arab governments, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia,
to bring back an arrangement similar to that of the 2007
Mecca agreement . The Mecca agreement installed a
national unity government that was rapidly moving
toward accepting the relevant stipulations of international
legality and the pursuit of a final agreement to the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
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